DISSENT

ARMS AND THE MAN

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A Letter from Paris

APRIL 9

You ask me about Messali Hadj and the MNA. This is an extremely complicated story and I hesitate to take any categoric position.

It would seem that the French government recently thought of using the MNA and Messali as a counterweight to the FLN and that this project took shape just when the Evian negotiations appeared to be set.

In my eyes, and from the French standpoint, the reasons for this are entirely natural and even legitimate. The FLN is tied to the International Communist bloc and includes an internal tendency whose orientation, thought and fundamental political conceptions have nothing in common with democracy and everything in common with Communism of the Moscow variety (Fidel Castro). Under the circumstances, de Gaulle, who has taken a stand in favor of Algerian independence, now seems concerned about the nature of that independence. He is trying to assure the future in terms of French economic interests on the other side of the Mediterranean, in particular the Sahara, and also in terms of resistance to Soviet and Chinese pressure on Africa.

Paris is operating under a double hypothesis: first, that the MNA has a potential mass base in Algeria. This claim does not appear to be false, but it remains to be seen to what extent the militants of an organization tolerated by the French authorities can capitalize upon and organize such a diffuse influence. Further, the Messalists have fought Moscow and the Stalinists for more than 30 years. They are also at odds with Nasser and Moscow's other Arab friends. They therefore represent a guarantee against Soviet influence in North Africa.

It is impossible for me to tell right now to what extent the MNA, even in Algeria, is profiting from the tolerance of the French authorities in order to rebuild its movement, or to what extent it has succeeded in doing this. A source close to the government informs me that this operation has taken on a certain size already, but some degree of bluff and deception in it must be taken into account.

What is certain, however, is that Messali was able to hold a meeting of more than 2,000 of his supporters on the property wheer he is held under house

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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FASHIONABLE FALLACIES ABOUT UNIONS

David Carper

Latest, easiest and cheapest, since it is the least hazardous, intellectual fashion is to dissent against unions.

From Victor Riesel to the upper reaches of the Ford Foundation, an orchestrated carping plucks on the anti-intellectualism of the unions, their bureaucratic rigidity, their lack of militance, and the inferior quality of union leaders, who are compared inferentially with the writing fellows. All this is set against an invocation of a time past, the thirties, when unions were, presumably, none of these things.

Most of the windfill is not so, the historic assumptions are untrue, and the conclusions, when they are made, are mainly misapprehensions. Consider the prevailing fallacies and misconceptions current about unions.

First, the so-called resistance of unions to the thoughts of the thinking men. Actually every verbal expression that comes out of American unions is an illustration of the statement by Lawrence Durrell that history is a fleshing up of a skeleton provided by writers. Union programs, vocabularies, arguments, even the picket sign slogans are tissued layers of fashionable radical cliches deposited in the union mentality by intellectuals over the last six generations.

At the end of the 1920s when Selig Perlman wrote a final proof that industrial workers could not be organized and that it was the genius of the American labor movement to be nonpolitical, his thesis strengthened the convictions of the leaders of the American Federation of Labor long past the time when their own interests should have led them to abandon a judgment which was not only not so, but was, in addition, a senseless self-injury.

Meany before a congressional committee, Reuther before a national conference of social workers, McDonald in negotiations, the president of the retail clerks before his union convention, union lecturers before local union meetings: if they don't quote the social philosophers and scientists from Marx and Engels and Pope Leo XIII to Keyserling, Galbraith and Rostow, they at least parrot them. Norbert Wiener, Veblen, and even C. P. Snow lard practically every union meeting called to order, they oil presentations at bargaining sessions and Congressional hearings, and they grease union briefs submitted in arbitration, over no matter how narrow or technical a grievance, just as they are the messianic lubricants in union newspapers.

The problem is not that union leaders are hostile to intellectuals but that they are too gullible under the spell of non-participating advisors whose glibness is not matched by a

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Journal of the Quarter

NOTES ON THE U.S. POLITICAL ECONOMY

H. Brand

The 1960-61 recession has displayed two contradictory characteristics: it has been the mildest postwar recession when measured in terms of the cutbacks in output, capital investments and inventories, but the worst in terms of unemployment and business failures.

The paradox has its origin in the stabilization policies of the Federal Government. These policies have been concerned with the volume, but not the direction, of the flow of funds going to or emanating from the private sector of the economy. In times of recession, budget deficits have, in effect, swelled the cash holdings of businesses and households. The increased total of unemployment compensation and social security payouts (related to earlier-than-intended retirements) has helped maintain aggregate consumer purchasing power. Easier credit has supplemented budgetary deficits. Acceleration of Government contract awards has also acted as a brake on over-all recessionary trends, and has in large part been responsible for eventual upturns.

The fiscal and monetary policies of the Government have thus far in the postwar period undoubtedly helped in dampening cyclical fluctuations. The business cycle being itself an "aggregate" of a vast series of events, the policies dealing with it, too, have been designed to have "aggregate" effects. But the effects are on events, not institutions. The basic institutions and structure of the capitalist economy are strengthened or, at least, protected by stabilization policies. The latter safeguard and promote the private conduct of economic affairs, including the most crucial element of such conduct, namely, the making of investment decisions. At the same time, they have proved to be quite reconcilable with large-scale unemployment, the ruthless elimination of weaker firms, and the misdirection (from a social point of view) of human labor and natural resources. They do not interfere with the kinds of investments made, the location of industry, or the pace of technological development and of the improvement in productivity. On the contrary, they tend to secure, or "underwrite," the framework within which the decisions affecting these matters are made. They seem socially neutral, but they are

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complementary with the objectives of business as a class.

THE QUESTION now is whether this complementariness of Government stabilization policies and business objectives will remain a stable fact of national life in the United States.

We cannot speculate here as to the location of the present recession in the most recent "long wave" (if such indeed there be) of capitalist development. But it is probably safe to say that the great postwar boom has ended. Overcapacity abounds in most United States industries. Structural unemployment is spreading. Once flourishing areas of the country are now subject to creeping stagnation. Foreign competition is sharpening in domestic and other world markets. In addition, the civilian labor force is growing at one and one-half times the rate which prevailed in the fifties. Prospects of useful jobs opening up at a similar rate are dim. These problems cannot be solved by reliance on stabilization policies. That is one lesson of the 1960-61 slump.

Two major reasons—one economic, the other political—have accounted for the relative moderateness of the decline in output and capital investments characterizing the present recession:

1. The recovery from the 1957-58 recession (which was the most severe of the postwar period) was relatively free from the kind of speculative excesses that had previously marked the capital investment boom and inventory accumulation of the mid-fifties, and had aggravated the 1957-58 downturn. (The wave-like nature of the economic process of capitalism entails roughly similar amplitudes of the upward and downward curve of the cycle.)

Price rises—whose magnitude generally afford a good comparative measure of speculative demand pressures—amounted to 13% between 1955 and 1957 for producer durable equipment, but to only 2% between 1958 and 1960. Non-food wholesale prices rose 7% in the former period, but less than 2% in the latter. Private business investment in plant and machinery sank below its 1954 recession level in 1958. In the 1960 expansion, it failed to recover the peak it had attained in 1957. Inventories were reduced rapidly in 1957-58, but the new high they reached in the summer of 1960 was barely ahead of the old one hit in 1957. The long steel strike in the summer and fall of 1959 distorted the whole pattern of the recovery; it is doubtful whether the output indexes would have been driven up as high as they were without the anticipatory and post-strike inventory movements occasioned by the strike.

Illustrating perhaps most strikingly the weakness in underlying demand is the fact that throughout the 1958-60 recovery, the backlog in new orders for manufacturers' durable equipment remained far below previous levels of the fifties. Recently it has declined to 10-year lows.

The inadequacy of that recovery in terms of absorbing unemployed workers has been amply publicized by the Kennedy administration. Less well known is the fact that the trend in both the number of unemployed as well as in the ratio of unemployment to the civilian labor force has been gradually rising throughout the postwar period. (See the writer's "Poverty in the U. S.," DISSENT, Autumn 1960, p. 346.) It is statistically almost impossible to separate the cyclical from the so-called structural causes of unemployment. But there can be little

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doubt that technological changes together with their cumulative effects on the location of industries and consumption habits have left, and are leaving, many persons stranded. In addition, there have been rapid advances in productivity. The volume of manufacturing output in the U. S. has expanded around 53% in the past 13 years, while the number of man-hours required to produce it has remained virtually unchanged. At the same time, capital investments and organizational innovations in the later fifties have been predominantly labor-saving (cost-cutting) rather than capacity-expanding.

The duration of cyclical expansions has become progressively shorter since 1948, owing to the growth of industrial capacity and the consequent contraction in demand backlogs. Average annual growth in the employment of non-agricultural establishments has slowed from 2.5% in the years 1948-53 to 0.5% in 1957-60.

2. The "political" reasons for the relative moderateness of the current recession when measured in terms of production outweigh in significance the economic ones. In 1957, recessionary tendencies were clearly discernible in the summer; yet, the steps then taken by the Federal Government and the monetary authorities aggravated them. In 1960, a Presidential election year, countermeasures were initiated with alacrity even before some key business indicators had peaked out.

In the earlier period, the budgetary policies of George Humphrey, then Secretary of the Treasury, resulted in cancellations of defense contracts or "stretchouts" in their terms of delivery. This caused widespread lay-offs. In the latter half of 1960, defense orders were stepped up rapidly. Payments to the States from the Federal Highway Trust Fund for road construction were expedited. In 1957, the Federal Reserve Board stubbornly pursued its tight-money policies into the late fall, long after signs of the recession then taking place had multipled. In 1960, credit was eased even before output and employment trends had begun to deteriorate.

•

Defense expenditures are beyond doubt a major prop of American prosperity. But they have "stabilizing" as well as "destabilizing" effects. Changes in armaments technology have probably been at the root of the far-reaching structural dislocations which the economy has undergone since 1953. In the 1953-54 recession, reductions in defense outlays accounted for most of the decline in the Gross National Product (GNP). On the other hand, a 100% increase in defense contract awards during the first half of 1958 provided the key to the subsequent recovery and expansion.

However, increases in defense spending or contracts must draw on funds already appropriated. Expenditures stepped up, say, in the first half of a fiscal year lessen the funds (or obligational authority) available in the second half. This then tends to have a dampening effect on the economy. Theoretically, new appropriations could be made available. But aside from the delay involved, it is simply impractical to subject major public spending programs to the Procrustes bed of countercyclical policies. The more important economic aspect of defense expenditures is their effect upon the *structural* stability of the American economy.

We stated earlier that stabilization policy does not in principle interfere with the conduct of business; it insures

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the social *status quo*. We must now modify this assertion. No stabilization policy would be effective without the great taxing and spending powers of the Federal Government. These are bound, over the longer term at least, to affect the allocation of resources in the U. S., and thus modify the economic structure; and, although business as a class may be the principal beneficiary of stabilization policies, the latter cannot but impose limits upon its freedom.

Federal taxes amounted to around 3% of GNP in 1929. In 1959, they came to 20%. (States and localities, who carry the burden of maintaining the social overhead in the U. S., have barely raised their share of GNP over the last 30 years: it ran to 7.3% in 1929, and to 8.3% of a vastly larger pie in 1959.)

The growth of Federal taxation is inseparable from the growth and permanence of the defense sector. Nearly 60% of Federal budget receipts (amounting to about $79 billion in the current fiscal year) are allocated to the military establishment. Another 10-11% goes for interest on the Federal debt, incurred mainly for World War II financing; and some 6% are spent for veterans' benefits. Three-quarters of the Federal budget, then, pays for past or possible future wars.

Defense absorbs 9-10% of the national product; the capital investment represented by military hard goods and construction equals over one-fifth of total public and private capital investment. The defense sector thus has become the major single outlet for "savings" in the U. S. In this sense, it has become a key, perhaps *the* key stabilizing force in the economy.

BUT WILL IT, can it remain so? Business representatives have, in general, been chary about advocating larger defense expenditures. They have usually favored "economy" in Government spending, regardless of the latter's purpose. The growth of the defense sector has not enhanced the social power of U. S. business, although, of course, the latter has profited nicely from that growth. However, the answer to the above question does not devolve upon the attitude of business alone. The military is no longer a mere junior partner in the councils of business. It has become a political and economic power in its own right.

"From 1950 to 1959," states a report of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, "while the Nation's volume of business expenditures expanded 76.5%, Department of Defense expenditures expanded 246.2%." The military and civilian payroll of the Defense Department amounts to $11 billion annually; it is more than twice that of the auto industry and 1½ times that of the steel companies. In some states, especially Virginia, Texas, California, New York and Massachusetts, military payroll and procurement outlays provide a substantial portion of income.* While only 100 firms account for three-quarters of defense procurement, there are thousands of smaller contractors and subcontractors dependent upon defense business.

For the reasons just detailed, increases in defense spending (or contracting) have the inestimable advantage of acting quickly in well-established areas of the economy in times of recession. They also have the great political advantage of offending no one: they do not compete with any private interests, and do not imperil

*Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply, February 16, 1960.

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"national unity." On the other hand, a growing public non-defense sector would present a serious further challenge to the social power of business, circumscribed as that power already is by the rise of the military.

It is undeniable that serious efforts were made under President Eisenhower's "business" administration to keep defense spending in bounds. It is significant that projections of the Federal budget for 1965 and 1970, made just before the Eisenhower administration left office, foresaw only minor boosts in military outlays, but quite substantial rises for welfare services and other civilian purposes. Budget projections made by the National Planning Association, an organization composed of liberal business, trade union and farmer representatives, include a forecast for a nearly 50% increase (to around $68 billion) in defense spending by 1965.* Such an increase would, if it materialized, bring the U. S. considerably closer to becoming a garrison state than the one contemplated by the conservative Republicans of Mr. Eisenhower's former Budget Bureau.

THE DEMAND for economy in defense spending arises from the same antagonism to a greater role for the Government in the economy as does the resistance to bigger non-defense programs. It is not mere "ideology" which prompts such opposition. For seven post-Civil War decades, American business was master in its own house, its social power unchallenged, its "ethos" popularly accepted and approved. Its historical evolution differs radically from that of its counterparts elsewhere: in Europe, business generally grew under the tutelage of a strong state, and was always confronted by radical opposition from below. Hence, European business has long been reconciled to the state's active role in the economy.

It would seem improbable that unemployment will be permitted to continue to grow and to become chronic, if for no other reason than that the international position in which the U. S. finds itself does not allow it. It also seems unlikely that greater defense spending will become a major means of absorbing the unemployed. It would probably require ever increasing increments of such spending to yield a given number of jobs. This implies a degree of irrationality and, more important, a tax load and an extent of government control which would seem unacceptable to business as a class. (But it might well be acceptable to trade unions, which have a large stake in the defense industries, but which have, with few exceptions, been unable to come forward with creative alternatives.)

American society is pluralistic, true; and this pluralism is reflected in the fragmentation of those sectors where power resides—business, the military, the top layers of the executive branch of government—as well as among other influential but less powerful groups and strata. This pluralism (which is not necessarily tantamount to democracy) makes the American political system a relatively flexible one. One should not underestimate the ability of this system (taken in its widest sense) to adjust to new situations and meet new challenges.

However, there exists beyond question a conservative consensus which is in great measure assured by the business-dominated press and air waves,

Targets for U. S. Economic Growth in the Early Sixties; National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., 1961.

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and the immense financial power of the corporations. This consensus inhibits the system's flexibility; it limits severely the initiative the Kennedy administration can take in expanding public non-defense services, both domestic and foreign. Yet such expansion is not only socially desirable, it has also become an economic necessity. It is the only means through which job opportunities can be increased rationally. But it hinges entirely upon the unpredictable outcome of political struggles yet to be fought.

Detroit Letter

TROUBLE IN AUTO

Frank Marquart

The auto workers are facing serious trouble these days The trouble was dramatized by an incident reported in the *Detroit News* (Feb. 16):

> The UAW's 24-year tenure as spokesman for 550,000 Detroit-area auto workers was challenged today. Ouster of the Union as bargaining agent for employees at the Nine Mile press plant of Chrysler Corp. was demanded in petitions circulated by a rank-and-file committee.

This development is the first of its kind since the United Automobile Workers Union forced General Motors to its knees in 1937—and then won contracts from Chrysler, Ford and the lesser companies. The UAW is taking steps to suppress the rift for fear it might have damaging effects on this year's contract negotiations.

But the real significance of the "rank and file committee" is that it puts into sharp focus the basic problem plaguing auto workers in the Detroit area. A union spokesman at the Nine Mile plant explained how the trouble started: "On February 7 Chrysler announced a transfer of stamping operations from another plant to its Nine Mile plant. The Nine Mile employees feared they would be bumped from their jobs, because of a UAW agreement with Chrysler that when operations are moved to a new location, the employees performing the operations move with the job." The spokesman said some of the Nine Mile men had already been bumped by the follow-the-job-operation employees with greater seniority. "So the Nine Mile workers are greatly worried."

Employees in Chrysler's other Detroit plants are also "greatly worried." They know that thousands of their fellow workers who have been laid off will never again be called back. Those displaced workers are

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the victims of technological and structural changes in the auto industry since the post-war period. In modernizing its plants Chrysler, for many years Detroit's biggest employer, trailed behind General Motors and Ford. Chrysler was still building its cars in obsolete multi-story plants after General Motors and Ford had erected assembly plants tailored to fit automated machinery, in strategic market areas across the country. To survive Chrysler was forced to follow the pattern of decentralization and automation. Chrysler is of course the weakest of the Big Three. But if it can't match GM and Ford in capital investment, it can and does pursue a policy of pitting its workers against the machines of its competitors. Old timers in Chrysler plants insist that speedup is now more intense than at any time since the thirties.

To DECENTRALIZATION, automation and speedup, add the UAW policy of permitting the company to force overtime on its workers when thousands of their fellow workers are unemployed. Taken together, these factors produce results such as were summed up in a *Detroit News* report, January 21, 1960:

> The auto companies will hit peak production this quarter with about 136,000 fewer production workers on their payrolls than they had during the previous record year in 1955. . . . Two principal factors account for the sharp drop in hourly rated employment:
>
> 1—Increased efficiency and a general tightening of production standards—particularly at Chrysler.
>
> 2—The use of overtime—instead of added workers—to increase production. . . .

In addition to technological and structural unemployment, Detroit has more than its share of cyclical unemployment. Latest figures show that 165,000 or 11.7 per cent of Detroit's labor force was jobless in January. Almost as alarming as the January figure is the *rate* of increase in this city's jobless. In October 1960, unemployment was 95,000 or 6.8 per cent of the labor force; in three months unemployment increased by 70,000 or 73.7 per cent.

There are no figures to show how many of the permanently unemployed workers are aware, or unaware, that they will never again be recalled to their jobs. And those who are temporarily unemployed do not know when they will return to work. Those drawing unemployment compensation hope they will be back to work before they exhaust their jobless claims and use up their savings, and are forced to apply for welfare relief. The Detroit welfare load in January 1961 amounted to 12,471 cases—about 55,000 persons. Compare this figure with the average case load of 4,700 for the period 1955–56. This February the Detroit Welfare Department reported 1,350 relief applicants per week for the past six weeks. "We haven't got a man on welfare," the official said, "who wouldn't rather be working than going through what he has to go through to draw his welfare check."

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THE PHYSICAL HARDSHIP of living on welfare is by no means the worst that a displaced worker has to endure. What happens to auto workers who are permanently dropped from a firm for which they worked a long time? This problem was studied in all of its ramifications after the Packard Motor plant closed down in Detroit.* In the section dealing with the psychological impact of unemployment the authors of the study found that responses indicated feelings of helplessness, apathy, pessimism, and personal futility about the future.

The permanently unemployed are not the only ones who feel demoralized in Detroit. Plants which once employed over 15,000 workers are now operating with a labor force of less than 3,000. Parts plants are closing their doors as the big producers fabricate their own parts in order to make their automated equipment pay off. And all the time the large companies continue to decentralize, to automate, to shift their operations in order to get out more production with fewer workers. In this dynamic productive process there is no level at which the labor force becomes stabilized, no level at which those who are still working can feel secure about their jobs. Is it any wonder that workers in the auto plants feel bewildered, frustrated and afraid? Such an atmosphere is hardly conducive to union solidarity. Secondary leaders at the local union level insist that union morale was never so low as it is today.

To make matters worse for the Union, the 1961 negotiations will take place in a year which began with close to a million unsold cars in dealers' stocks. The Union will be in a weak bargaining position and the big corporations will plan their strategy accordingly. Already the Big Three have arrogantly declined invitations from Walter Reuther to attend a union-sponsored "Get America Back to Work" conference. Officials of those corporations dismissed the conference with the cynical remark that the best way to fight unemployment is to sell more cars. Another UAW suggestion was rebuffed after Ford's labor relations vice president, Malcolm Denise, engaged in a debate with UAW's Ford Department director, Ken Bannon, on automation. During the debate Bannon said the union "may feel it necessary to put some restrictions in our contracts as to where management locates new plants." Denise did not reply to this during the debate but later sent a letter to the union snubbing the idea.

UNTIL THE UAW holds its special convention in April to draft its economic demands, any speculation about the major issues that will be raised at the bargaining table would be premature. "No matter what formal demands the convention decides on, there will be teeth behind them. The union's strike fund now containing more than $31,000,000 is expected to grow to $40,000,000 by July." (*Detroit News,* January 29).

To what extent the UAW is prepared to show or use its teeth re-

* *Too Old to Work—Too Young to Retire: A Case Study of a Permanent Plant Shutdown.* Prepared by Harold L. Sheppard, Louis A. Ferman, and Seymour Faber. Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan and Wayne State University, 1960.

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mains to be seen. But one thing is certain: Regardless of what gains the Union wins at the bargaining table, the process which is creating an ever larger new *lumpen proletariat* in the auto centers will continue so long as management's "sole prerogatives" remain intact. Not only tens of thousands of auto workers, but whole communities will pay a terrible price because a few oligopolies command the social power to determine cold bloodedly what is to be produced, how much is to be produced, at what prices the products are to be sold, what plants are to be built and where, what kinds of machines are to be installed, how production operations are to be rationalized, when workers are to be hired, and how many are to be thrown on the industrial scrap heap.

Sooner or later the UAW must do what it has failed to do so far: speak out for the crucial idea that the men who make the autos have a share in determining their fate.

As this issue of DISSENT *goes to press, the first details of the Cuban fiasco are* beginning to leak out. It is technically impossible for us to print a comment now on this matter and any attempt hastily to improvise one would probably be dated before it reached print. But, since the problem is serious, we shall try to arrange, as we did during the Hungarian revolution, for a special abbreviated issue to reach our readers within a short while. Meanwhile, we suggest that the two pieces on Cuba in our Winter 1961 issue bear rereading.—ED.

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We print below the first section of a memorandum prepared by Seymour Melman, an associate professor of Industrial and Management Engineering at Columbia and the editor of Inspection for Disarmament. *Mr. Melman is now at work on a book concerning the problems of disarmament, and the following pages represent a condensed version of part of the argument of that book.*—EDITORS.

ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW DEFEATISM

To: President John F. Kennedy

From: Seymour Melman

A new theory for the international arms race has been invented in the United States. It bears the equivocal tag "arms control."

One might think, from the ordinary meaning of the words, arms control, that this is some form of disarmament: the political-technical process of reversing the increasingly dangerous arms race. Actually, as world wide desire and hope for disarmament mounts, this new, essentially military plan, is being elaborated as a policy alternative to disarmament.

Arms control is a scheme for trying, by agreement, to equalize the major missile or other military capability of the Soviet Union and the United States, with the calculation that this would discourage each side from attacking the other and thus produce a condition of "stabilized deterrence."

1. A plan for "how to live with the bomb," arms control is the newest development in a doctrinal succession that purports to be hard-headed realism, while representing a most defeatist prognosis for American society. Disarmament is feared by many as a policy that would "leave the United States naked." The military strategists of the West have fallen into a deeply despairing estimate of Western political capability.

2. Lacking a competent political theory and a will to challenge the Soviet system by political and economic methods, many American strategists have fallen into a sense of political futility. Conservative political and military analysts have no coherent view on how to cope with the burgeoning Soviet political campaigns in Asia, Africa, and now in South America. If acceptable political methods are not available to these men, then the extension of the Soviet system must in their view be contained by military methods. Arms control is the latest of these military policies of containment.

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3. During the past fifteen years the Soviet economic and political system has shown vigor and dynamism at home and abroad. Its expansion has been sustained even while the United States has had nuclear military monopoly, superiority, and parallel capability.

4. When the main political alternatives for industrial society are set forth, they show at once the political choice that is implied in the preference for disarmament as against arms control and other military plans.

The Soviet claim is that monolithic, authoritarian state control of society is the necessary condition for rapid economic growth. The alternative is that economic and general social development, at speed, are aided by multilateral and democratic decision-making in society and in government.

5. Such alternatives are not perceived by men who themselves are avowedly apolitical or biased against democratic methods. Thus, American conservatives have been unable to represent the democratic alternatives to the Soviet system. One crucial feature of the democratic way is multilateral decision-making. In industrial life, for example, this means the right of workers, and other employees, to form independent organizations, separate from the management and from government, and the use of these organizations as vehicles for their own decision-making, paralleling that of management.

6. Managers of major industrial firms are unable to make a political case for the principle of independent unionization of workers when they themselves participate in a sustained struggle to restrict or even eliminate such unionization. A year ago in Moscow this writer was advised by a visiting American that "now that relations are getting better between Russia and the United States, perhaps we can learn something from them." "What do you mean by that?" I asked. He replied, "Maybe they can teach us how to take care of the unions." The conservative mentality in the United States, which views independent organization by workers, and resulting multilateral decision-making in economic life, as a threat to the power of management, is incapable of proposing precisely that development as a competing and more desirable alternative to the Soviet system of monolithic decision-making.

7. For the young nations this matter is important. Economic development there must take place under conditions of major initiative through government. The Soviets have a theory of how to use government for such decision-making. They proclaim that authoritarian, monolithic methods are necessary and inevitable. The democratic alternative must include the proposition that state initiative is perfectly satisfactory, but that the crucial difference lies in the existence of multilateral decision-making, the right of independent organization, in society, and accompanying democratic methods. The latter conditions afford the basis for political democracy.

8. In order to propose these conditions abroad, however, Americans must explicitly understand their political importance and must be prepared to welcome these conditions at home.

9. American conservatives, because of their inability to do just this, have be-

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come too weak to cope with the problems of political and economic competition with the Soviet system. They have thrown in the sponge. They make a compensatory attempt to undo such political humiliation by emphasis on military power alone. Ironically, what parades as military realism is actually the politics of futility in estimating the competitive chance of democratic society. These men have supported a variety of military doctrines. These include: surprise attack on the enemy; theories of balance of terror; and now—stabilized deterrence (arms control).

10. The military-minded conservatives are driven to reliance on military methods and finally to reliance on military surprise attacks as possible ways of seizing initiative. Logically then, the same policy tendency includes estimates of what would happen to the United States under various forms of World War III. The gruesome statistical estimates of varying millions of casualties prepared by Herman Kahn of the Rand Corporation are the ultimate and logical development of the primary resort to military strategies, and a complete failure of confidence in political ways of competing with the Soviet system.

11. These same men, opponents of controlled disarmament, have no ideas for preventing the spread of nuclear armaments to the smaller countries and to China. They thus reveal themselves as ready to risk exposure of the United States and the West to an uncontrollable situation—including world wars in which the United States could not possibly win and could not escape destruction.

12. The American theorists for the arms race are the defeatists for American society. Theirs is the council of despair for political victory. Their advice now includes World War III and mass suicide for this society. The lectures and writing of Herman Kahn set forth this theory in detail. Their wide dissemination has been a major factor in a political conditioning process: making Americans accustomed to a dehumanized mode of perception of themselves and their fate; making a tidy system out of social catastrophes; making it seem as though there is no way out but that of conservative military strategy.

13. The danger for the United States is that continuing emphasis on the arms race, including its new form, arms control, drives us towards eventual war and towards eventual similarity to the totalitarianism we abhor in the Soviet system. The arms race helps to confer a world victory to the Soviet system: in the economic sphere it does so by default; in the political sphere it hands over victories to totalitarian methods at home in the name of stemming them abroad. Disarmament, by contrast, requires as a precondition explicit coping with political and economic problems and includes within its methods a range of political effects that strengthen freedom in society at home and abroad.

14. The emphasis on military preparation, by its prolific using-up of materials and resources, becomes a cause of inability to accomplish the worldwide task of economic development that could forestall extension of the Soviet system.

15. Warfare has generally served political goals. Military deterrence schemes like arms control, however,

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show no promise of restraining the extension of the Soviet system when political and economic methods are used. A military deadlock is not necessarily a political deadlock. What use is then served by military strategies—which include deterrence as well as plans for "first strike" surprise attacks on the enemy? Formal victory in a major nuclear war would include gross destruction of all the societies involved. In the absence of one triumphant functioning social system, military victory is without political meaning and indeed has no meaning at all.

16. The main available gain from present military strategy is an effort to "destroy communism" and to "get it over with" even at the price of our own destruction. Such a military adventure has merit to those who find unbearable the tension of a military deadlock paralleled by the successful political extension of their system by the Soviets. Such unbearable tension and feelings of helplessness to forestall "humiliating crises" and political defeats through political methods are expressed by the strategists of the arms race in a strong suicidal policy, to destroy the communists even at the cost of their own lives and the life of an entire society. This expression of weakness and implied defeat reveals the sterility of all arms race strategies.

17. The ultimate counsel of political despair by the militarists is expressed in their proposition that, for American society, it is better to be dead than unfree. When this proposition is formulated for the society as a whole, this reflects the casting out of all optimism with regard to a successful political and economic contest versus the Soviets. A military contest to the death with predictable mutual destruction of entire societies is the counsel of these defeatists whose explicit advice is couched in words of military strategy and alleged realism. Theirs is the empty realism of failure and social suicide. Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* is the wrap-up of this sort of thinking.

18. The strategy of disarmament is a polar alternative to these negative prognoses. Disarmament assumes a will to live and a possibility for success in democratic ways of organizing a society both in industrialized and in developing countries. Disarmament involves a process of international commitment and mutual control that would strengthen the capability for operation of democratic institutions.

19. The last ditch opponents of disarmament, with their negative estimate of the efficiency of democratic institutions, oppose even the very first stages of a disarmament process with insistence. This insistence comes directly from what they believe to be true—that democratic institutions cannot compete for allegiance against the Soviet system. Democratic institutions, they feel, are doomed before a Soviet offensive. Therefore, a disarmament strategy that includes opposite assumptions, is, in their view, hopeless from the start. Therefore, they must not let it start. The firmness with which they oppose disarmament is the firmness with which they believe in the weakness of political and economic democracy.

20. The militarists are the defeatists of democratic society. The pro-disarmament strategy assumes the strength of democracy and gives hope to freedom in society.

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THE INSANITY OF REALISM

Robert P. Wolff

History has until now been kind to the school of political theorists who are known, to themselves as well as to others, as the "realists." The ineptitude, Sunday-school moralism, and easy optimism of unskilled diplomats and politicians has served as an easy target for their critical treatises. By the time the Eisenhower years were drawing to a close, they had made sizable reputations for profundity and sagacity, frequently by doing no more than suggest that ambassadors learn the language of their country or the name of its prime minister. Quoting copiously from Churchill, they have developed a style which marked them as sober, solid, sophisticated students of the "immeasurably complex" problems of international affairs.

Just as these years of preparation seemed ready to pay off, with a new President sympathetic to their caveats and critiques, history played a trick on the Realists. It threw up on the world scene a problem unlike those which had bedeviled nations in past years. This problem, making suddenly irrelevant their accumulated lore, was *disarmament.*

The catch-phrases of the new literature on disarmament reveal the novelty of our present situation: War has ceased to be an instrument of policy; the weapons are a source, rather than a reflection, of tension; the unending revolution in technology makes all strategies immediately obsolete; we must all live together or die together.

Now the stock-in-trade of the "political realists" is the long view—backward. Secret diplomacy in the eighteenth century, power politics in the nineteenth century, and the British foreign service in any century, are their standards of excellence in the conduct of present-day affairs. Their favorite gambit is the weary but patient explanation, to some enthusiastic johnny-come-lately, that "a knowledge of the history of negotiations on that point will reveal the impossibility of any significant alteration in the present situation." They like to imagine themselves surrounded by blithefully ignorant optimists who impute to the Russians (or the Germans or the Japanese) absurdly humane motives. Then they can lower their voices to an impressive rumble, fix the poor fool with an avuncular eye, and explain the facts of life. It helps to have a German accent.

But, unfortunately for the Realist, there is no history of nineteenth-century negotiations on nuclear weapons. Nor are there experts on the subject, unless we so classify the physicists and engineers who invented them. The hard-won maxims of generations of conference tables is worse than useless to the Realist—it is a liability. He has learned that "war is always with

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us, and must be used as an instrument of policy." But the most hopeful prediction that he can wring from the scientists is the possibility that we might survive one more war—not even the Realists can bear to think about a war after that! He has learned, too, that "we arm to parlay." Yet what if the parlay is about—disarmament? The world has changed out of all recognition, and the Realist, seeing it still through the eyes of yesterday, has suddenly become an unrealist. His expertise no longer applicable, he salvages his sole remaining possession: the pose. If he cannot be wise, he can still look wise. He can still plead for a "recognition of complexity."

BUT THE PROBLEM REMAINS, on which side of this new issue shall the realist throw his weight? Here we encounter one of those curious paradoxes which from time to time enliven the political scene. The Realists have chosen to cast their lot with a new breed of brisk, futuristic, thermonuclear men — the game-theory strategists. Secret diplomacy meets science fiction as Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn join hands beneath a banner inscribed with the device of their legion: *Stabilized Deterrence.*

According to this theory, the instability of modern weapons systems is the principal threat to peace. The ever-decreasing reaction time of our defenses makes hair-trigger responses and dispersed authority inevitable. From SAC airplanes with a transit time of several hours, we have progressed to missiles which take barely thirty minutes for their deadly flight. In that short time, the decision must be made whether unidentified blips on a radar set are enemy missiles—or geese. The danger always exists of a self-confirming prophecy, that nightmarish situation in which one nation launches its deterrent in the mistaken belief that it is being attacked, and thereby provokes the very response feared. An Air Force general with poor judgment, a Polaris submarine commander who has gone mad, a miscalculated bluff, can all touch off an unwanted nuclear holocaust.

The solution offered is to take steps to stabilize this balance of terror, while not reducing the ability of either nation to destroy the other. Polaris submarines, it is urged, will free us of the necessity to respond instantly, for hidden under the water they can deliver their deadly cargo even after the United States has ceased to exist. Minuteman missiles, shunting endlessly back and forth on the tracks once occupied by the New Haven and other dying railroads, will elude the warheads which destroy our cities.

Direct telephone lines must be opened between Washington and Moscow, so that should an American missile accidentally take off for a Russian city, President Kennedy can quickly assure Mr. Khrushchev that it is "all a mistake." (Such a plan, of course, requires that both men be always within ten-minute call. One can imagine the fate of nations suspended while an aide hurries through the White House, searching for the President who has just slipped out to visit a friend.) Rules are to be worked out determining which weapons may, and which may not, be used in a "limited war."

The effect of these measures, we are told, is to reduce below the danger point the probability of accidental war, while allowing us to retain the military might on which our policies are founded. Here we see, finally, the attraction of the theory for the political realist. With some technical ad-

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justments and safeguards, the threat of annihilation is removed, and the business of international affairs can go on as usual. Since the limited wars of the nuclear age are fought with the weapons of previous wars, the Realist can feel perfectly at home with them, secure in the knowledge that the *status quo* is preserved by the existence of the stabilized deterrent.

THE SCHEMES for stabilization all involve an assumption of awesome self-control and delicate calculation on the part of the men whose hands hover unceasingly over the buttons. Indeed, a student of Max Weber might find here a "rationality" to challenge Benjamin Franklin's double-entry account of virtues and vices. The counters are human lives and the hell which awaits us is here on earth, but there is the same mathematical calculation of damnation. Young men, clean-shaven and smiling, stand their watches at the control center. This one casually holds Moscow in his hands, that one Leningrad. One hundred million men and women, half a world away, rise and work and sleep again, while the lads who have spared their lives go off to a movie.

The mark of a sane man is that he sees the world as it really is, and adjusts to it when it changes. The insane man, by contrast, clings to comforting beliefs, ignoring contrary evidence and postulating ever more improbable conditions in order to protect his image of his surroundings. Now the realist prides himself on his unblinking acceptance of the real world of international affairs. No ideology, bias, or unfounded optimism clouds his vision, we are told. But in the past several years the Realists have gone progressively "insane," for as the world has changed, their view of it has remained unaltered. The distinguishing features of the new thermonuclear age are, first, the overwhelming destructiveness of weaponry, and second, its unending technological revolution. These unprecedented developments, in particular the second, make the policy of Stabilized Deterrence absurd and irrelevant. In the past fifteen years alone there have been three complete revolutions in the nature of our weapons: first the original fission bombs, then the one-thousand times more powerful fusion (hydrogen) bombs, and most recently the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Technological innovation has become so standardized that one can even assert as a general law that an entirely new weapon system will appear every four to five years. Indeed, one might add a second law that as the first operational model of a weapon comes off the assembly line, the prototype of a device to counteract it is on the drawing boards. Polaris submarines stimulate anti-submarine research, the missile engenders the anti-missile missile. Thus the deterrent which is stable in one phase of the arms race may become unstable in the next. With each successive development, the destructive force grows greater, and the tension increases. Herman Kahn, taking what he considers a long view of future problems, tries to calculate ways of living until 1970. No one is prepared even to speculate on the possibility of seeing 1980.

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GOING UNDERGROUND IN MASSACHUSETTS

Stephan Thernstrom

To "preserve free government" through war and peace alike, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has decided to go underground. Its legislators have determined to become pioneers of the nuclear age by approving construction of America's first emergency underground shelter for state government.

Shelter plans, which date back to 1955, were conceived with maximum haste, minimum debate, and little thought. $1,069,000, to be matched with federal funds, was appropriated then, as part of the annual state construction boondoggle. The wheels of Massachusetts government, however, grind exceedingly slow. Bids for shelter construction didn't open until February 15, 1961. Digging is to begin in the Spring, and the impregnable shelter supposedly will be ready "in a few months." The chosen spot is in Framingham, some twenty miles from the State House on Beacon Hill. Three hundred persons can be given an umbrella of six feet of dirt and four feet of reinforced concrete for a mere two million-odd dollars. And the select three hundred? These are to be "working delegations of the three branches of state government," and the entire state civil defense staff.

If Senators and Representatives actually *read* the bills they vote for, we might expect some querulous voices to be raised. Legislators have been observed to demonstrate normal human concern about saving their own skin, and the problem of the composition of the "working delegations" eligible for salvation should have given the politicos pause. An even less subtle cause for alarm exists. Framingham is a full half hour's drive from Beacon Hill in light traffic. Since our schizophrenic civil defense program alternates between shelter and evacuation plans, between telling us to run and telling us to hide, we may be certain that millions *will run* when the sirens scream, and that the resulting traffic jam will make twenty miles seem two hundred. The Framingham location was chosen in the technologically primitive early fifties, when warning time was measured in hours rather than minutes. In the ICBM age, working legislators will likely have only the gilt on the Capitol dome to interpose between themselves and a twenty megaton warhead, not an assuring ten feet of earth and concrete.

If any of the Commonwealth's elected officials brooded darkly on these difficulties, they resisted all temptation to let the electorate in on the secret. Hardly anyone had even heard of the Framingham project when, on February 8, ninety people from Boston SANE appeared at the State House for an anti-shelter demonstration. A long picket line formed

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along Beacon Street, and curious passers-by were given a protest leaflet. A second demonstration brought out 135 marchers, again mostly students. Press, radio, and television coverage was good, and a sharp detailed critique of the shelter plans was dispatched by SANE to every member of the legislature. Liberal Democrats, and a few Republicans with a keen eye for a wasted dollar, have sponsored a repeal bill.

IT MAY BE too late. Some iron law of democratic inertia may be in operation—if it takes six years to get a ludicrous project underway, it may take another six to stop it. What has been encouraging is the marked lack of coolness under fire displayed by civil defense officials in recent weeks. If anything will strengthen the "widespread public resentment" against the "grand illusion" of civil defense which U. S. Senator Stephen Young sees rapidly growing in the country today, it will be effective publicity of the ideas of the civil defense establishment.

Consider the helicopter incident. When it was first pointed out that legislators would never be able to reach the hole in the ground at Framingham under conditions of nuclear attack, the CDA was somewhat taken aback. Soon, however, a "solution" was proposed: a kind of Boston Airlift was to be devised. A few dozen helicopters would be kept on hand at the State House (perhaps the flock might hover over the gold dome to amuse the tourists), ready to whisk those fortunate "working delegations" away to safety. Helicopters, it appeared on investigation, were not so cheap. And what about their crews? A score or two of the politicians, it seemed, would have to give up their places in the shelter for them, else the pilots might take off for the northern woods at the first alarm.

So again the problem of numbers intruded itself. However tidy and ingenious the plans for the shelter, only 300 people can be crammed into it. *Who will choose* the elect from the damned? Shall the two parties be equally represented, or in proportion to their strength at the last election? Are Senators worth more than Representatives? An Associate Justice of the State Supreme Court more than the State Highway Commissioner? Even if legislators, judges, administrators and helicopter pilots can work out an acceptable order of priority, other difficulties remain. The fact that the shelter will be located next to the State Police Barracks in Framingham calls to mind a vision of 80 cops with revolvers politely requesting admission and unwilling to entertain a sweetly reasonable "no vacancies" in reply. Shortly behind them would follow hundreds of panic-stricken local citizens, who could only be persuaded away from the shelter entrance with machine guns. Had the Founding Fathers been clairvoyant, they might have propounded the self-evident truth that all men have an equal right to protection from incineration; perhaps the last democratic demand to be made in the land of liberty will be the cry "WE WANT IN."

MR. HERMAN KAHN of the Rand Corporation believes that democracy can survive a thermonuclear war (if it follows his advice), and this is the official theory of the civil defense establishment. In private conversation, however, the bureaucrats are more candid. One Massachusetts CDA official has reportedly conceded that there won't be any helicopters at all, and

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that in the event of attack no one *cares* what happens to the Governor, much less the representative from the 23rd district. The formal title of the shelter is to be the "State Control Center and Alternate Site of State Government." What this label gracefully obscures is the fact that the state government to occupy the alternate site will be a new government—a military government by civil defense officials. Thirty-four members of the CDA staff will spend their working days in the shelter—anyone else who happens to get in will have no influence on decision-making.

This should come as a shock to trusting state legislators. For the rest of us it hardly matters, since we'll be dead anyway. The people in the shelter, for that matter, may be dead as well. The Massachusetts CDA, at last report, had a dangerously foggy notion of what twenty megatons could do to Boston. It seems never to have worried about the threat of massive firestorms described vividly in Harrison Brown's *Community of Fear.* Such a storm would rage for a minimum of 25 miles from the point of explosion, making the whole area a vast sea of flame. The proposed shelter is equipped with neither a built-in oxygen supply nor a cooling system. But again, who cares? Herman Kahn's answer is wrong, but he asks the right question: *Will the survivors envy the dead?*

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THE BRAVE NEW WORLD FOR SCIENTISTS

Edward Speyer

All the benefits mankind may some day gain from atomic energy and space travel cannot hide the fact that the main reason science has recently been catapulted into importance is its ability to advance the technology of warfare. From a self-directed discipline followed by a small and quiet fraternity, science became an indispensable part of the military services during the war years.

Scientists are not bribed to work on weapons research; their laboratories have simply become dependent on defense funds. The majority of jobs in science today are subsidized, directly or indirectly, by military agencies, so that if any considerable number of scientists were to refuse further military work, their alternative would not be to return to non-military research, but to leave scientific work.* They would thus set themselves off from their colleagues and from society at large, for it is more respectable to accept the new state of affairs than to resist it.

The Cold War raises fundamental questions for scientists: is the present weapons research program a means of strengthening democratic forces, or at least of holding off totalitarianism? Since the survival of civilization itself is at stake, is not opposition to, or abstention from, the defense effort hopelessly idealistic? Is not support of weapons research politically and morally the lesser evil? Isn't the only alternative a purely personal attempt to escape responsibility for the evil of war?

As though these questions are not difficult enough for anyone,

* To give a few examples: the study of transmission of radiant energy through the atmosphere is heavily subsidized by the Air Force, not because of its importance in weather studies but in order to protect "aircraft from the thermal radiations generated by atomic and nuclear weapon detonations," e. g., how American planes can "deliver" atomic bombs without being cooked in their own fireballs. Weather studies themselves, especially possible weather modifications, are considered as military strategies, e. g., in terms of starving or freezing an enemy country. Oceanography, a poorly subsidized science until recently, is now receiving largesse in the interests of submarines carrying the Polaris missile, etc.

Examples are just as plentiful in other directions: considerably more than half the papers published in *Physical Review*, the biggest and probably the most respected physics journal in the world, are credited (usually in a footnote) with being subsidized by either a military agency or a semi-military agency like the Atomic Energy Commission. Similar figures apply to the papers presented at the annual scientific meetings. At the February 1961 meeting of the American Physical Society, such military-supported papers constituted more than 55% of the total. *Fortune*, in an editorial in February 1961, asserts that the military now controls "some 80% of all U. S. funds for research and development."

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scientists are burdened with a special, additional difficulty: they are, by tradition and training, averse to letting political considerations interfere with scientific work (which is not at all to say that scientists were or are uninterested in politics). As Oppenheimer put it, "...when you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success." Science, like any other healthy discipline, has progressed through the efforts of eager and bold men. The only limits and denials accepted have been those imposed by the scientific problems themselves.

The questions asked above can only be answered from a standpoint which unites, rather than separates, the ideals of science and of social welfare. What such a unification involves is illustrated by the atom bomb. The story of the Manhattan Project contains in dramatic form much of the larger story of how scientists became transformed into pawns of power politics.

I. *Why Did They Work to Create the Atom Bomb?*

Although work on the atomic bomb was carried on in several widely separated localities, only in the Metallurgical Laboratory (a code name) in Chicago did the scientists hold organized discussions on the larger issues raised by the new weapons-to-be, and only among the Chicago scientists did energetic protest arise against the planned dropping of bombs on Japanese cities.

The Franck Report was the political climax of the protest movement among scientists. It was a clear, forceful presentation of the political and military considerations for demonstrating the atomic bomb to the world before being used in warfare. It warned of the increasing difficulty of outlawing atomic weapons, of the effect on America's moral and political prestige, of the need for American and British public participation in the fateful decision. Although formulated at the very outset of the atomic age, these and other ideas were discussed with greater insight than has generally been achieved in the thousands of articles written after the warnings and predictions proved accurate.

Signed by three physicists, three chemists, and a biologist, the Report was submitted to Secretary of War Stimson in June, 1945 (after the Nazi surrender but before the first bomb was tested in the New Mexico desert). Both Stimson and the official Advisory Panel of scientists (which included none of the signers of the Report) disagreed with its main conclusions. The protest did not cause even a delay in the frantic effort to "deliver" the bomb at the earliest possible date. As Churchill wrote in *Triumph and Tragedy:*

> . . . to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world . . . by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance. . . . The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the after-time, that the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue.

The Franck Report was a credit to the moral character of those who

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initiated and supported it, but it was doomed to failure. The scientists were naive about the political beliefs of their employers, and, as is still true today, in ignorance of the degree to which they, the scientists, are the pawns of the High Brass. As for the scientists' belief about their own motivation, the Franck Report states that "the main motivation of the initiative which American scientists took in urging the development of nuclear power for military purposes . . . the compelling reason for creating this weapon with such speed was our fear that Germany had the technical skill necessary to develop such a weapon and that the German government had no moral restraint regarding its use." There is no doubt that the scientists *believed* this to be their main motivation, but this explanation raises a number of difficult questions:

1. Why, after Germany surrendered and the threat of an enemy getting the Bomb had evaporated, was there no move, no protest, no thought even (apparently) of halting the development of the Bomb? If the main cause of the frantic effort had disappeared, why was there no reflection of this fact within the Project?

2. Why, even before the German surrender, did the question of whether or not the Nazis were developing atomic weapons cease to have decisive importance for the scientists? Nobody asked, for example, as military intelligence continued to find no German counterpart to the Manhattan Project, "If the Germans aren't working on an atomic bomb, why should we?"

3. Why were the scientists willing to work on the Manhattan Project without any commitments, declarations of policy, or whatever, as to the use of the Bomb by their employers? It was one thing to join the war effort to defeat Hitler, and another to give carte blanche to the military and political leaders who were running the war.

4. The Franck Report was a belated attempt to get a declaration of atomic policy. Why then, when the Franck Report was summarily rejected, did no one resign from the Project?

5. After Hiroshima, and after the even more inexcusable Nagasaki, why were there no protests and resignations? To this day, the atomic scientists have not publicly denounced the use of the weapon with "no moral restraint" which *our* side showed the world. Nor have scientists refused to continue developing "ultimate" weapons.

THE ANSWER to all of these questions lies in realizing that the atomic bomb was developed for the same reasons that chemical and bacteriological weapons were, and still are, being developed. The particular fears of the particular scientists on the particular project had nothing to do with the course of events once the project was started. The scientists had their private motivations, but they were hired to develop weapons against which there would be no practical defense, just as the missile scientists are today. Scientists who work on such weapons for reasons of their own ignore the extent to which they are captives of the war apparatus.

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The anti-Nazi idealism of the atomic scientists was very far from influencing the use of the Bomb. The chief reason that a third atomic bomb was not dropped on Japan is evidence of this: no more atomic bombs were ready at that time. Four Japanese cities had been designated as targets in Truman's military order. This shortage of bombs was also used as an argument against a demonstration on some desert island: if the demonstration failed to impress the Japanese sufficiently—the scientists themselves grossly underestimated the Bomb's power—instead of a "rain of death" the Americans would be able to wipe out only *one* Japanese city. Another discussion, apparently, involved the idea of first detonating some aerial fireworks, so that the Japanese would be looking upward when the atomic bomb exploded, and would be blinded. Such discussions were held among the colleagues of the men who, at the beginning of the war, had been terrified that the *Germans* might develop the Bomb without "moral restraint regarding its use."

Still, quite a few scientists *did* protest the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan. Why then were the eminent scientists who wrote and supported the Franck Report of different opinion than the eminent scientists on the official Advisory Panel? Why was Einstein out of it altogether? There is a story of an American reporter who was told by a German civilian in 1945 that the atrocities in the German concentration camps were not due to the policies of the Nazi regime, but only to the sadistic guards. Retorted the American: "And what kind of men did you expect to attract to jobs like that?" An historical task seems to rally to itself the kind of people who are capable of performing it.

But suppose the Advisory Panel *had* supported the Franck Report. What would have happened if they *had* taken a strong stand against dropping the A-bombs on Japan? We can do better than guess because the situation was repeated, as far as political situations ever are repeated, a few years later when a similar official Advisory Board unanimously opposed a development project to try to build a hydrogen bomb. There ensued then no struggle or long debate—the politicians simply found other scientists who disagreed, and took the latter's advice. Equally illuminating is the turnabout of these *same* (anti-H-bomb) scientists when some time later, a "technically sweet" way of making the H-bomb was discovered.

It is easy to "explain" the behavior of weapons scientists as a failure of nerve, or character, or morality. But moral arguments miss the mark because the primary errors of judgment and fact are political. Morally, one cannot go much further than to insist that everyone is responsible for the likely consequences of his work, and to point out the contradiction between dedication to the ideal of a better world through science and the practical goal of more widespread death through science.

II. *The Post-War "Struggle"*

A. *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*

The Federation of American Scientists and its *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* arose directly from the ashes of the Franck Report, but

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never reached the level of the original effort. The *Bulletin* is a liberal monthly magazine, comparable in political outlook to the *Reporter* or the *New Republic*. It has an average circulation of 18,000, and its directors and sponsors include many of the best known names in American science. Its articles deal with fallout, civil defense, deterrence, population problems, criticism of State Department travel restrictions, nuclear reactors, training of scientists, artificial satellites, etc. It has carried employment ads for scientists which state "U. S. citizenship required," i.e., ads for classified military work.

The *Bulletin* crusades for (a) the right of the public to know the truth about atomic weapons (as though what is already well-known of their long-term and short-term destructiveness were not enough), and (b) the need for scientists to influence national military policy. When the *Bulletin* first appeared in 1945, it campaigned for a liberal policy on international atomic energy control; today its policies are so moderate, even conservative, that it refutes its own purpose, viz., one can see that if the supporters of the *Bulletin* were given a decisive voice, little would change in American policy.

The following excerpt from an official statement, printed in the *Bulletin,* March 1958, is illustrative:

> The FAS has previously advocated an initial test ban agreement limited to weapons of such a size that testing could be detected by monitoring sites outside the territorial limits of the nuclear powers. In view of the increasingly positive attitude of the major powers toward at least limited mutual inspection, it now seems practicable to proceed directly to a test ban including even the smaller nuclear weapons. Techniques currently available. . . .

The *Bulletin* limits its horizons to what "now seems practicable" to everyone. They are thus one step behind even the official diplomats.

B. *Society for Social Responsibility in Science*

The purpose of the SSRS, according to its constitution, is "to foster throughout the world a functioning cooperative tradition of personal moral responsibility for the consequences for humanity of professional activity, with emphasis on constructive alternatives to militarism: . . . to embody in this tradition the principle that the individual must abstain from destructive work and devote himself to constructive work, drawing the line between the two according to his own moral judgment. . ." The SSRS publishes a four-page offset monthly *Newsletter*. The most active among a membership of about 500 are largely Quakers, and shy of political action; even the proposal of a Hippocratic Oath for scientists is opposed by many members on the grounds that they are opposed to taking oaths. Although it is an organization of scientists and engineers (non-scientists are not allowed to join), the real raison d'etre of the SSRS is not discontent among scientists. It represents in fact a force from outside the scientific community —the Society of Friends—who are somewhat like Marxists in the trade unions. Nonetheless, its insistence that scientists should themselves clas-

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sify projects from the political or moral point of view, instead of leaving classification entirely to the military, reflects a sense of dignity which most scientists have not shared.

In common with much of the pacifist movement, the SSRS sees the misuse of science as a primarily personal problem. Its members do not face up to the disappearance of "constructive alternatives to militarism," to the fact that today the large majority of scientists are paid, directly or indirectly, by governmental agencies. The SSRS raises no questions as to the causes of the decline of the scientific conscience (just as the Women's Christian Temperance Union sees no reason to investigate the social or psychological roots of alcoholism); it therefore is blind to the inadequacy of opposing a powerful trend with moral exhortation. The outlook of the SSRS is not that of scientists in protest, nor of citizens engaged in stemming a tide, nor yet of political thinkers feeling their way, but that of an inward-facing sect.

C. *The Pugwash Conferences*

Six international non-governmental political conferences of scientists have been held, attended by scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Bertrand Russell has been a leading organizer, and Cyrus Eaton, a retired millionaire, has subsidized the conferences. The conferences have discussed, and issued statements on, such problems as nuclear disarmament, inspection and control, and the need for negotiations between the two Power Blocs.

Pugwash participants present no political perspectives of their own. They do not stray far from the "line" of their own countries' politicians. The declarations are thus, of necessity, carefully limited to ambiguous generalities, which give definitive evidence of failure since the underlying idea of the conferences is that scientists should be able to make *better* progress in discussing controversial issues than politicians or diplomats. For example, the most strongly worded section ("The Responsibility of Scientists") of the declaration issued at Vienna in September 1958, never gets beyond such phrases as, "In the eyes of the people of many countries, science has become associated with the development of weapons. (Meaning, if one wishes, that people in one country think this about scientists in *other* countries—E.S.) This diverts science from its true purpose...We deplore the conditions which lead to this situation..."*

The Pugwash conferences began as a more or less maverick attempt to by-pass official power politics and conservatism. However, they have been all but taken over by the government agencies they were by-passing; they have become "realistic," i.e., oriented toward co-operating with

* Just how ambiguous such phraseology is, can be seen from a similarly worded concluding sentence in a personal letter to Prof. Ryokichi Sagane of the Imperial University at Tokyo. Sagane, a nuclear physicist, had studied at the U. of California in 1935. Three of his former colleagues there, all eminent physicists on the Manhattan Project, wrote and signed the letter, which was *dropped simultaneously with the atomic bomb* on Nagasaki: "As scientists, we deplore the use to which a beautiful dis-

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official diplomacy. They have thus traded all chance of developing an independent role or perspective in return for respectability. The 1960 conference, held in Moscow, was attended by every member of the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Science—and science is nationalized in Soviet Russia. The American delegation included the recently appointed Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. On a television panel discussion (reported in the *Christian Science Monitor,* Jan. 25, 1961) among five members of the American delegation, one said:

> The conference was essentially private in nature, in that the discussions were not publicly recorded, and the working papers are only available to the authors. However, such information is freely available to the governments represented, and many of us have been busy, since returning, communicating and transmitting this information to our own government. . . . We were there as individuals, not representatives of the government, although I think we carried with us the confidence of the government.

D. *Declaration of 18 German Atomic Scientists*

In April 1957, eighteen of the most eminent German atomic scientists publicly declared that they would not participate in any way in the production, testing, or use of atomic weapons. Their announcement stirred up a great deal of interest and sympathy, and disturbed the Adenauer government sufficiently that several conferences were held with the scientists in unsuccessful attempts to dissuade them.

Subsequently, the leader of the group, von Weizsacker, backtracked. In a series of essays ("Mit der Bombe Leben") which expressed a point of view similar to that of the German Social Democrats, he inserted a sort of backhanded apology—an explanation that the refusal of German physicists to work on atomic weapons should *not* be equated with the proposal "that the Americans should withdraw their atomic weapons from Germany." God forbid!

Happily, von Weizsacker's vacillation was not typical of German physicists. In October 1958, the Union of German Societies for Physics (3,000 members) "issued a statement condemning the nuclear arms race, reminding physicists that weapons of mass destruction cannot be made without the cooperation of physicists, and reminding scientists of their responsibility. The union also made plans to help scientists who lose jobs because of refusal to work on atomic weaponry." (SSRS *Newsletter*) With the exception of Japan, this is the only case of which the author is aware of a scientific body taking such a stand. If scientists in other countries would do the same, the prospects for world peace would look less gloomy.

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covery has been put, but we can assure you that unless Japan surrenders at once, this rain of atomic bombs will increase manyfold in fury."

The internationalism of science and the ready friendship extended across national, political, and racial boundaries is further exemplified by the subsequent history of this letter. The letter, surprisingly, reached Sagane, who after the war sent it back to one of the three senders. This sender did not destroy it, as some might have done out of a sense of shame, but returned it with the inscription, "To my friend, Sagane, with best regards."

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III. *Do They Have the Right to Strike?*

Michael Amrine writes at the end of his history of the Manhattan Project, *The Great Decision*: "The dreams of victory ended with the reality of achievement, and ever since we have been troubled by the face that victory wore." Many scientists and non-scientists seriously misunderstood (i.e., had "dreams" about) the nature of the war they were aiding, and the postwar period has been remarkable for its lack of rethinking and hindsight re-evaluating.

Patriotism is just what Dr. Johnson called it—the last refuge of a scoundrel—if it disregards the criminal negligence which causes the disasters and says only: "In this critical time of life and death, human slaughter is the only way out." Dr. Johnson's insight is proved sound once again when, after the deaths are dealt out and the crisis is, at this price, successfully surmounted, the killers and their superiors and weaponeers "resume the follies which had so nearly cost them their life" (Churchill). If one considers side by side the willingness to sacrifice innocent lives in wartime and the present unwillingness to protest the preparations for the next war (or the similar unwillingness before the last war), it is hard to accept at face value the justification that scientists in every country must help to kill as efficiently as possible whenever political and military leaders offer to pay them.

There is a generally held opinion that scientists have no right to use their special position to inflict on the entire nation their own convictions as to what weapons should, or should not, be developed. For example, Rabinowitch rejects out of hand "a threat of scientists to go on strike, or refuse cooperation with their governments. A majority of scientists know they cannot separate themselves from their national communities by individual non-cooperation, or establish themselves, by threats, as arbiters of international relations."

Even if one grants that the overwhelming majority of Americans would endorse in a referendum the enormous military budget and the reasoning on which it is based, there remains a contradiction between the liberal idyll of American democracy with its theory of countervailing powers and the admonition, in this case, as to the impropriety of exercising one of those powers. Should people crusade for their point of view and put pressure on their government, or should people limit their protests to letters and meetings and voting at election time? Should scientists stick to their laboratories and let the paths that science should follow be decided by non-scientists?

The typical liberal will be annoyed by this "dishonest" presentation of the question, insisting that scientists should make their opinions known, but only through the proper channels of discussions, petitions, and ballot box. But only political rhetoric, not political policy, is affected by the ballot box, and petitions do not change major policies. For better or worse, ours is a government of, by, and for pressure groups and lobbies. Under the circumstances, the free marketplace of ideas would benefit if the interest groups operated in the open, i.e., if their

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"unfair" pressure tactics could be observed by all. Scientists boycotting (and picketing) weapons research is just such a visible "unfair" tactic. If the democratic process is interpreted realistically, then the scientists, having an interest in the control of their own work, have the *duty* to resist its misuse.

Democracy is meaningless without the diffusion of power. If scientists (and other groups) are forbidden to exert any power, i.e., must limit their political opposition to sterile protests and choices between party machines, democracy becomes a game, a form, a mere exercise in semantics.

ANYONE WHO BELIEVES, as the author does, that the questions raised in the third paragraph of this article should be answered in the negative, ought to welcome the resurgence of an anti-war movement such as a boycott of weapons research. The scientists *should* strike, but they won't. And as long as there is no solid, collective sentiment among scientists (and others in defense industries) to halt further work on weapons of mass destruction, it is neither sensible nor fair to advocate actions which are doomed to defeat.

Influence on the real world, i.e., actually halting the development of new horror weapons, must not be confused with demonstrations of individual moral purity. The impracticability of a strike or boycott appeal to scientists lies not in the fact that Russia will get ahead of us (What does "ahead" mean when each nation already holds the life of the other in its hands?) but in the failure of such an appeal to indicate what is involved. Scientists will not be allowed to "interfere" in military and diplomatic decisions. If scientists were to try, they would encounter hostility from the entire official and unofficial apparatus of the government and its propaganda machines, including the veterans' organizations, newspaper columnists, university administrations, etc. Scientists would then discover the true significance of the security clearance system, i.e., a super-blacklist.

Although military research is only a small part of the defense program, which is itself only a part of American foreign policy, the authorities cannot afford to allow any maverick group to be defiant and "get away with it." What would happen to respect for government? What group would be disobedient next? A few thousand scientists cannot regain freedom from military and industrial domination without changing the whole power structure of American society. They would have to oppose and denounce generals and Congressmen; they would have to forfeit their jobs and their "recognition"; they would have to assume political leadership.

The scientists are going to do none of these things. There may come a time when they will protest their new role, but the *Bulletin,* the Pugwash meetings, and even the declaration of the German physicists mark primarily, not the shouldering of responsibility by the creators of a new danger to mankind, but remorse because they did *not* shoulder

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it. The struggle for the "purity" of science is practically over. The struggle has not been bitter or protracted, or carried on with theoretical clarity; the scientists have been assimilated.

The history of the atomic bomb, and of germ warfare, and of missile warfare, and of the next weapons not yet discovered, is as obvious as it is tragic. In Einstein's words, "The ghostlike character of this development lies in its apparently compulsory trend. Every step appears as the unavoidable consequence of the preceding one. In the end there beckons more and more clearly general annihilation."

THE QUESTION of a strike by scientists suggests the growing similarity between scientific work and other kinds of work. Even if the atomic bomb had never been developed, the status of scientists would have changed because modern technology has become directly, instead of indirectly, dependent on science. Today's scientists work under new conditions because their work has a different social significance. But it is unjust to single out the scientist as the man to abandon the career he prepared for, the creative work he likes, the source of his social status and his self-esteem, and the only way he knows of supporting his family in their customary comfort, because his laboratory is now subsidized, and his reports used, by persons not interested in science. Scientific ability is only one of many talents to be converted into an important commodity. Science is the latest major branch of our culture to be infiltrated by the values of the business world. We must cease to expect exceptional political or moral behavior from scientists (did we ever have the right?) and recognize them simply as fellow citizens in the marketplace.

The more our society is diversified, the more alike become the problems faced by different sectors. This is because the diversification takes the form of specialization and atomization and rationalization. The research scientists have come out of their ivory towers to encounter schedules and budgets, technical proposals and administrative duties, security clearances and government advisory boards, teamwork and press releases. The individual scientist wonders whether to work on "bread and butter" problems, leaving interesting and significant scientific problems uninvestigated. The collective scientists, that is, the scientific societies, concentrate on their bread and butter problems, too: not one scientific organization took a stand (although many leading universities did) when Congress considered the merits of a special loyalty oath and a disclaimer oath for science students receiving federal scholarships or loans.

Personality testing of job applicants and executives; the use of scientific knowledge to manipulate people for economic advantage; the continued development of poison gases, deadly bacteria, radioactive dusts; intercontinental missiles, etc....these misuses of science by our society are paralleled by misuses of every artistic and intellectual talent that human beings have developed. Artistic gifts, personal charm, ideas, athletic prowess, and now scientific ability, all are converted into commodities.

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Many non-scientists share the scientists' deep belief in the potentialities of human reason, but political ability, like competence in scientific research, is developed only through involvement, and consciously directed training. In the absence of such involvement and training, what is learned is learned the hard way. Scientists are politically like other people, and, like them, they learn the hard way—the way the scientists of Germany and Japan learned.

A LETTER FROM PARIS Continued from second cover

surveillance 30 miles from Paris. It is likewise a fact that he refused to recognize the authority of the FLN to negotiate with France in the name of all the Algerians. He also said no to Bourguiba's request that he efface himself before the FLN. Messali proposes to negotiate with France, either at a "round table" conference or parallel to the FLN. Is this megalomania on his part? Not so simple. Messali considers the FLN to be a movement not authentically nationalist.

Moreover, the latest developments do not prove him to be wrong. The FLN, made sensitive by France's effort to reintroduce Messali into the game, has given a new and extremely interesting definition of its delaying maneuvers. It now says, *"We will not sacrifice the revolution to independence."*

What does this mean? That we could now obtain independence, but under such conditions that this independence would be circumscribed by an agreement with France which would prevent us from freely choosing our international orientation and which would force us to remain economically tied to France. Conclusion? Let the revolution continue. The *fellagha,* having fought for the independence of Algeria, will go on fighting so that Algeria will not be attached—either closely or even remotely—to the Western bloc.

This new orientation of the FLN is in conflict with that of Bourguiba, and even with the *official* Russian line which approves of negotiations with France and recommends that the FLN accept a transitional phase for the preparation of self-determination.

There is something mysterious in this. The most likely explanation to me seems to be that Russia intends to make use of the Algerians' doubts and hesitations to put pressure on France. Russia's aim is to lead France itself to increase its role of opposition within the Western alliance and to come out in favor of the creation of a European and neo-neutralist African bloc. If this is the case, Moscow is not opposed to negotiations between France and the FLN but wants the Algerians to be as firm as possible in the course of the negotiations on those points of interest to Soviet strategy. Moscow wants neutralization of the Sahara and all military bases in North Africa. My impression is that this is what Moscow will obtain.

France will yield in the belief it is making a compromise; the Sahara will be neutralized, the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir will not become a NATO base. The Algerians will also think they have made a compromise. As usual, they will think they are carrying out a revolution and will only have prolonged the fighting for strategic reasons over which they have no control.

For the time being at least, Messali and the MNA can do nothing in this story. As for the political aims of the American State Department, they are sworn only to one thing: Do everything not to be absent from these events, even if it's a question of our own funeral!

PAUL PARISOT

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METAPHYSICAL STALINISM

(A Study of Sartre's "Critique of Dialectical Reason")

Lionel Abel

One cannot be the son of both Kierkegaard and Marx.
—Raymond Aron

Sartre's New View of Existentialism

The first volume of Sartre's newly published *Critique of Dialectical Reason* contains two sections, and these, in the author's own phrase, are "unequal in importance and ambition." The first, entitled *Questions of Method,* written in 1957, "in response to the request by a Polish review for a treatment of the situation of Existentialism in 1957," is the lesser work in length, though not in quality, and it has the virtue of being complete; the second section of the book, the *Critique,* will require another volume, possibly one as big as this first, which runs to some 750-odd densely written pages.*

In his preface, the author remarks: "I dislike talking about Existentialism." Clearly this announces a different Sartre from the one of twelve years back, who propagandized for Existentialism, calling it a "Humanism." In *Questions of Method* he explains: "It is clear that the periods of philosophical creation are rare. Between the 17th and 20th centuries I know of only three, and these I identify with the following famous names: there was the moment of Descartes and of Locke, that of Kant and of Hegel, finally that of Marx. These three philosophies became, each in turn, the humus of any particular thought and the horizon of all culture.... Existentialism... I hold to be a parasitic system which lives on the margins of real science.... Kierkegaard was right against Hegel, even as Hegel was right against Kierkegaard. ...Marx was right against both Kierkegaard and Hegel, since with the first he affirmed the specificity of human existence and since with the second he addressed himself to concrete man in his objective reality. It would seem natural, then, that under these circumstances, Existentialism, that idealist protest against idealism, should have lost all utility and been unable to survive the decline of Hegelianism. In fact, it underwent an eclipse: in the general struggle it directed against Marxism, bourgeois thought leaned on the post-Kantians, on Kant himself and on Descartes; it didn't then dream of going to Kierkegaard for help. The Dane was to reappear at the beginning

*To be precise: *Questions of Method* runs to 111 pages. The first part of the *Critique* covers 644 pages.

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of the twentieth century, when people began to think of fighting against the Marxist dialectic by opposing it with pluralisms, ambiguities, paradoxes; this was the moment when bourgeois thought first went on the defensive." Such is Sartre's new historical judgment of modern Existentialism, including, I assume, his own.

Sartre's Judgment of Contemporary Marxism

Sartre has taken the following position in his new work: "I consider Marxism to be the ultimate philosophy of our age . . ." But he does not conceal the fact that he is dissatisfied with the intellectual performance of "contemporary Marxists."* What he dislikes in them is their neglect of, or positive disregard for, particulars, that is to say, for individual personalities and specific, concrete facts. According to Sartre, Marx's own approach was quite different: "In the works of Marx, this focus of perspective never claims to prevent or render useless the appreciation of a given process as a *particular* totality . . . in other words, he [Marx] gives to each event, in addition to its particular meaning, a revealing role: since the principle governing inquiry is to find a synthetic totality, each fact, once established, is interrogated and deciphered as part of a whole . . . thus, a living Marxism is *heuristic* with respect to its concrete investigations; its principles and already established knowledge appear as merely *regulative.*" How different, according to Sartre, is the practice of "present-day Marxists"! These people no longer bother "to study facts in the general perspective of Marxism with a view of enriching knowledge or clarifying action: analysis consists merely in getting rid of details, in imposing meanings on certain events, in denaturing facts or even inventing some, so as to discover behind or beneath them, as their very substance, immutable and fetishized 'synthetic notions.' The open concepts of Marxism are closed; they are no longer *keys,* interpretive schemas: they appear in their own right as an already total knowledge. Of these singularized and fetishized general types, contemporary Marxism constructs, to speak the language of Kant, the constitutive concepts of experience. The real content of these typical concepts is always of a *past knowledge;* but the contemporary Marxist takes them as eternally true . . . the heuristic principle: 'look for the whole in each part' has become for them this terroristic practice: 'liquidate the part.' "

Sartre claims that he does not want to liquidate the part, the particular, the particular individual. He remarks in a note that the intellectual terror represented by the theoretical practice of "liquidating the part" went hand in hand, politically, with the liquidation of particular individuals. Here Sartre claims to oppose "contemporary Marxism" both theoretically and practically. And he insists that its theory as well as its practice is contrary to the true spirit of Marx. For surely, if Kierkegaard was right against Hegel, if Hegel was right against Kierkegaard, and if Marx was right both against Kierkegaard and Hegel, then how could Kierkegaard finally be right against Marx? Yet, according to Sartre, the Danish thinker would be right

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*In speaking of "contemporary Marxists" Sartre makes it quite clear that he is referring to "Marxists" now associated with the French Communist Party and also to certain French Trotskyists and ex-Trotskyists whose Marxism he considers to be dogmatic. I take it then that by "contemporary Marxists" he means present-day dogmatic Marxists.

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against Marx if the latter's view could not do justice to real facts, specific events, particular individuals. Sartre's claim is that the Marxist view, properly understood, *can* do justice to such facts, events, and individual personalities. If I may restate the claim he makes in his new work, Sartre envisages Marxism as the foundation for a psychology of the individual and a sociology of groups. Not just the basis for a sociology at the expense of an understanding of the individual, but at the same time, a deeper grasp of both the individual and the social, in short, a philosophical anthropology. In fact, he calls his own renovated "Marxism" a "prolegomena to any future anthropology."

The Primacy of Marxism

In attempting to make a synthesis of Existentialism and Marxism, Sartre has undeniably given the primacy to Marxism. After all, he asserts, Marxism is perfectly capable of dealing with the individual in his concrete reality; the only real difficulty is that "contemporary Marxists" have not truly understood the suppleness of their own doctrine. Why then, one might ask, is it necessary to make a synthesis of the two doctrines if one of them, namely Marxism, without the aid of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, or Sartre, for that matter, is able to deal adequately with the individual? The villain of the piece seems to be "contemporary Marxism," which has continued to "force individuals and facts into pre-fabricated molds." Confronted with this type of Marxism, Sartre claims that it is "legitimate and necessary to resuscitate Existentialism." One does not see why. Would it not be simpler to "resuscitate" the true and authentic Marxism in order to deal effectively with its contemporary counterfeit? The question is, though: was the true, the authentic Marxism meant to be applied specifically to the particular, the concrete, the irreducibly individual? I think it was not, but if it was, as Sartre claims, then what need is there for him to resuscitate Existentialism?

As far as authentic Marxism is concerned, I think it was perfectly prepared to admit that there were some realities it was not especially designed to deal with. Engels, for instance, was ready to admit that the theory of Historical Determinism was more true with respect to a *longer* period of historical development than to a *shorter* period, thus having more truth when applied to tendencies than when applied to individuals. This concession of Engels is, it seems to me, entirely to the credit of that thinker; but if Engels was willing to admit that Marxism is not equally valid in every context, Sartre is not. For him, Marxism *must* be equally valid when applied to a shorter period of time as to a longer period; as valid when applied to an individual as to a tendency. Engels, whatever his faults as a thinker (and Sartre has called attention to many of them), was not enamoured of the word "total." And Sartre is. For the latter, then, Marxism must do full justice to the psychology of the individual, or be characterized as lacking in concreteness and hence, false. It is to be noted here that Sartre is making the same theoretical claim as the very "contemporary Marxists," whom he says he despises and who in their turn have made it clear that they reject him, for they too claim that Marxism is able to deal adequately with the specific, the irreducibly contingent, the individual. They make this claim against Engels; Sartre makes the very same claim, but in behalf of Marx.

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Sartre on the Individual

According to Jean-Paul Sartre, "contemporary Marxism," which he characterizes as "lazy," converts real men into the symbols of its myths and thus "transforms into a paranoaical dream the only philosophy which is really capable of grasping the complexity of the human being." He adds: "If I want to understand Valéry . . . it would be best not to go to the Marxists" for an explanation. The typical Marxist "will highlight a certain analytical idea, mathematical in character and lightly marked with pessimism . . . the almost total vagueness of the ideology just described will enable him to form of it an abstract schema presiding over the perfection of contemporary works. At that moment, the analysis stops and the Marxist thinks he has finished his work. As for Valéry, he has evaporated."

Similarly with Flaubert: "Contemporary Marxism will show . . . that the realism of Flaubert is in a relationship of reciprocal symbolization with the social and political revolution of the petty bourgeoisie during the Second Empire. But it never shows the genesis of this reciprocity of perspective. We are never informed why Flaubert preferred literature to anything else, why he lived like an anchorite, nor why he wrote his own books rather than those of Duranty or of the Goncourts. Marxism situates without doing anything more in the way of discovery: it leaves to other unprincipled disciplines the tasks of establishing the exact circumstances of the life and of the personality and then intervenes only to demonstrate that its schemas have again been verified: things being as they are, the class struggle having taken such and such a form, Flaubert, who belonged to the bourgeoisie, had to live as he lived and to write what he wrote."

All this would seem rather good. At first sight, on reading this passage, one thinks that Sartre is making good his claim for Marxism and against "contemporary Marxists," and that he is trying to do justice to the individuality and specificity of the historical individual, Flaubert. But I am struck by his objecting to the fact that Marxists leave to other disciplines—disciplines "without principle"—the establishment of the exact circumstances of a life or of a personality. It never occurred to me that there was anything wrong with Marxist procedure in this regard. Biography is a literary discipline, and it must involve principles which hold equally for Marxists and non-Marxists. What I myself have found objectionable in the treatment of individuals by dogmatic Marxists, contemporary or otherwise, is the effort to answer all questions about an individual in terms of social psychology, and I do not believe that social psychology can answer all such questions. Certainly there are some aspects of the life of an individual which would have to be treated in terms of individual psychology, and even in terms of one's wayward intuition. What I object to about dogmatic Marxists is, that in speaking of an individual, they tend to give the same answer, no matter what the question. But this is not Sartre's objection. He too wants to give *the same answer to no matter what question asked about Flaubert;* needless to say, he wants the answer to be a better or more profound, one, to encompass a greater number of details, a wider range of fact.

Sartre writes: "Contemporary Marxists are only concerned with adults: one would think in reading them that we were born on our first pay day." To this remark one cannot but

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respond sympathetically, but a moment later Sartre takes away all the joy of it. Let no one think that there is any aspect of the individual, his childhood, for instance, which Sartre will admit to lie outside the scope of a Marxist social psychology. On the contrary, he wants to extend the range of Marxist social psychology to cover childhood, too; that he has in mind such an extension of social psychology is made clear by the following remark (again directed against "contemporary Marxist" thinking about the individual): "[Marxists assume] that men experience alienation . . . *in their own work first of all,* when, as a matter of fact, one experiences it *first,* as a child, *in the work of one's parents . . .*" Social psychology has something to say about childhood; certainly it is proper for social psychology to treat the effect of a parent's work upon a child. But as certainly, an individual psychology might have something to say about a child, and as certainly there may be alienations experienced by a child which have no relation whatever to the particular work of the parent.

Many Questions, One Answer

Dogmatic Marxists generally tend to give the same answer to no matter what question about an individual because their method of analyzing an individual is fundamentally to refer to a particular datum with respect to him. Since they are interested in the class connections of the individual, it is about such connections that they want to speak and have made themselves expert; when asked about *other* aspects of an individual, would they not have to reply in some *other* capacity than as Marxists? And since Marxists of the dogmatic variety are seldom fond of not being Marxists, they will try to reduce all questions about an individual to the one question which their mode of thinking enables them to answer.

Now an individual is someone about whom many questions can be asked; the individual is inexhaustible; one can always ask still another question for which no established discipline has a ready answer.

Dogmatic Marxists will partially conceptualize the individual and then ascribe to such partial conceptualization a total validity. To this procedure Sartre rightly objects. But what does he himself want to do? His aim—as he insists—is to conceptualize the individual totally; but he wants *his* total conceptualization of the individual to be real, not superficial, he does not want to exaggerate the meaning of a single aspect of an individual so as to explain the whole man by it; he wants to single out that one aspect of an individual which is identical with the whole man and can render every fact about him intelligible. But is there any one aspect of an individual which can be said to be identical with the whole man? If so, what is this aspect? For dogmatic Marxists this aspect of the individual is his class connections. For the Sartre of *Being and Nothingness,* this was the individual's ontological project; for the Sartre of that work, the "whole man" is contained in the manner in which a particular individual tries to render his own experience into a "whole." Now it seems that in his new work Sartre still holds to his original doctrine, and he implies as much by the kind of attack he makes on the interpretation of individuals by "contemporary Marxists." No doubt he now thinks that in showing how an individual makes his experience into a "whole" it is of very great importance to take note of that individual's "class."

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Now I do not believe that the "whole" of the individual can be conceptualized or known. In describing an individual, we are, I think, limited to partial conceptualizations and should admit these to be merely such; to these partial conceptualizations Marxism could certainly contribute something; also psychoanalysis. The individual himself has, to my thinking, something not present in any conceptualized data about him, namely, life.

Marxism, then, can turn up a certain kind of datum about an individual, his class connections; psychoanalysis, a different kind of datum which I shall not for the moment try to specify; the question is, though, whether there is any specific datum which Sartre's Existentialist approach, addressed to finding out how an individual sees his own experience as a "whole," is suited to uncover? I do not think so. The weakness of Sartre's approach, like its strength and interest, comes from the fact that it is not related to any particular datum; any datum can serve it; this is a method for guessing; it is not what is called in science a "working hypothesis." Fundamentally, it is an idea for making up individuals and has far more meaning when one can invent the individual to whom one applies it than when applied to an existing individual whose character was expressed in life. Sartre's original approach to the individual was closer to that of the playwright or the novelist than to that of the biographer or the historian. The French thinker seems not to have noticed Nietzsche's very pertinent warning that the reason we enjoy characters in fiction is precisely because they are so superficial. Why superficial? Because the fictionalist—novelist or playwright—having invented all the facts about the characters to start with, is able to present them as "wholes."

The Method and the Motive for Using It

Sartre is completely confident that the method he has in mind, and which he sometimes even designates as "Marxist," is bound to throw a total light on the character and personality of any individual to whom it is applied. He calls his method the most complex instrument ever designed for understanding human beings. Let us for the moment suppose it to be just that. I would still be of the opinion that this method, however perfect in theory, would, in application, prove no better than the particular individual employing it. I would go even further: it could prove no better than the particular motive for employing it on a given occasion. Sartre here seems to have forgotten something rather important in his own Existentialism, namely, that in human affairs, the subject employing no matter what method, does not by using it become superior to his own fate, which involves subjection to chance. It takes luck for an individual, born by chance, to understand another individual similarly born, luck in addition to whatever methods of "understanding" are at the "understander's" disposal.* The analysis of Flaubert, made from a Marxist or Existentialist point of view, can be no better than the individual using either or both of these modes of analysis can make it. And more: the analysis of Flaubert can be no better than the peculiar motive for analyzing Flaubert which has stimulated an individual to make that analysis. The very same individual using the very

* The psychoanalysts—when they are honest—admit that they "prefer" some patients to others.

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same method or methods might very well say something more true about someone else whom, by chance, he had a deeper motive for wanting to describe truly.

As a matter of fact, the specific analysis of Flaubert Sartre makes in his *Questions of Method,* in order to show what can be accomplished by a Marxism informed by Existentialism seems to me far inferior to the analysis Sartre made recently, using the same methods, of Tintoretto, though that study, too, was done with a view of proving the value and fruitfulness of the method Sartre is arguing for in his new work. And I think Sartre had a personal motive for wanting to understand Tintoretto; it was this motive which gave his portrait of the Venetian painter a depth I do not find in his analysis of Flaubert. In Tintoretto's competition with Titian for the admiration of the people in Venice, Sartre saw, I think, an analogy with his own struggle to capture the admiration of the young men of France, who have continued to regard Malraux as the one "genius" in contemporary French literature, just as the people of Venice, despite all the prodigious efforts of Tintoretto (Sartre is a prodigious worker too) continued to regard Titian as the unsurpassable creator of "the beautiful." The value, then, in Sartre's discussion of Tintoretto is not to be ascribed solely to the method employed by him; it arises from a chance fact: Sartre could see himself in Tintoretto as he did not see himself in Flaubert.

To be sure, Sartre devotes only a few pages in *Questions of Method* to Flaubert; his work on Tintoretto is a far more extended study, hence more complete. But this is not enough to account for its superiority. Sartre has also devoted an entire volume to the life and work of Jean Genet; no one has ever criticized this work for being too brief and it, too, is the application of an Existentialist Marxism to the understanding of an artist. Yet Sartre's *Genet* is far inferior to his study of Tintoretto, though using the same methods. Sartre actually ended his book by "proving" that Genet had no further need to express himself in writing. It was after the publication of Sartre's book on him that Genet wrote the two plays for which he is likely to be remembered: *The Balcony* and *The Blacks.*

"Questions of Method" as an Independent Work

This section can be read independently of the much bulkier and still unfinished section, *The Critique of Dialectical Reason.* Much of what I have had to say about *Questions of Method* has been critical; evidently the work is not without contradictions, and some of these are damaging. Sartre's method for understanding individuals is really a method for inventing individuals; and its value was shown to be dependent on the motive for employing it; moreover the method has no particular relation to Marxism, for there is no reason why in terms of this method the class connections of an individual should be privileged as against some other type of data.

Despite these difficulties, *Questions of Method* does leave one with a certain sympathy at least for Sartre's intentions; while the work solves no problems, it does indicate that there are problems to be solved. Often brilliant and provocative, openly critical at all times of typical Stalinist formulations and perspectives, there is nothing in this first section of Sartre's new book which prepares one for the meta-

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physical exaltation of Stalinism with which the much longer and more important section terminates. Taken together, the two works remind me of those twin satellites sent up by a single rocket into entirely different orbits.

II

"The Critique of Dialectical Reason"

I come now to the *Critique* itself. Here there is an entirely different atmosphere from that of *Questions of Method.* From the latter one understood that Marxism was not without problems. In the *Critique* one is presented with a Marxism whose problems have presumably been resolved and for which Sartre claims the ultimacy of truth. Here it is not a question of amending Marxism; this is Marxism as amended, and such is the author's contention, the definitive philosophy of our time.

Many topics are treated in the *Critique*: There is a defense of the so-called laws of dialectics, a defense I find both dazzling and dizzying; there is an economic theory of scarcity, which Aimé Patri in *Preuves* has already shown—and I think with reason—to be heretical; there is a sociology and the outline of an anthropology. I cannot treat all these matters in this paper. I shall restrict myself entirely to what I consider the main topics of the *Critique,* and which were the very topics Sartre treated in *Questions of Method*: the individual, his status and standing in society and in history.

Unhappily the conception of the individual Sartre outlines in the second and major part of his new work is very different from the one he set forth in *Questions of Method,* and expressed more fully in *Being and Nothingness.*

In that work, as was remarked before, the individual was seen as trying to form his experience into a "whole," and the emphasis in that work was on the *effort* of the individual to do this. But while in the *Critique,* the individual is still seen as trying to render his experience into a "whole," the emphasis of the author is now on the *failure* of the individual to do so. What interests Sartre now is not at all to see the individual as a "whole" but as a "totalizer," not as one who makes a totality of his own life, but as one who, failing to make a totality of his own life, totalizes the historical process, and contributes to making a "whole" of history. Sartre writes: ". . . I find myself dialectically conditioned by the totalized and totalizing past of the human adventure... I totalize myself in terms of a millennial history and, according to the depths of my culture, I totalize this experience. Which means that my life itself is millennial, since the schemas which enable me to understand, modify, and to totalize my practical enterprises . . . have entered into the present by way of the past. . . ."

Sartre's present interest is to show that history is a potential "whole" and that it is being made into such a "whole" by the frustrated strivings of individuals to be "wholes" themselves. He thinks he can show by means of his dialectic, that it is logically possible for there to be a multiplicity of "totalizers" or "makers-of-the-whole,"

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and yet but one single eventual "totality" or "whole," that is to say, history. And he thinks, too, that if he has proved the above logically—which he may have, though I doubt it; in any case the matter is too difficult to discuss here—he has succeeded in integrating the individual with history, and in adjudicating the conflicting claims of Kierkegaard and Marx. But has he not in fact gone back to Hegel's view of the individual, a view opposed—on different grounds, to be sure—by both Kierkegaard and Marx?

Having said in the first section of his book that Kierkegaard had been right against Hegel in affirming the specificity of the human individual, Sartre can permit himself to write in the second section that the individual's understanding of his own life "should go as far as to deny the particular qualifications of that life and to look for that life's dialectical intelligibility in the whole human adventure." But what is an individual life that is bereft of its particular qualifications?

In the first section of his new book, Sartre concerned himself with the psychology of the individual; in the second section, his interest in the individual is sociological through and through. In *Questions of Method,* as was noted before, he was concerned with how the individual could be seen as a "whole"; in the *Critique,* he deals exclusively with the manner in which society renders the individual into a part—of itself and of history.

Sartre's Sociology of the Individual

The individual described in the sociological section of Sartre's *Critique* is never himself, always someone else. He is someone else when he gets on a bus, reads a newspaper, listens to a radio or television broadcast; he is someone else on his job, on the street, waking or dreaming. Why is he not himself? What has happened to him? Society has transformed him into the member of a series. He has been *serialized.*

To explain what he means by *serialization,* Sartre begins with a grouping of the most humdrum sort, a number of people waiting for a bus. No one of those waiting is especially interested in the others. In waiting for the bus, the group has its single being in this object, which is still to arrive, and each individual is singled out by this object, the bus, only insofar as he is exactly like all the others. Each one waiting is the same as the others waiting precisely because he has become other than himself. Identity here is otherness, and this identity of otherness characterizes the contemporary individual in every casual context of life.

The notion of serialization developed by Sartre is certainly interesting but one wonders immediately: is it so important? First of all, there are ways of being oneself even while waiting for a bus. But supposing the thing is impossible, and you just can't be yourself while you wait. Is this such a drastic matter? Can't you resume your true identity when you get home? Of course, once there, a form of serialization may be awaiting you, and one of a much deeper kind than any Sartre has described.

I am thinking of the experience of "serialization" described in James Joyce's *Ulysses,* and undergone by Leopold Bloom, when, having taken leave of Stephen Daedalus, he goes home, attends to himself in various ways, undresses, and enters the bed where his wife is sleeping:

> What did his limbs, when gradually extended encounter? New clean

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bed-linen, additional odours, the presence of a human form, female, hers, the imprint of a human form, male, not his, some crumbs, some flakes of potted meat, recooked, which he removed.

If he had smiled why would he have smiled? To reflect that each one who enters imagines himself to be the first to enter whereas he is always the last term of a preceding series even if the first term of a succeeding one, each imagining himself to be first, last, only and alone, whereas he is neither first nor last nor only nor alone in a series originating in and repeated to infinity.

The serialization of Bloom described above is surely of a far more drastic nature than could be imposed upon a person by having to wait for a bus or in any merely casual context of his life. Moreover, the serialization of Bloom can scarcely be said to have been brought upon him by society. Cannot we conclude that serialization, in some form or other, is part of the human condition and has to be endured along with many other things we would rather not experience but must? But Sartre will not have it so; he thinks that serialization affects the deepest being of an individual, identifying him as the member of a class.

Sartre's Sociology of Classes

Sartre maintains in his *Critique* that such classifications as bourgeois, petty bourgeois, and proletarian express different varieties or instances of serialization, and that classes exist fundamentally because individuals are serialized. In other words, classes are composed of dead or inert individuals, and it is through serialization that individuals are rendered dead or inert. Individuals are collected into classes by material entities, jobs, or property, in the same way that a bus collects a group of persons hoping to be taken home by it. Thus class expresses the victory of matter over the human mind and the individual personality; it is a consequence of serialization, which it presupposes. Members of a class have no genuine feeling of solidarity; class is ". . . not a practical solidarity but, on the contrary, the absolute unity of destinies through lack of solidarity."*

Is it true, though, that classes presuppose serialization and render inert rather than vivify those individuals who belong to them? Is it the case that a bourgeois individual is the less individual for being bourgeois? Would we not think there was something wrong about a worker who did not behave or

* Is "serialization" the same as what Marxists have called "alienation"? Since Sartre speaks of "alienation," too, and in a way which seems to fall in line with the general use of the term in Marxist literature, I assume that he considers "serialization" to be an instance of "alienation," and, from the space he devotes to it, a most important instance. Now by "alienation" I understand a situation in which a person thinks himself the victim of things when he is really the victim of men; "serialization," as explained by Sartre, implies only the victimization of men by things. Clearly "alienation" and "serialization" are related. But how? Let us go back to the "serialization" of Leopold Bloom cited above. Now the specific fact which identified Bloom as the member of a series, was not the actual lover of his wife, but the imprint of that lover's body on Bloom's bed. It was a physical object which "serialized" Bloom. Thus it will be seen that Joyce used the concept of "serialization" exactly as Sartre does. However, Joyce treated Bloom's "serialization" comically. For after all, it was the lover of Bloom's wife who had victimized Bloom, and not the imprint of the lover's body. Insofar as Bloom is ready to forget about the lover entirely, I should say that he is "alienated."

The reader may wonder how Sartre could be so superficial. It will be recalled that before he came to Marxism he accepted as an hypothesis explaining certain forms of human behavior, the notion that men feel inferior to things. Now Marx would have thought that such a notion itself requires explanation.

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talk like one? Here, I think Sartre has falsely equated serialization with class membership, on the assumption that both negate individuality, and by further assuming that two things which negate the same thing are equal to each other.* What is worse, Sartre by reasoning in this way has destroyed, it seems to me, any validity in the idea of socialism. As he himself admits, serialization is not limited to capitalist society. Under socialism, too, people will have to wait for buses; also, they will have to listen to television broadcasts wherein what will be said may not conform with their opinions. Men, it can be assumed, even under socialism, will be serialized by signs indicating they have unfaithful wives. All of which goes to show that traditional Marxists were not quite as superficial as Sartre evidently thinks they were, when instead of speaking of fighting against serialization, they talked about putting an end to exploitation, a very different matter. One cannot imagine the first, second, or third Internationals being formed to fight against serialization. If exploitation is ended and serialization continues, as Sartre grants is very likely, does this mean there will still be classes? In that case, the dream of a classless society is a Utopia, for no one, I imagine, besides Jean-Paul Sartre will ever be found ready to take up arms against society in order to put an end to his serialization by it. After all, the bad thing about buses is not that we have to wait for them. The bad thing, I should say, is where they take us to.

"The Group In Fusion"

As a "serialized" being the individual is inert, unable to act. Can he become capable of action? Yes, says Sartre; the catch, though, is that he cannot do so by his own effort alone, or as an individual. To act he has to join a group, and take on an individuality held in common with others.

The first kind of group Sartre describes which gives the individual access to action, is what he calls, the "group in fusion," that is to say, the group which is formed more or less spontaneously to deal with some particular emergency. An example given by Sartre is the group formed by Parisians to take the Bastille. Sartre argues that in this kind of group, the individual can really express his own aims even though he is one of many. To be the hundredth in a group of one hundred, is not that to be merely a numerical entity? Not at all, says Sartre, arguing that if the other ninety-nine want to accomplish what you yourself are aiming at, then you are not one among a hundred, but one multiplied by a hundred. He remarks, too, that you make the other ninety-nine into one hundred. I am perfectly ready to grant this argument. What I wonder, though, is whether an individual engaged in this kind of action, is really himself. Certainly Sartre's selection of such an action as the taking of the Bastille loads the argument morally in his favor. What if the particular action were the lynching of a Negro in the South? I grant that each person in a lynch mob may feel his own power multiplied by the power of the others involved. What I do not grant is that a person engaged in a

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* Sartre writes ". . . *class-being* . . . is disclosed . . . as a status of seriality in the multiplicity that constitutes it." And again: "A class as a collectivity becomes a material thing made up of men insofar as it is constituted as a negation of men and of their serial incapacity to negate this negation." And again: "Class is the serial totality of serializations.. . . ."

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lynching is necessarily himself or expressing personal aims. Is it not the case that the presence of all the others in the action, while it may enhance the feeling of power of each person involved, will also have the effect of minimizing the individual responsibility of each participant? Let us see whether Sartre's numerical terms do not add up differently when made to express individual responsibility rather than individual power. An individual engaged with ninety-nine others in lynching a Negro is, morally speaking, not one person multiplied by a hundred, or one person making ninety-nine other persons into one hundred persons, but one person ninety-nine hundredths of whose conscience has been taken over by other persons, and who by adding his own hundredth of moral conscience to the ninety-nine one hundredths represented by the others, can bring the total sum up to the figure of only one conscience, which an individual is supposed to possess on his own, in the first place. As a matter of fact, this bit of contrary arithmetic, might be equally true of such an action as the taking of the Bastille. My point is that in actions of this kind the moral responsibility of the individual is probably at a minimum; I do not believe that in actions which involve a minimum moral responsibility the individual can really be himself.

The Organized Group

But Sartre does not really hold out the possibility of joining a "group in fusion" to the serialized contemporary individual; he himself recognizes that such groups are impermanent, unlasting, occasional. The kind of group the contemporary individual will most likely have to join if he is to escape from "serialization" and become capable of action, is an "organized" group or party. In this type of group, Sartre grants, the individual cannot be himself and is necessarily transformed into someone else.

The "organized" group comes into existence when the "group in fusion," the emergency it was formed to meet being over, tries to assure its permanence. This necessitates an oath of allegiance by each member, and the oath of allegiance implies that each member is inessential to the group, and could be replaced by someone else. Sartre also claims that the oath of allegiance gives no matter what "organized group" the right to visit the death penalty on any of its members: ". . . the fundamental statute of the group bound by oath is Terror. . . ."

Now in the "freely" constituted group or party to which one joins oneself by an oath, one can no more be oneself than when waiting for a bus or listening to a broadcast. The individual ". . . loses himself by means of his oath so that a common individual can exist. . . ." But why, it may be asked, does this have to be the case? Why cannot one maintain one's individuality within an organized group or party?

According to Sartre, the desirable group to join must be a fighting group —otherwise it would not offer the opportunity to fight against serialization. Unhappily, as a fighting group it is in danger, even in mortal danger, and can only overcome such danger by reducing to one common person all those who join it. Each new member may have it in mind to desert or betray the group; hence, the mere fact that one is an individual means that one cannot but be an object of suspicion. Suppose one puts one's individual interests above those of the group? According to Sartre, this would be noth-

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ing less than treason. And he defines the only organized human group which can offer the individual access to history and to action as that kind of group which is permanently threatened by the treason of its members; the only way the group can assure its safety, is to require that each of its members give up his individuality and become other than he is.* The group, or party, is composed of persons who, fighting against serialization, and striving for access to historical action, have freely consented to become one "common" person.** Such consent, according to the author, is precisely freedom. Who will be surprised, then, that Sartre finds one of the great moments of human freedom in the Terror of the French Revolution?†

The Political Group and the Individual

Jean-Paul Sartre thinks of the political group as fighting against the inertia of the masses, who cling to their inertness as the result of having been serialized. Now undeniably there is a certain truth in looking at the role of fighting political groups in this way. If Sartre had said this much and no more one would have to go along with him. Unfortunately, he has also made the point—and attached a very great importance to this point—that the fighting political group must necessarily transform those individuals who join it into beings other than they are, and further that the means for bringing about this transformation is intra-group terror. Now these propositions are utterly questionable. Suppose we take as an instance the Bolshevik Party under Lenin, a political group which in Trotsky's phrase was military from top to toe, and was certainly the most effective "action" group in modern political history. Now is it the case that the Bolshevik Party, when a revolutionary organization under Lenin's leadership, transformed its members, destroying their individual personalities and replacing these by a common party identity?

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* Sartre writes: "The group is produced in each one by each one *as the individual birth of an individuality common to all,* and at the same time, each one grasps his own birth as a common individual in the feeling of fraternity. . . . This fraternity is, by the way, *the right of all* through each one over each one."

** Sartre does envisage one possibility for the realization of individuality within organized group structures. Of course, he concedes that this possibility can only be realized after "a long dialectic of alienations." Let us look at this positive possibility: According to Sartre, the organized group rests on the destruction of individual differences, a destruction formalized by the oath of allegiance, and concretized by group terror. Let us suppose, though, that the group is securely organized. At this point it may become necessary for the group to invent differences for certain of its members, to invent rather than to destroy otherness. Suppose there is some special function which can only be carried out successfully by an individual having certain qualities, not possessed by other members. In this case the group may have to invent such an individual or individuals. Here individuality will simply be identification with a particular function, and this kind of individuality, Sartre claims, is "more intelligible" and more desirable than the kind of individuality which arises from accidents of birth, character, personal history. I think it is sufficient to note that what I think of as lack of personality in the technician, Sartre advances as the historically most "advanced" and the one positive form of individuality.

† Here, according to Sartre, is the structure of freedom as made possible by group action: "Obeying the Other insofar as he is Other, in the name of a common practice, each one makes himself Other insofar as he is the Same. Here is the fundamental structure of obedience: it is realized in the milieu of 'Fraternity and Terror' and against a background of violence. . . ." He also writes: "Terror is directed against seriality, not against freedom."

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The facts, as any scrutiny of the Bolshevik Party's history from 1917 until Lenin's death will show immediately, are quite the contrary: the Bolshevik Party was composed of great and often bizarre and eccentric individuals: Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, Stalin, Smirnov, Muralov, Rakovsky, Zinoviev. These names call up different and distinct personalities, no two of these persons can be said to be alike in any other respect except that they belonged to the same party and accepted Lenin's leadership. When did the Bolshevik Party begin to transform individuals, robbing them of their real selves, replacing these with Party personae? Precisely under Stalin, when the Party was no longer a revolutionary organization. The means for transformation were the false confessions of the Moscow Trials, during which, under the threat of terror, individuals like Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, and other old Bolsheviks, confessed to crimes they had not committed and expressed judgments we know were not their own. In short, the fighting group is not incompatible with the maintenance of individuality; it was the rigid bureaucracy of Stalin, as we know today from Khrushchev's arraignment of Stalin, that converted the Bolshevik Party *from the thing it was into the thing Sartre now believes any organized fighting political group must be.* He could not be more wrong, and I shall not hesitate to substitute for the word "ultra Bolshevik," which Merleau-Ponty used to designate his politics, the more exact term: ultra Stalinist.

Let me add one detail, here which I think is not necessarily minor. Sartre has praised the milieu of "Fraternity and Terror." It is to be noted that Lenin opposed fraternity to terror and did not sum up both into the same dialectical unity. In one of his last statements to the Party he urged that the blood of party members not be spilled under any circumstances, and the ground he gave for opposing bloodshed within the Party was that Party members were, "brothers."

"Critique" in the Light of "Questions of Method"

I have shown, I think, that Sartre's *Critique* is not without difficulties. I showed before that his *Questions of Method* was not lacking in contradictions. Moreover, the two sections of his new work negate each other.

In *Questions of Method* he was interested in subtlizing Marxism so that it could deal adequately with particular individuals. But the burden of his *Critique* has been to show that in the contemporary world there are scarcely any individuals to deal with—by Marxism or any other discipline. In *Questions of Method* he objected to the notions about historical individuals expressed by "contemporary Marxists." Now by "contemporary Marxists" did he not mean in the main Marxists who are members of the present-day Communist Party, which last, according to his own analysis changes individuals—and according to Sartre has no alternative but to change them—into party people? I submit that only an individual can understand another individual, or is likely to have any respect for another's individuality. Why should members of the present-day Communist Party, who have consented to the Party's liquidation of their own personalities, be especially sensitive to the personalities of a Flaubert or Valéry, or permit Sartre to lecture them on their lack of interest in particular individuals in the very same work which denies the very possibility of retaining one's individ-

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uality in the contemporary world? Sartre has justified the transformation of the individual into a Party member; at the same time he wants the Party member, whom he approves of for being a member, to really understand and think there is some great importance in understanding the true individuality of Flaubert and of Valéry. This procedure is not unlike that of Stalin, who could demand a Communist Shakespeare, or Molière at the very least, after he had liquidated the talented writers of his period.

III

"The Critique" in the Light of "Being and Nothingness"

It will be recalled that while in *Questions of Method*—as in *Being and Nothingness*—Sartre was concerned to view the individual as trying to render his experience into a whole, in his *Critique* his interest is to show that history is, or can be, rendered into a "whole," the individual being reduced to a part. In fact, the whole of the *Critique* turns out to be a systematic withdrawal from the individual of what was granted him in *Questions of Method* as well as in *Being and Nothingness.* One extraordinary instance of this, to my mind, is the removal of the peculiar and almost Pascalian pathos with which the individual was invested in *Being and Nothingness,* and the bestowal of this very pathos on the political group or party.

In *Being and Nothingness* the individual was a *pour-soi* (a Nothingness) confronting the *en-soi* (Being), and the *pour-soi* was seen as disturbed, terrified, as well as stimulated by the presence of the *en-soi.* The individual was seen, in other words, as a lack of being, and as tormented by this lack. Being was seen as replete in itself.

But now in his *Critique,* in discussing the relation of the political group or party to the individual, Sartre has given the political group or party the role of the *pour-soi* (Nothingness), and the individual the role of the *en-soi* (Being). The pathetic and active rule he now hands over to the political group, which, if you please, is seen as the ontologically terrified entity, terrified precisely because it lacks an ontological structure, lacks Being, is nothing but its practice, its acts, exactly as in *Being and Nothingness,* the individual was seen to be nothing but his practice, his acts. Anxiety at having to confront Being, this is now the experience of the political group. Conversely, both the individual and classes now are said by Sartre to possess an ontological structure, to possess Being. If the political group uses terror against the individual, this is fundamentally because it is afraid of the individual; similarly, it is afraid of classes—they, too, have Being of a sort. The political party has none at all; it is ontologically a Nothingness; dramatically it is forceful, pathetic, often terrible; it has a right to do evil, it is, in fact, evil by definition, good by its exertions, exactly as the individual consciousness was seen to be in *Being and Nothingness.*

Assuredly this is an idealization of the political group in its ultra-Stalinist form, though I do not imagine

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there are many Stalinists who would be pleased to find the Party so idealized. I do not suggest that Sartre has raised Stalinist practice to a metaphysical level in order to endear himself to Communist Party members. The motives for his performance must be far deeper than that; I do not say I know what his motives are; I only know what Sartre has done. His attempted synthesis of Existentialism and Marxism—or infusion of Existentialism into Marxism, to use his own terminology—has ended up by projecting onto the political group or party all those traits which in *Being and Nothingness* were reserved for the human individual and said to define his humanity. The only entity or character in Sartre's *Critique* which can be called human is thus the political group or party; compared with it both individuals and classes have the inhumanity of Being as such. Now this is a metaphysic; it should be properly designated: it is the metaphysic of Stalinism, for it places against the horizon of Being the historically limited form of the Communist Party of the period when Stalin was its leader. Yet Sartre does not scruple to introduce this metaphysic by asserting that these, his new ideas, could only have been formulated or advanced in the post-Stalin era!

Is it right, though, to judge the *Critique* as I have done, when it is still incomplete? But I think the main lines of the work have been sketched in and I do not see what Sartre can add that will decisively change what he has already set down. For my own part, I can only say that a careful reading and rereading of this work has filled me with the kind of dismay I feel when I think of the extraordinary quantity and quality of thought now being expended on complex mechanisms that are designed for some inhuman end. There is so much thought in Sartre's new work, so much brilliance, erudition, observation, but all to what end? And the work is verbose, unmeasured, disproportioned. It will not please those whom it praises, for they insist on being praised in different terms; it will not please genuine Marxists; it has already been repudiated by the Communists. The Stalinist enemies of Khrushchev can no more like it than can Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist supporters. The book is monstrous in size and is certain to be brief in its effect. It did succeed in giving me the feeling which *Being and Nothingness* may have been intended to produce but never did, for that work was too tonic, too clear, and too forceful even in its most pessimistic passages to make me feel what it was presumably saying, and what the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* is presumably unsaying: "Man is a useless passion."

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RETURN TO INDIA—PART II

Stanley Plastrik

Toward Calcutta—late July:

A city turbulent, jittery, easily upset. It is twenty years since my last visit, yet the memory of this city is a vivid one. Calcutta is the home of Indian terrorist nationalism, its people quick and volatile, forever dissatisfied and demanding. The thing to find out would be the effect that partition, that deep wound separating Bengal into West and East, India and Pakistan, has had upon its people. Never had the Bengali dreamed he would see his land divided in two, nor had he expected the day to come when 5 million of his fellows would be forced to flee and be shunted like nomads through different parts of India.

Twenty years ago Calcutta was militantly organized behind the ultra-nationalist leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose and his "Forward Bloc," its dissatisfactions centering largely around the failure of the Congress movement to move with sufficient rapidity toward independence. The city felt sure of itself in those days. But Bose perished mysteriously while allied to the Japanese. And I knew the controlling forces and passions of the war period were, of course, gone.

Waiting for the Calcutta plane at the Patna airport, I overhear a dialogue of the deaf. An American woman, in her sixties, on a flight to "visit friends" in Singapore, is describing her husband's wheat farm in Nebraska to my friend S., the *bhoodan* guide who is seeing me off. Half a mile wide, about ten miles long, totally mechanized, valued at about $300,000. S. counters with a description of the average family farm in the Ganges basin, 2 to 4 acres, operated by arm, leg and back power, valued at under $1,000. Neither grasps the other's description. "Why are all you Indians so spindly in the legs?" the Nebraska lady despairingly demands. S. smiles politely and explains, there are so many of us.

Some hours later we reach Dum Dum airport north of Calcutta. Calcutta is very much alive; it is, in fact, in the midst of a general strike (*hartal*). The *hartal* is a popular protest strike of Bengalis in support of people from West Bengal who now live and work in the state of Assam, over toward the Burmese border. It is caused by the "language issue," a problem tormenting India's unity since independence. The reports from Assam are unclear, but sufficiently detailed to indicate that uncontrollable violence and mob hysteria are on the loose, a violence di-

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rected by Assamese groups against the powerful linguistic minority of Bengalis in their state. Of particular significance is the fact that, for the first time to my knowledge, Indians from one part of the country are apparently unsafe in another part of their own country. The *hartal* which has utterly paralysed the city is due to end late that afternoon; until then no busses or cars dare move.

HOURS LATER we were in Calcutta proper; late afternoon and the city slowly came back to life. Calcutta is an international, cosmopolitan city, jammed and packed with a multitude of people. It is active, clashing, noisy and resentful. If Bengal, as is often said, is the Catalonia of India then Calcutta is its Barcelona. If West Bengal has become the "problem state" of the Indian Republic, it is in Calcutta that these problems are most exacerbated. I am grateful to Narendranath Das for his acute summary of these problems, most of which date far back but to which have been added new problems arising out of the violent partition of Bengal. Today, outwardly, Calcutta is simply more crowded with refugees, its slum areas more unbelievable, its English people largely gone or in hiding, its wealthy class of Punjabis and Marwaris, now the heirs of the city's incredibly vulgar night spots, more puffed up and preposterous than before.

Leaning heavily upon N. D. Das, I might summarize my observations of Calcutta's resentments and grievances as follows:

- West Bengal is not a replica of other Indian states; she feels neglected by the central government, the political parties and the country as a whole.
- The Assam atrocities against Bengal's people came as the latest and most humiliating in a series of affronts to Bengali pride. As a result, separatist talk is quite common in Bengal and Calcutta.
- The 5 million Bengalis driven out of what is now East Pakistan nurse exaggerated grievances and nostalgic memories of their former life. No less than 3 million Indians from other states have migrated to and earn their livelihood in West Bengal. A good portion of them camp out on the sidewalks, live in and about the railway stations or in government *godowns*. They are permanent transients. Thus, 8 million out of 30 million in the state are both dissatisfied and unintegrated in its life.
- Economically, partition meant that Pakistan took the agricultural "Green Belt" while West Bengal was left with industry and aridness; its economy is lopsided. And, writes Das, "at the top of all, Calcutta occupies the position of a giant sucking every ounce of the green juice from the rural hinterland." Further, the ownership of industry is non-Bengali (partly British, partly non-Bengali Indians, partly central government). West Bengal claims not to get her rightful share of earnings from the central government's monopoly over jute and tea, two important Bengal products.

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In the brief spell I was to stay in and around Calcutta, many of these observations were borne out. But this city has its other, more cosmopolitan and sophisticated side. Within a few hours of arriving it

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was possible for me to track down old friends from New York, Paris and wartime days in London. Old friends who retained much of their earlier interests, yet each of whom had changed in his politics. Calcutta is a city where political ideas are always discussed with a good deal of heat. Ranging from the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom to the coterie grouped around the dissident socialist Dr. Ramanohar Lohia, one finds a passionate concern with politics that is largely absent in the west. But I must add to this, it is often playful in tone and wispy in content. I can select no better illustration than my short visit to Dr. Lohia.

Since his break with the Praja-Socialists (PSP), Lohia heads a comparatively small group of left-socialists who, in turn, carry on a permanent form of protest and passive resistance against the government. Lohia rejects Congress-run India root-and-branch; he is the eternal oppositionist. The activities of his group are primarily protests against the many bureaucratic actions of the government, protests which take the form of courting arrest, jail and sentencing. Rarely do such deeds awaken the response looked for; this is not the moment in Indian life for perpetual *satyagraha*. The general view is that Lohia, though a well-known and popular figure, has isolated himself from the life of India.

My meeting with Lohia whom I had last seen in New York is rather strange and disappointing. Given to a supercilious and self-mocking manner, Lohia is surrounded by a group of admirers who form the usual backdrop of the political cult. This man who, a few years before, was one of the most responsible figures in Indian socialism seemed strangely facetious in his notions. What does he look forward to, what does he want? Lohia laughingly dismissed the activities of all his former political comrades. The man has become a self-centered *farceur* unable to discuss, at best able to amuse and mock. This is hardly the leadership India needs.

WE TAKE AN ELABORATE tour of the University of Calcutta, including lecture halls, small libraries, student groups and a fabulous coffee house where masses of students congregate for hours on end. My guide is concerned that I shall find the students unsophisticated and intellectually backward; he is more concerned that I accept his explanation that this is basically the fault of their professors and teachers. It is true, of course, that the contents of the libraries are pitiful and outdated; that the contents of the publications and student reviews I glance at are ritualistic and often border on gibberish, but is not this unavoidable in the atmosphere of a feverish city where ideas—mostly half-baked—circulate in a vacuum of frustration? Only if Calcutta and West Bengal were to succeed in straightening themselves out in relation to the rest of the India Union, to find their place and then set about making it secure, could this confusion come to an end.

Here, the group of socialists of the PSP whom I meet one evening in their party headquarters, seems to show more understanding. Their very limitations—provincialism, concentration on Bengali affairs, lack of political sophistication—push them in the proper direction of hard,

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basic work, the achieving of practical immediate goals, and a strong feeling for the needs of their city and state. In the midst of a discussion about life and politics in America a message comes to these people that a serious conflict between two or more of the many groups that live in the city has broken out in a remote quarter. Firmly and with no hesitation, they—and this includes the splendid woman who is chairman of the West Bengal party—excuse themselves and go off in a body to see if they can halt this pointless violence. And they are right to do so, of course; there must be some example of calm in this explosive city.

The continued industrial development of Calcutta, West Bengal and the sector leading southward toward Madras, may ultimately change the picture I have drawn. For one thing, it will become impossible to ignore the deterioration in relations between New Delhi and Calcutta. Further, the new steel centers (Perambur, Bhilai, Rourkela located close by) give a weight and importance to the area in terms of Indian economic planification. Take the case of the steel industry. Before the second Five Year Plan (1955), India produced 1 million tons of finished steel, mainly at the Tata Iron and Steel Works, a single privately-owned plant in Jamshedpur, state of Bihar. The Planning Commission decided to set up three steel projects, now in varying degrees of construction and operation in the publicly-owned sector and with a production target of 6 million tons altogether.* At Bhilai, for instance, the steel township already has 100,000 people. Such towns and areas face all the questions familiar in the modern industrial world: the conflict between the Indian Civil Service administering these vast modern projects and the technicians and specialists who build and run them; the conflict between rival Indian trade unions anxious to organize large numbers of new and comparatively well-paid workers; and the difficulties inherent in establishing new industrial centers with reasonably modern living conditions. For the time being, the triangular industrial area whose points are Calcutta to the east, Jamshedpur to the west and Visagapatnam to the south must remain in a state of chronic restlessness brought on by large-scale industrialization.

During my Calcutta visit the strike of the railway employees comes to its predictable ending. The striking unions beat a retreat before Nehru's inflexibility. It is many days before the chaos of disrupted schedules and communications will clear up. More important, the government follows up the end of the strike by wholesale firings in the thousands, pursuit of those arrested and a generally vindictive attitude. Thus, preoccupation with the strike's after-effects will dog the rest of my visit. As I prepare to leave for Madras and the south of India it is still the center of news in the daily press. The plane heads out over the Bay of Bengal in the early morning, passing over threaded Chowringhee Road and pointing toward the endless beaches that line the bay. The last sight of Calcutta is of a city somewhat ragged around the edges but fixed in its setting, there, permanent.

* China, 12 million tons; Russia, 60 million; USA, 120 million.

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

Indian Industrial Expansion: Inset map shows industrial concentration area

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Madras—early August:

Madras, capital of the newly reorganized new language state of Madras, is South India's largest city, gateway to what historians conceive of as classic India. The people of Madras and all of South India are clearly different. At one time, these people, Dravidians, controlled the entire subcontinent and the South Indian nationalists have never forgotten this. Then came the endless round of invasions from central Asia, from the Near and Far East, and finally, from the West; each invasion compressing these people and their culture deeper into the southern tip of the subcontinent. C. Ross Smith has summed up the differences between North and South:*

> ... The north's comparatively light skin becomes black; the frame becomes smaller, more wiry; saris and turbans, no longer pale and washed, become deep green and purple and yellow and red; the languages (Tamil, Kanarese, Telugu, Malayalam, etc.) become agglutinative (the average word contains six or seven syllables); the voice becomes louder, more urgent; the head bounces from side to side in the Madrasi waggle; the smile is more quickly there, more quickly gone, superficial.

In the city of Madras the emphasis is on the historical: the Portuguese were here and built the curious Cathedral of San Thome near which I stay; the doubting Saint Thomas is supposed to have been martyred here; Marco Polo on the way back from China in the 13th Century stopped in the harbor; the East India Company (1639) set up its famous Fort St. George (Thomas Pitt, Warren Hastings). Madras has a rhythm and pace all its own; to enter it is to enter a world quite apart from the northern regions of India. For one thing, its cultural life—largely traditional and classic—separates it from the more diversified north. Classical Hindu music, theater, dance are pursued with intense passion throughout South India.

The city itself is dry, dusty, overpoweringly hot. My first accidental contact while I am looking for the PSP headquarters is, curiously enough, with an ardent young Tamil nationalist who explains to me he had once been a socialist but feels the "socialists" betrayed South India to the North. He belongs to the DMK (*Dravida Munnetra Kazagham*), a movement favoring South Indian separatism, and speaks a political language which, I confess, was new and surprising to me; separatism, Dravidians are the victims of Delhi and northern economic imperialism, the Congress is run by northern Brahmans etc. I learn later to evaluate this movement as a social protest of the poor of South India (above all, untouchable and lower caste people) against the wealthy and ruling Brahmanic élite. While it is easy to overestimate its strength because of the extreme violence of its language, the DMK is symptomatic of the admitted failure to integrate the parts of India into a coherent nation.

The many days I am to spend in and about Madras are arranged by an exceptionally able young socialist woman leader. Only Miss S. V.'s

* *In Search of India*, page 208.

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own enthusiasm and nervous energy could keep me moving about each day from early morning late into the night amid the tremendous heat. One of my first visits is with the Minister of State Industry who proudly displays on his desk an advance copy of the proposed third in the series of Five Year Plans, the plan which is to go into effect in 1961. We have a long and candid discussion on the progress of India's economy as well as that of his state. Again, as is so frequent among the younger Congress leaders and the new cadres of managerial administrators, there is a sense of competence, acknowledgment of the problems and a desire to work constructively and carefully. Above all in the south there is a need for diversification of small and medium-scale industries, for the region is predominantly agricultural and below average in resources. The Minister further acknowledges much of the intense criticism of the old-line Congress leadership throughout the south and himself illustrates an important fact: there exists in the country a significant left-wing Congress group of administrators and functionaries who share common attitudes. They will surely be the heirs of the Congress organization, as well as the administrators of future plans, nation-wide and local.

Rajaji

What crowded days and hours in Madras! A round of discussions, meetings, conferences, with glimpses of the city limited to quick taxi rides from one spot to another. The whole set against the Bay of Bengal in front of which stretches the Marina, or oceanfront drive. At one end of the vast and almost deserted beach are the huts of a village of Tamil fishermen, men who go far out into the bay in their *catarmans*. In the company of S. V. who knows them well I go to talk to them. A little beyond and off the beach, the city is building a housing project out of stone and cement; it hopes to persuade the fishermen to move in and abandon their beach village for a more settled way of life. But the fishermen—how familiar this story has become!—say they will not go; the rents are too high and besides they feel their way of life is unsuitable for such fine dwellings.

My first day at Madras—it had begun at 5 A.M. in Calcutta—ends 20 hours later in the overpowering embrace of a Tamil movie which, having begun 3½ hours earlier, was still moving strongly along when I staggered out into the heavy Madras night. A fantastic mixture of the incredibly bad (posturing and declaiming at its worst) and the incredibly beautiful (*Bharat natyam* classic dancing, natural scenes shot against the stone pagodas, carvings and elephants of Mahabalipuram, the sacred temple area south of Madras). Like most of the interminable Indian pictures, the story was based on incidents from some ancient legend, this from the life of one of the ancient Pallava kings. Sleep was impossible the rest of the night; it is not as easy to make the transition from Calcutta to Madras as, say, from New York to Chicago.

Among my hasty notes taken during the days in Madras I find references to visits to other state ministers, each occupied with a particular task, to a private school for young children run by the Punjabi com-

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munity and directed by an extraordinarily calm and tranquil lady (songs, garlands and the delight of talking to alert young children), a meeting of rather well-placed and well-off Madrasi citizens. There are numerous discussions with many individuals, socialists, people of long experience and background in the nationalist movement—in general, their political cultivation is broader and more objective than that of the Bengalis. But to me, most important, was a visit to Antony Pillai, an important figure in the Madras labor movement. Originally from Ceylon, Pillai is now thoroughly integrated into the life of South India. In addition to heading a local group of labor unions. Pillai, who received his political training in the Ceylon Trotskyist movement, was elected by a local constituency to the Indian Parliament at New Delhi. He has the reputation of being one of India's most skillful labor leaders. Still, I must confess to some disappointment, for his approach to trade unionism in India seemed to me to indicate the general weakness of labor in a country whose industrial and economic growth ought to be turned to the profit of the unions.

ONE OF THE BASIC AND unresolved problems of the Indian trade unions is their relationship to the political parties that frequently dominate them, a relationship that keeps the unions from achieving the autonomy they have in some of the Western countries. Pillai, however, seemed to find no problem here, perhaps because his public role depends upon a continuation of a commonly accepted situation. But I doubt that the hundreds of thousands of newly-trained workers drawn into the new and complex industries India is building up so rapidly can be satisfactorily served by a trade union leadership that is dependent on the wishes of one or another party.

If we accept the figure of two million union members for all of India, about 48 per cent belong to the Congress-dominated unions (Indian National Trade Union Congress), about 20 per cent to the Communist-controlled unions (All-India Trade Union Congress), about 16 per cent to the Socialist-controlled unions (Hind Mazdoor Sabha), about 6 per cent to unions organized by dissident socialists (Marxist United Trade Union Congress), and about 10 per cent independent.

But, and here I follow the analysis of Rohit Dave, an excellent political and economic observer, these figures by themselves signify rather little. They fluctuate rapidly and workers tend to shift allegiance in accordance with their estimate of who is closest to the sources of power. The activities of outside political leaders in the unions "... does lead to the phenomenon of exaggerated promises to the workers, one group outbidding the other and creating tensions which are out of proportion to the economic realities." Dave does not oppose the active participation of outside political leaders at this stage of India's trade union development, but he does insist upon minimizing their political exploitation of economic situations. He feels that "... much more could have been achieved than what has been by this (labor) movement so far."*

* See excellent discussion article, "New Outlook for Indian Trade Unionism," by Rohit Dave, *Janata*. October 30, 1960 and subsequent issues.

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In the future it seems probable, however, that with the number of workers employed in industry rising rapidly, a different type of labor leader will come forward—one trained in the techniques of industrial relations, economic research, the skills of management and collective bargaining. There will be little place for the transitory politically-oriented labor leader, skilled in organizing the spontaneous strike, in militancy, in the fly-by-night kind of union. This will be infinitely less dramatic than in the past, but then the task of contributing to a nation's growth by pursuing intelligent but limited aims is usually not one of high drama.

Thus Antony Pillai and others whose political activities are founded upon the older working class populations, largely textile mill workers, may well be pushed aside by the forward thrust of industrialization with its new type of worker. It was striking to me that in our conversation, Pillai presented an elaborately rationalized explanation of developments in India with heady overtones of simplistic Marxist and Trotskyist doctrine. Yet I felt that behind all this stood a small-time labor boss with his "private" preserves, quite apart from the large stream of labor that now begins to gather.

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An intense discussion with Miss S. V., my Madrasi guide and one of the ablest women I have come across in Asia. *Subject*: the future of Indian democracy. *Outlook*: bright and optimistic, on her part; more cautiously so on mine. An American is particularly sensitive in India to the varied forms of life and the diversity of its cultural and social institutions. Particularly in the south, where the traditional order is both oldest and most deeply rooted, is this diversity striking. The old order, based upon a complex system of caste interrelationships, Hindu theology, philosophy and law and a set of fixed community values, has proved particularly effective at absorbing and synthesizing the new. India, as Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have pointed out,* has never had an organized reactionary movement. Even in the south only a few minor groups propose to return to the rule of the Brahmans. In the new context of political democracy and the secular state, even caste organizations have largely accepted democratic politics and function within the circle of its rules and regulations. Again and again, I am struck by the essentially democratic nature of life in India today, the widespread tolerance, the give-and-take of the multitude of conflicting groups and parties.

These thoughts occur to me as I prepare to leave Madras on the long train trip that will take me into the state of Kerala, which the Communist Party boasted only two years before would become known as the Hunan Province of India.

Trivandrum, Kerala:

Again, that astonishing experience one has throughout India

* "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations"—*Pcblic Affairs,* March, 1960.

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—a short trip brings one into a different world. Kerala is amazingly similar to many parts of tropical Ceylon. After crossing over the Western Ghats which separate Kerala from Mysore, the terrain westward slopes gently down into widening valleys. Here are tropical plains crossed by numerous rivers, streams and canals and dotted everywhere with homes, plantations, cultivated areas, towns and small cities. Kerala is covered by a network of natural and man-built waters down to the long and narrow stretch of sandy seaboard where some of the world's finest beaches are found (Malabar Coast, etc.).

The natural vegetation and man-grown crops of Kerela are incredibly varied: in the higher elevations, tea, coffee and cardamom plantations; on the lower elevations, pepper, rubber, ginger, turmeric, banana and plantain groves, fields of rice and tapioca. The coastal belt is covered with cocoanut plantations, while a variety of trees—areca, jack, mango, cashewnut, etc.—cover the plains.

The known history of Kerala dates from the time of St. Thomas, the Apostle who passed through Malabar in the first century A.D., setting up seven churches which still survive. It is the smallest of the Indian States (15,000 square miles, width varying from 5 to 75 miles, 360 miles in length from Mysore to Cape Comorin, with the fantastic population of 15 million—that is, 1015 people per square mile, the highest pressure of population on land in the world). Every possible patch is cultivated. Industrialization is backward, proceeds at a slow pace and has limited possibilities.*

My few days in Kerala are largely on my own. Although it is a year since Communist rule was removed from the state, I come away with a sense of uneasiness. One feels in the air of Trivandrum and other towns and cities that these people have passed through a harsh experience whose effects are far from shaken off. Although legally elevated to power in the state elections, the Communists deliberately set about creating a situation in which their rule would be perpetuated through extra-legal means: the infiltration and transformation of all political and social institutions. In a state where politics is a pastime (over 30 daily newspapers), suffering from density of population and widespread unemployment, and with a highly literate population, it is not surprising to learn there has always been an intense fragmentation of social and political life.**

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* *Kerala Under Communism,* a report of the Democratic Research Service of Bombay, 1959, is an excellent source about Kerala as well as the best account of Communist rule from April 5, 1957 to July 31, 1959. Also Overstreet and Windmiller's *Communism in India* (University of California Press, 1959) contains much information of value.

** Kerala's 15 million people are grouped into three main communities: *Hindu* (56 per cent); *Christian* (24 per cent) and *Moslem* (20 per cent). But the fragmentation goes beyond this. Hindus, for example, are separated into Brahmans (landholders, priests), Nairs (wealthy and upper middle class), Ezhavas (one-fourth of the population, laborers, tenants, etc.) and other lower or scheduled caste groups, including tribes. The Christian community is divided into Protestants, Catholics, Joacobites, Thomites, etc. Many of these people are idle, non-earning dependents who belong to a dozen different political parties. The 1957 electoral landslide in favor of the Communists

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Trivandrum itself, a university town combined with a state capital, is not particularly striking. The Mascot Hotel at which I stay, described by Arthur Koestler as a rather sinister Communist headquarters in his recent book, *The Lotus and the Robot,* has reverted to the placidity of an ordinary provincial hotel. I spend many hours wandering around the city: Christian churches, Hindu temples of imposing beauty, rather terrifying; massive government buildings, numerous schools, colleges, the University of Kerala and a splendid museum with an outstanding collection of Hindu sculpture.

THE UPSHOT OF MANY discussions with officials and political people is that Kerala still must go far before overcoming the effects of Communist rule. Most of all, it must establish its own prosperity and stability. P. T. Chacko, the powerful minister for Home Affairs, Catholic, Congress leader and anti-Communist ideologue, expresses the need for basic "law and order" throughout the state, with the application of economic planning and massive capital import from without. More important, he acknowledges the weakness of the present government (a coalition of the Congress party, Praja-Socialists and the Muslim League) by stating bluntly to me that the Communists still have the support of the workers in Kerala, the industrial unions and "the poor." As so frequently happens in a coalition government, the various political forces within it draw strength and supporters from one another rather than from the enemy they have united against. The socialists have grown but at the expense of the Congress; the Communists, led by the present compromise national secretary of the Communist Party of India, Namboodiripad, who had been Prime Minister of Kerala, have retained their popular strength.

V. V. Giri, the New Delhi appointed Governor of Kerala State, seemed to have the keenest understanding of Keralian problems: this shrewd and able politician, an old-time leader of India's railway workers' unions, made clear his dissatisfaction with the uneasy alliance in Kerala and its lack of accomplishments. Ousting the Communists in an electoral alliance is one thing—desirable and fundamental—but the disease, rooted in a generalized poverty and unemployment, still remains. I left Kerala with the impression that no definitive settlements had been reached, that the future of the alliance was shaky and discordant (there was, for example, much criticism of the socialist Chief Minister voiced by his own party people) and that only economic measures involving large sums of money from the central government could bring results which would push Kerala into some kind of economic integration with the rest of India.

Does the Congress-Socialist coalition set a pattern for future politics in the country? Or is this an isolated arrangement? This, of course, is an open issue within the socialist movement. It seemed to me that the Keralan coalition is unique, defensive in nature, and that the question of

is best grasped, it seems, as a political experiment in search for stability rather than an ideological commitment to Communism; an experiment that almost proved fatal!

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future coalitions between the Congress left and the socialists, starting on a local basis and perhaps leading eventually to a national coalition government, is rather a different question, tied to the country's future needs rather than a rearguard action against a partly discredited Communist movement.

Before flying out of Trivandrum to return to Madras, I visited the University of Kerala to meet the students. Monsoon weather has struck Kerala and many are idling about, classes over, with time on their hands. Like students everywhere, they are eager to talk. They are displeased with their university, with its teachers and classes, with their own prospects. The curriculum is rigid, old-fashioned and formalistic; the university is comparable to a small-town, mediocre college somewhere in America. Much of the learning is by rote, by mimeographed sheets of notes handed down from "generation to generation"; there is little initiative or encouragement. The political parties naturally have their clubs, but this affects only a small percentage of the student body. Student actions, rather, result from more dramatic and direct situations—rumors of corruption, bickerings with bus conductors, movie managers, exams and, above all, bad relations between professors and students.

Out of every 100 students who graduate from primary and secondary schools, approximately one-third go to college, but hardly 4 reach the post-graduate level. Economic difficulties and failure in examinations account for this. I have never been in a country where such bad relations exist between the college teacher and the students. K. R. Jadhav, writing in *Humanity,* is guilty only of exaggeration when he states, "Contempt for students and flattery of superiors seem to [the college teacher] the only two clear paths in the jungle of the present day educational system. The average college teacher in India today is a shocking example of mediocrity, middle-browism and second-rateness." He goes on to describe how the teacher classifies his students: "Out of 100, ten are good, twenty not bad and the remaining—pigs!"

The conservative elder who complains that the Indian student takes too much interest in "politics" is wrong; he's mistaking the demonstrations, and protest riots for politics; actually, I found the Indian student even more indifferent to political life than his American counterpart. Since relations between boy and girl students in India is circumscribed by a tradition of puritanism upon which is imposed caste distinctions, it is quite natural that student energies are directed along pleasure-seeking lines. This is frowned upon, and the student must seek his pleasures surreptitiously; that is, tastelessly, without the normal joy of youth, and with much guilt. I spoke to students in many cities who confirmed this rather bleak picture; in Kerala I saw it again.

Yet, there is another, more official, side to this and it ought to be indicated. Humayun Kabir, the Central Government Minister of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs and a noted educator whom I was to meet later in New Delhi, balances the picture in these words contained in his 1959 convocation address to the University of Kerala:

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"In India, there are today about 800,000 students in universities and institutions of higher learning, which gives an intake of roughly 200,000 per year. The number of possible entrants by relevant age group per year would be almost 10 million! In other words, barely 2 per cent of the total population of the relevant age group have the opportunity of university education and yet this proportion is itself high compared to many countries of the world. It compares favorably with the proportion in the United Kingdom and most countries of Western Europe and Japan. . . . In India, for every one in the university, 98 have been denied admission. And while they are in the university, they are being supported by the entire community at a cost which is about four times the per capita national income of our people."

These remarks are true, but they have little bearing on the quality of the university education received and they tend to ignore the many complaints one hears from Indian students everywhere.

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The plane from tiny Trivandrum airport circles southward over the tip of the Indian peninsula before turning north toward Madura, Trichinopoly, Madras. We are 1,000 feet up, below the dark monsoon clouds; a lightning storm flashes in the distance. We fly above Cape Comorin, another "end of the world" spot, where three waters—the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal—merge. A few days before I had driven through here by bus, but from the air its beauty is more complete—a network of backwater lagoons, canals, paddy fields, and stretches of white beach bordering the oceans. Today is a Hindu holiday, the attaining of the full moon, and many hundreds of thousands have come to the beaches for the sacred ocean dip.

Across the Deccan:

It is possible, of course, to fly from Madras to Bombay in a few hours. I chose to take the train trip—one and a half day's time—passing through the heart of the Deccan. The Deccan is the triangular plateau fixed into the southern, peninsula section of India, which separates the Arabian Sea from the Bay of Bengal. It is India's most ancient region, an island when the northern plains of Hindustan were still under sea. A volcanic upheaval gave the Deccan its peninsular shape and its rich, volcanic soil. In the upside-down triangle of the Deccan itself lives an immense concentration of South India's population, many still at a primitive tribal state of life, raising cotton, citrus fruits and rice. The number of villages on this dusty plateau is beyond measure, its dryness relieved occasionally by hilly areas and sparse forest lands. The Deccan is a region, ancient and burdened with the history of remote Dravidian milleniums. To cross it in a slow-moving train, gazing out over the plateau during endless hours, is to be carried back into time's utmost recess.

I travel with Indians eager to talk about their country but who prefer to describe its present and future, concealing their interest in the

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past. Their talk is of hydroelectric and dam-building projects in the hills, of canals and waterways, of crop diversification and village cottage industries. At a railway stop not far from the town of Raichur, a group of ragged boys leap onto the slow-moving train. They offer for sale baskets of small lemons, oranges and other fruits. One of them tells us about himself—he is nine, has never been in a school, shares a mud hut with his parents in a nearby village. If he sells his basket he will earn a rupee that day; he will give it to his blind father. He rides along the line with us for many miles; later, that day, he will catch a train going back the other way. He will pass many years doing this, as will others Primary education has yet to reach as much as a third of India's children. This boy has never worn a pair of shoes; but then, neither have millions of others.

In the early morning hours we reach the city of Poona. Here, twenty years before, I had attended a session of the Congress top leadership, meeting to decide its strategy in the independence struggle during the days of the London air blitz. For the first time I had seen men like Nehru and Sardar Patel in action and had felt the tremendous influence of Gandhi himself; Gandhi whom I was to meet later. From Poona onwards one returns to "modern" life, to political India.

Bombay—Early August:

Bombay means "Americanization," people with problems of leisure time, vacation time, boredom time, money in ample amounts, juvenile delinquency coexisting with cocktail parties that flout the city's prohibition laws, India's only practicing psychoanalysts, art, theater, culture, rounds of movies (the latest) from abroad. For better or worse, Bombay is a modern city facing Europe and the West.

Bombay means wretched housing conditions, gigantic slums to which flock relatives and their relatives from every possible corner of India, and numberless thousands who call their small stretch of sidewalk home. It means a proliferation of small-scale industries, from the village-transposed potter and his wheel to the chemical soap factory, an ultra-modern atomic research plant, air-conditioned office buildings and hotels, technical training institutes of high order and a university bursting with students.

Under the guidance of one of the most devoted and competent socialists I have ever met, Dr. G.G.P., I scurry about from meeting to meeting, person to person, school to school in a whirlwind of impressions. The trouble with this, of course, is that I would like to get to know these people more intimately than is possible and to talk to them far beyond the time allowed. My refuge is the home on Vatcha Gandhi Road where I am staying and where my greatest delight is to ply with questions Mrs. Jh., an articulate woman who had passed her younger days in the nationalist movement. She reflects the disappointment of people of her generation with the "new youth," their apparent indifference to politics and ideals; more important, she embodies that serenity and spiritual force found in India among so many women of the middle

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and educated class who had followed Gandhi in the thirties and forties.

I select at random from my notes on Bombay:

• Detailed discussions with the Praja-Socialists of Bombay, one of the better organized branches of the PSP with strong roots in the city. These people know how to carry on political actions. Particularly impressive is the Party's spokesman in the city council; thoroughly immersed in the life of the city, its most complex financial and housing problems. The Party must soon prepare for municipal elections, prelude to and perhaps a test of the nationwide elections in early 1962.

• A group of Indian Trotskyists, including a professor of sociology, who expounded familiar doctrine to an unsympathetic ear; all countries and worlds sound alike in their jargon.

• A young married couple—he in advertising, she a nursery school teacher—whose home was strikingly similar to that of newly married American couples; Indian "themes" and motifs in decoration and design seem to have been introduced from without in these homes. There is a fascination and occupation with interior decorating in Bombay that surely must point to the city's general affluence.

• M. R. Masani, general secretary and organizing spirit of the new conservative Swatantra Party; as sharp, quick-witted and alert as twenty years ago, but taking a bit too seriously American office habits of efficiency, polished desks with buttons and telephones.

• A trade union rally in behalf of government employees sacked because of strike action; there was an intensity and anger present in this meeting I noticed nowhere else. Jobs were on the line and loss of work in India is disastrous, there being no unemployment benefits and 100 applicants for each job.

• A long drive through the wet Maharashtra countryside to a lovely spot in the hills set aside for a Gandhi memorial laid out in Hindu and Buddhist designs. On the way, a visit to a state cooperative dairy supplying most of Bombay's milk; strange to see such organization, efficiency, cleanliness and concern in India.

• Crowds of Indian journalists—clever, quick, alert but often superficial; mainly interested in American "beatniks" about whom they know little but assume each visiting American's expertise. Anxious apparently to stimulate the Bombay beatnik; search for sensational copy. My one interview in the Indian press confined to subject of beatniks.

• Bombay culture and art: a performance of Lorca's "Yerma," his play on the tragedy of a village woman's sterility. One would think this would touch deep cords in village India. A sophisticated Bombay audience, robed in gorgeous saris, indifferently listening to intellectualized actors giving a sterile performance on a stage whose decor is superb. But this play ought to be shown in the towns and villages upon which these people have turned their backs.

• Breakfast, Gujerati-style, in the pleasant company of Indian friends; a variety of sweets and stuffed candies; comfortable middle-class atmosphere with much talk of interior decorating and how best to educate one's children; familiar echoes of New York life.

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• If Calcutta has a clear and sharp image of itself, made up of its strong resentments, Bombay is struggling to find a self-image and not too successfully. The pursuit of "culture" will not yield it. The sudden and shifting influences of the West are felt too strongly here.

New Delhi—August:

I am to leave by plane that night for New Delhi and the final week of my visit. I am reluctant to go, so enjoyable has the stay in Bombay been. Early on the morning of my last day the child of the family with whom I am staying tugs at my arm until I follow her out onto the porch. A man carrying a flute and a large woven basket has stopped in front of the house and is waiting for a signal to enter the gate. I am about to see that most simple and fascinating of theaters—the snake charmer! Within seconds a large crowd collects on the other side of the fence. In front is his paying audience, behind him, his mass audience. He unhooks the basket cover, takes up his flute, the reedy music starts. Out of the basket, awakened, pops the head of an enormous hooded cobra, ugly, repellent, frightening. The child's fascination is mirrored in a hundred faces who have quickly gathered around; the music quickens and undulates, the charmer moves his flute from side to side, the cobra sways and dances, rising and falling.

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The monsoon has halted for the time being in New Delhi and my last days in India are to be spent in the burning heat of the sun-drenched plain on which the Indian capital has been built. It is difficult to carry through the scheduled round of official visits, more difficult to summon up the energy and curiosity to make all visits worthwhile. The heat, steadily in the hundreds day after day, is the enemy, a general torpor takes over.

The monsoon session of the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) is about to begin; mainly domestic issues are on the agenda: the government employees' strike, the draft outline of the Third Five-Year Plan, etc. I attend several sessions.

Nehru

Still elegant and handsome, Jawaharlal Nehru dominates the parliamentary proceedings as, in fact, he dominates the political life of India. Alert and active, articulate in both Hindi and English, Nehru is present for most of the sessions, answering questions, participating in the debates, well-briefed and energetic. There is a flow of humor and wit, always a good sign of a healthy parliamentary body, as socialists, Swatantrists and independents go about their task of questioning, needling ministers, probing. Nehru himself is treated with utmost respect by all. His standing is clear. The level, tone and rhythm of the debates are serious and impressive, except for the comparative inferiority of many of the Congress representatives, "party" men who rely entirely upon Nehru and his ministers.*

* The Congress Party dominates the country's politics. The distribution of seats in the present Parliament and the State legislative assemblies illustrates this. (See page 169)

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This is the nation's supreme body, and the view of Asoka Mehta, chairman of the Praja-Socialists, that the Lok Sabha must continually assert itself as both the top repository of democratic power and the source of leadership in the country is borne out by what I hear. It is in the Lok Sabha that Nehru has attained the peak of his career. I have never counted myself among his admirers; his arrogant and often petulant style is not to my liking and his frequent ambiguity and even hypocritical way of thought repel me. But there is no question that he has held India together since independence, struggled to lay the foundations of a progressive, secular state, resisted bigotry and communalism, and served as the symbol of an all-India effort within a unified country. If Nehru has become more difficult of access in recent years, more touchy to criticism, the response of the crowd to his presence still indicates that this man is India to them.

By the same token, the chairman of the Praja-Socialist Party, Asoka Mehta, a brilliant and forceful personality, embodies the best in Asiatic socialism. This man became heir to his party at the lowest moment in its history. It had lost a third of its membership in the Lohia split, its spokesman and greatest figure, Jayaprakash Narayan, had withdrawn, and one of its best thinkers, Narendra Deva, had died. It is no secret that democratic socialism in India was close to its end some five years ago. The PSP seemed haunted by its inability to find the proper relation to the Congress movement and to the nation as a whole; it existed, largely as a ginger group, but was uncertain about its right to exist. To inherit leadership of such a movement is no enviable task.

Mehta accepted this task. In the long conversation we held together he stated flatly that the party, having reached its lowest point some time ago, has since been moving steadily upward. I believe Mehta is right; granted the continuation of democratic forms in India and the absence of international war, the future of the PSP looks bright. We discuss my impression of local party provincialness and lack of contact with the center, as well as the frequently low theoretical level shown by party members who have no clear notion of the public image (or images) their party casts. Mehta explains that first priority is party organization, so as to become the leading opposition in the country.

But, and here is evidence that Mehta is a man of political stature, the party's progress does not take place at the expense of the country's inner adhesion or even at the cost of other movements. Just as issues of democracy in India (secularism, national unity, language-based states

Parliament	*State Assemblies*
Congress Party—366 seats out of 500	2,029 seats out of 3,190
Socialists (all)—20 seats	204 seats
Communists—27 seats	170 seats
Conservative Regional parties—37 seats	297 seats
Independents—44 seats	409 seats
Jan Sangh Hindu Party—4 seats	49 seats

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etc.) cannot be separated from problems of socialism (agrarian cooperatives, workers' democracy in the new industries, social justice etc.), so the growth of the socialist party must go together with the growth of all democratically-oriented parties and institutions, including the Congress itself. In my opinion, this must also include the so-called new caste associations which are, in effect, political parties based upon the awakening of their people, an awakening expressed in demands for more representation, popular education, the breaking down of caste walls which discriminate against its interests. Many have found Mehta reserved and remote (Guy Wint calls him a political expert rather than a national leader), too logical and cool. Perhaps. I find him a man of fine intelligence, broadminded and, above all, hopeful for his country's future. He has combined socialist idealism and political nationalism into a finely woven texture.

Summary and Farewell:*

The Race: The Third Five-Year Plan, about to be implemented, is based on an assumed population of 431 million people by March, 1961.** There are many other assumptions in the Plan, not the least of which is a continuing high percentage of unconditional foreign aid, but this population outburst is fundamental. How shall the race between food production and mouths that consume be run without faltering? The Plan concentrates on the problem of agrarian production, but avoids that of land relations. As for birth control, it is a farce except for middle-class city folk whose issue would go down in any case; a wise socialist doctor in Lucknow put it to me quite bluntly when he remarked, "Until we offer the villagers and city masses some other kind of life than that of endless work, until we can substitute entertainment and recreation in the form of community life, radio, education, theater etc. for their present entertainment after the day's work, the soaring birth figures will continue. Only uplifting the people and enlarging their cultural horizons will flatten out the curve."

The Third Five-Year Plan—whose objective is to drive the Indian economy forward so that it henceforth generates its own fresh capital formation—is India's most ambitious program to date. The Plan cannot be taken literally; there are too many question marks built into it. During the past ten years the habit of planned economic development has taken hold in India. Foundations exist for the development of modern technology in steel, power and agriculture. The infrastructure has been strengthened, but must be completed not only materially (roads, transportation), but culturally (basic education).

The main issue is what rate of development (pressure) can the econ-

* These are mere notes. I hope to write a separate essay in which I evaluate the problems and prospects of Indian democracy. I would like to discuss the coming 1962 general election already actively underway and which will be crucial for the country.

** The official census taken in February, 1961 came to 438 million, or 7 million more than estimated. This represents an increase in population of 21 1/2 per cent in ten years. Each year there are tens of millions more Indians.

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omy sustain in terms of the general economic situation. National income is expected to increase at the rate of 5 per cent annually. This will be the source of new investments, but also new consumption demands. These demands will be fed further by increased population, the movement into the big, consumer-oriented cities and the general demand of people to live better. Therefore, says the Plan, we must be prepared to keep consumption from rising too fast—a classic problem in countries striving for industrialization.

Further, the immediate economic situation is spotty. Strong inflationary pressures, rising consumers' goods price index, no lessening in unemployment and a tendency for seasonal and part-time employment to drop, poor control over the nation's price structure. These factors are so delicate that gains of the past ten years are easily imperiled by inflation.

What have been these gains? We summarize:

- Since 1951, a 42 per cent rise in national income.
- A 20 per cent increase in per capita income.
- A 120 per cent increase in industrial output.
- A 40 per cent increase in agricultural production.
- A $21 billion investment in the Indian economy to which the United States contribution is merely $1 billion.
- Electricity generated by 200 per cent, railway freight-traffic by 80 per cent etc. Such figures, of course, tend to conceal the low starting point, but the forward movement is indicated.

When one compares this to Communist China, with its superiority in basic natural resources, and the disputed rate of its development as well as the undisputed nature of its total state structure, why should the democrat, the socialist despair? India today is a free and open society with a mixed economy leaning toward increased governmental leadership and control; it is an authentic parliamentary democracy with a maximum of individual freedom; it is an economically underdeveloped country moving steadily toward a viable economy with a better life for its people.

I make no effort to brush aside its difficulties, perils and shortcomings. On the contrary. But I cannot help thinking of the multitude of western and European intellectuals who, their eyes riveted in fascinated horror and/or admiration upon China, have consistently neglected and ignored India. In India itself I found the magnetic pull of China to have completely lost its power except for a diehard group of Communist intellectuals.

The attractiveness of India today consists of the fact that its political community is made up of such a variety of associations, both natural and voluntary, all of which play their role in the exercise of political freedom, in formulating some approximate notion of the public good, in influencing the state directly or indirectly, and in protecting the liberties of both the individual and the organizations. This "pluralism" is more alive in India than anywhere I know.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN INDIA

Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner

A viable political framework in the new states of Asia and Africa is generally considered a prerequisite for any programs of planned economic growth. In this article we propose to explore one popular notion about this problem with particular reference to India.

Perhaps the most commonly held view about ways to achieve political stability is through economic growth. This theory states that the gap between aspirations and reality, between demands and resources is at the bottom of political instability in most underdeveloped areas and that therefore the best policy is to fill the gap by the most rapid economic development possible. This notion is based on the usually unstated assumption that the basic political ills of modern Asia, its political instabilities and threats of violence, its tendencies toward totalitarianism and autocracy on the one hand, and anarchy, on the other, can be solved through economic growth. In much of Asia and also in the United States and other countries of the West this ideology of "economism" is widely held and has found many supporters. A simple correlation is established between economic well-being and stable political relations, or at least between the rate of economic progress and political stability. The logical consequence of this ideology is the proposition that in order to achieve politically more stable regimes it is important to support them in their quest for economic growth, and this ideology more than any other forms the basis of American programs for economic aid.

Yet even superficial observation will show that there is no close correlation between political stability and either economic well-being or economic growth. Historically we find some of the most stable political systems the world has ever known associated with stagnating economies: the millenial rules of Byzantium or of ancient Egypt. But if we disregard these cases, since they may be said to represent social and economic relations too different from the present, we still find that some of the most stable political systems today are associated with poorly developed, economically stagnant societies. Examples are Afghanistan and Ethiopia, or Yemen and Bhutan, which for long periods during the last half century maintained a high degree of internal political stability even though scarcely any economic growth could be witnessed. And whatever instability existed was induced from abroad, i.e., by aggressive encroachments or diplomatic action.

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At the same time, some countries which have experienced a substantial economic growth have had to contend with significant political instabilities. In Kenya or the Central African Federation, in several of the states of the Middle East and in the Philippines political instability has been endemic in the last few years, even though many of these countries experienced noticeable economic growth in the same period. It is possible, of course, to find the reasons in each case for the political instability. In some countries it is the result of racial differences, in others the impact of Communist infiltration, and in others again the aftermath of the breakup of traditional social relations. But by pointing to discernible causes of political instability in these (and other) cases, we effectively destroy any simple theory which links unilaterally increases in political stability with increases in the level of economic performance.

IN INDIA ALSO the correlation between political stability and economic development is poor or even negative. During the period of British rule, political violence was most severe in the economically most highly developed provinces: Bengal, Bombay, Madras, and Punjab. Even today, Communists are strong in Kerala and West Bengal and weaker in some of the economically less-developed areas; and violence is more likely to occur in Jamshedpur, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, and Allahabad—to mention places of major disturbances during the past few years—than in more backward and underdeveloped areas of India.

In fact, drawing upon the experience of India during the later years of British rule and the first dozen years of independence, the proposition could be made that economic development, far from enhancing political stability, has tended to be politically unstabilizing. In other words, a simple correlation between the level of economic performance and political stability in different areas of India would show that, on the whole, the economically most-advanced regions also exhibited more violence and other signs of stark political instability than the economically less-developed ones.

This observation must, however, not be interpreted as leading to the conclusion that, on the one hand, economic growth has been the only or even the prime cause of political instability, or, on the other, that the best guarantee for the preservation of greater political stability is the renunciation of programs of economic development. If we were to argue this we would fall into the same pitfall of simplistic economist determinism as those who maintain the reverse proposition.

Political instability in India (and elsewhere) is, as already stressed, not related to economic development in any straightforward way. There is one point, however, which seems to explain why some of the most backward areas present a high degree of political stability and why in India and other parts of Asia and Africa the most highly developed regions have also displayed a high degree of political upheaval, at least temporarily. The political stability of many economically backward societies is the byproduct of political apathy among the masses

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and relative isolation of persons who could form the core of potentially strong organized groups. Backward countries are overwhelmingly agricultural and rural. Whatever groupings exist are based primarily on kinship or quasi-kinship relations, and economic interest groups are entirely or almost entirely absent. Moreover, the mass of the population is not only without popular political leadership, it needs no popular political leadership because it is isolated and politically apathetic. It is this combination of apathy and isolation which explains the stability of countries like Bhutan and Yemen, and which explains the greater degree of stability in some of the most destitute regions of Central India and Rajasthan, as compared with the frequent violence and instability characteristic of Bengal or Punjab politics.

In India, in particular, the nationalist movement during the thirty years before independence was the main instrument in destroying the apathy of the Indian masses. Indeed, the very struggle against the colonial powers made it desirable for the leaders of national independence movements to infuse the indigenous population with political consciousness. The newly independent states have inherited this politically conscious population, and, for this reason, apathy and isolation—and stability based upon them—are rarely to be found.

In general, economic development benefits from a politically active rather than a politically apathetic population. In fact, economic development in itself is a factor which contributes to the fairly rapid destruction of political apathy and isolation. But in India the rejection of political apathy has occurred more rapidly than the rise in the level of economic development and this has created, in large measure, the existing discrepancy between organized demands and resources available to the government to fill these demands. This is also the reason why one cannot rely on a slowing up of economic growth or even on economic stagnation to enhance political stability in India. Economic stagnation may be innocuous in a country in which political apathy is widespread, but in India it would lead to catastrophe.

In other words, the generally held assumption that economic development is a necessary *sine qua non* for the Indian government is true, not because there is an invariable correlation between the rate or level of economic advancement and the degree of political stability, but because in India a politically conscious public has become organized into economic and political interest groups which direct their demands at government, and because it is in the Indian tradition of relations between government and the public for government to assume responsibility for the public's welfare demands. Thus political traditions, the development of a politically active public, and the gap between demands and resources have produced a situation which, for the government of India, contains certain compulsive features.

One way out would be to change the "rules of the game," i.e., to abrogate the existing system in which demands can be freely voiced and to replace it by some autocratic or totalitarian system. Another

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alternative would be for the gap between aspirations and reality to become so wide that effective government ceases, and an anarchic or quasi-anarchic situation arises and holds sway, at least temporarily, to be replaced, most probably, again by a system of autocracy. The third alternative, and the one which the present government of India appears to be determined to follow, is to cope with potential stability by accelerated economic growth; in other words to narrow the gap between demands and resources, aspirations and reality.

One reason the Indian government looks upon the present level of development as perilous to political stability is the high degree of organized demands within Indian politics. Trade unions, peasant organizations, student groups, caste, tribal, and linguistic groups all place demands upon government for more jobs, for expansion in educational facilities, for investment in local development projects, for more food, and in general for higher living standards for their groups. India's governmental leadership is aware of the fact that the country's present political stability results from the popular strength of the Congress Party, the internal cohesion which the party has thus far been able to maintain, and a fragmented opposition which has made it possible for Congress to maintain control of the central and most State governments in spite of the fact that it commands the support only of a minority of the electorate. The rising demand of organized groups, however, stands in the shadow, and it is easy to understand why the Indian government looks upon economic development, and therefore a rise in its own budgetary resources, as a means for securing stability. But this solution in itself, as we shall see, is a perilous one and in the remainder of this paper we should like to suggest a few reasons why a development-centered policy is not likely to lead to a significant lessening of political instability in India, and why, in our opinion, the only decisive steps that may lead to this result lie in the realm of political action.

IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE to exhaust all the possible or even prospective interrelations between political instability and economic growth which may arise in India. What we can do, is to list a few special cases, moving from the more specific to the more general situations, in the hope of indicating how the unstabilizing effects of economic development may be operative at many diverse levels. First we presume that certain already existing conflicts may—and in some instances surely will—be magnified by economic growth. Secondly, we will attempt to show that with economic development certain existing relationships become altered or upset, and this, in turn, may lead to political instability and conflict. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will argue that the inherent structure of the political system is not likely to mitigate tension. We shall argue that even though resources at the disposal of government may increase, demands will increase with them, and indeed may increase more rapidly than re-

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sources, and the power, size and number of organizations which make demands upon government are likely to increase.

If we now turn to the already existing tensions which are likely to become aggravated by economic growth, we note first the existing regional conflicts. The growth in regional loyalties since the turn of the century, and their recent political expression in the creation of several new linguistic States may result in increased inter-State conflict as economic growth takes place. Tamil antipathies toward the north are expressed in increased pressure on the central government for investment in South Indian economic development. Tensions between Bengal and Bihar, Andhra and Madras, and the new States of Gujerat and Maharashtra are intensified as the central government has investment funds to allocate. With an increased program of investment, these tensions may increase in intensity. At the bottom of these growing conflicts is a gap between resources and aspirations. Are all States and all areas equally well endowed with educational institutions? Is the distribution of aid from the center equitable? Are some regions entitled to special treatment, either because they are more backward than others, or perhaps just because they are less backward? These are questions which have existed in the past, have not been solved, have somewhat increased in magnitude, and may lead to bitter conflict.

Another field in which existing conflicts may be sharpened by future development is the struggle among social and communal groups. An obvious example is the conflict between town and country, between the Hindu community and tribals, and between religious communities or castes. Economic growth may affect powerfully the relative position of these groups. So long, for example, as secular and ritual status of two castes coincide there is not likely to be a conflict, but when secular status changes while ritual status remains the same, conflicts are likely to ensue. Even where ritual and secular status have differed, economic growth may sharpen the differences. Take as an example the increasing penetration of the countryside by the money economy. In many villages traditional shares in kind were payable as land rent. With the introduction of money it may become to the advantage of either landlord or tenant to pay rent in money. Clearly the advantage of one group is the disadvantage of the other, and commutation of land rent may become a violently fought over issue. Some of these processes are visible at present. Some of the inter-caste violence which mars the Indian countryside today is an outflow of these changes. With continued economic change, and in the absence of very rapid advances in agricultural production, the conflicts resulting from such dislocations may become even more frequent and violent.

The very participation of government in programs of economic planning tends to increase these conflicts. While the notion of public planning may be widely supported, there are invariably differences over how public funds ought to be allocated. What priorities should be established in planning industrial development? In which district

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shall a new college be built? Shall government make its decisions on the basis of what will net the best return in the long run for the nation as a whole? No matter what criteria are employed, some groups are bound to be dissatisfied. The more the capacity of government to spend increases, and the more investment decisions are made by government rather than by the private sector, the more there are likely to be conflicts over allocations between organized groups and government, between local governments and State governments, and between State governments and the center.

IMBALANCES IN THE RATE of economic growth are still another source of political tensions. If industrial output and employment grow at a substantially faster rate than food output, urban costs of living rise, and this in turn may lead to political demonstrations, strikes, and possibly violence. But perhaps even more serious are imbalances between economic progress and cultural change. As long, for example, as various forms of manual labor are regarded as unfit occupations for a person with somewhat higher education, additions to the educated labor force may exceed the job opportunities considered appropriate by this labor force. Furthermore, if a man learning to read and write considers it beneath his dignity to farm, a raising of educational levels in the countryside may lead to widespread migration to the cities. India may thus enhance the problems it already faces with educated unemployed in the cities. Educated unemployment may increase on all levels, and the paradox already present in nascent form, may grow in size, of a country in which skilled labor is a scarce resource, and yet in which highly educated persons are in superabundant supply. But more important than the sheer economic problem of misallocation of resources—a misallocation due not to the economic realities, but the values and beliefs, or perhaps rather the status preconceptions of Indians—is the resulting political instability. No one is as inclined to foster violence as a disgruntled intellectual, at least within the Indian context. It is these persons who compose the cadres of the less responsible political parties who make up the narrower entourage of demagogues, and who become the leaders of millenarian and messianic movements, all of which may, when the opportunity is ripe, threaten political stability.

But even if we could anticipate that the existing conflicts between regions and States, between economic, linguistic, ethnic, and caste groups will not be sharpened, that employment opportunities will keep pace with the supply of new entrants to the labor force, and jobs can be found for the educated graduates of schools and colleges, economic development in India may yet increase political tensions and instabilities, because of the inherent structure of the system. We have described this system as one in which demands by organized groups are directed at government and in which the government is unable to meet these demands because of an insufficiency of resources at its disposal, because of the gap between aspirations and reality. Now it may

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be argued that resources under the best of circumstances cannot catch up with demands, because new demands are likely to be organized as growth occurs, and because those who are now organized are likely to increase their demands as they obtain more, rather than demand less. Groups measure themselves and their achievements not against what they had before, but against what others are getting. In other words, they are more conscious of their relative than their absolute position. It is very unlikely that all groups in society will improve their position at the same rate, and even if they should do so, they will not perceive it to be so. Moreover, economic development invariably produces imbalances of various sorts and they are sure to destroy whatever proportionality there may have existed between the achievements of various groups. For all these reasons, felt differences will continue and even temporary differences will be perceived as more permanent and fundamental than they really are.

Still more important is the fact that the extent of demands is largely a function of the size of the organized group, the conditions and form of its organization, its internal unity, financial and manpower resources, and most important, the nature and skills of its leadership. These factors are largely independent of economic growth, and to the extent to which they are dependent upon it are primarily enhanced by it. But the same impact which economic growth exerts on the size and internal structure of groups, it also has on the formation of new groups. The phases through which political development of India passed are well known. Its first organized groups appeared in a few large metropolitan centers; later an increasing number of urban centers developed political and other groupings; and by now organized groups are springing up all over the countryside. Yet only a relatively small part of India is organized and as education and mass communication increase their impact, and as people increasingly become aware of political opportunities available to them in a democracy to obtain from government the things they want, the more groups are likely to become organized and to make demands.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT has as a necessary consequence the expansion of educational facilities and the increase in the number of educated persons. It tends to widen the impact of the mass media of communication and to open up new communication networks which in turn establish new previously non-existent contacts and thus form the basis of new groups. In other words, economic development produces as a by-product, as it were, the leadership of groups and the organizational conditions for new groups. Thus we may predict with a high degree of confidence that the emergence and organization of new groups will take place as a consequence of India's economic development, and that with the growth in the number, size and strength of these groups the volume and intensity of demands upon government will increase greatly. The already existing gap will not be narrowed,

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but, if anything, widened and the political instability which is derivable from this gap will thus increase.

How to cope with this rising gap is indeed the great challenge to a political leadership concerned with maintaining stability in the framework of representative government. An increase in responsiveness on the part of government is surely one way of mitigating some of the tensions, but obviously no government could respond to all demands —even if it wished to—since, for one, in no society are resources adequate to meet all the demands made by citizens, and for another, demands are often conflicting. Furthermore, no government with any concern for economic growth and social justice can function simply as a broker for all organized demands pursuing no policies of its own.

How to mitigate the instabilities which are likely to result from the unsatisfied demands of organized groups involves for any government difficult day-to-day decisions. Some demands must be pacified if government is to survive; others may be partially satisfied; still others may, if only temporarily, be put aside. No general theory is likely to guide a government as to how to solve such problems.

But government can so act as to reduce the number and severity of the demands made upon it. It may choose to encourage organized groups to present their demands against one another and to minimize its own participation in group conflict within the society. The Indian government, for example, could choose to minimize its present role as arbitrator in labor-management disputes; in conflicts among linguistic, caste, tribal and religious bodies, the State and central governments might choose not to act unless the conflicting parties agree. The Indian government could choose as its role that of a referee ensuring that the rules of the game are properly observed. The more government can successfully function as a referee, the less it need operate as an adjudicator, and it is in this latter role that the government is confronted with the wrath of those whose demands are not acceded to.

Such a policy does not necessarily decrease the number of conflicts which exist, for conflict is built into any modernizing society where the relative position of social and economic groups are rapidly changing, but it can help to deflect some of these conflicts away from government. Indeed if harmony, or at least political stability is desired, in the long run it is best to encourage groups to converse, bargain, negotiate, and even fight with one another. For the state to serve constantly as a go-between is to minimize contact and communication between groups without which a sense of a nation-wide society cannot be built. The initial contacts between groups may in fact often be violent, in spite of the efforts of the state to enforce law and order but, as the Maharashtrians and Gujeratis recently learned, there must ultimately be negotiation and concession if there is to be settlement. If experience in other societies which have made the transition to modern life is any guide, it may very well be that some amount of inflexible group conflict and even violence is necessary for groups to learn the value of peaceful negotiations.

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COMMUNICATIONS

The Idea of Revolution

Tom Kahn

The spontaneous movement that erupted out of Greensboro last year is laboring forth an ideology. This is a difficult period for so young a movement, especially one relatively lacking in politically sophisticated leadership. The students are further handicapped by an accident of history: their revolt has come at a time in the United States when the revolutionary tradition lies wounded, and radicals contemplate their own disillusionment. The legacy of the thirties is a modern distaste for revolutionary lines of thought and a disinclination to confront the question of social power.

I believe Michael Walzer's "The Idea of Resistance" [DISSENT, Fall 1960] reflects this disinclination. In his effort to construct an ideology out of the sit-ins, Walzer turns to the Middle Ages for clues and proceeds to mangle history badly.

The burden of his article is that there is a terrorless alternative to Revolution—the Idea of Resistance. Resistance, he explains, predates Revolution, which does not emerge in Western thought until the 17th century. Resistance, as a response to oppression, was operative "long before men conceived of a plastic political order which could be refashioned at will." (Curious language with which to describe the evolution of the state.) In addition, Resistance was not "aggressive and transforming but . . . defensive and limited . . . designed to defend natural law, traditional rights or legal order." Techniques of Resistance included the "nonpayment of taxes, the refusal to publish the king's decrees, the passive refusal to stir at his command," etc. Finally, those techniques "can be enacted at many different social levels, down to the smallest community of men. . . ."

The extrapolation of modes of human conduct from their historical setting is in general a risky business. Without discrediting the techniques of resistance described above, it should be plain that they were particularly appropriate in medieval Europe. Under the feudal social structure, authority was at a distance. Nation states were only in the process of formation, and even later, when centralized authority had been established by the king over the nobility, he depended heavily upon their fealty. The "traditional rights" the nobility defended were those of the older feudal order against the encroachments of monarchical centralization. On the other hand, "aggressive and transforming" movements are led by classes and groups demanding rights and privileges in the main *not* recognized by the old order. (Obviously the Negro students, civil defense protesters and the like are demanding rights *not* recognized by the old order. Though they may appeal to "higher laws" they are not defending, by any means, the "legal order.")

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With the formation of the nation state, Resistance explodes into Revolution. It becomes recognized that the new need is to capture control of the state, whose increasing strength renders impossible the continuation of simple Resistance. Walzer fails to explain that this is why "the idea of revolution in Western thought emerges in the 17th century from the much older idea of resistance."

THE MODERN STATE is, of course, a gigantic, inescapable octopus. The FBI, that tentacular and almost autonomous secret police network, had no counterpart in feudal society. The federal government directly employs millions of Americans and indirectly, through contracts and subsidies, many millions more. As arbiter of our foreign affairs, the state has the power to plunge us into wars so totally devastating as to permit little hope of individual survival.

Under these conditions, Resistance, if it is to come down out of the hills, if it is to remold social life, must transform the state. That is, it must be revolutionary. Indeed, even if its goals are narrow, Resistance may not often escape its own revolutionary logic and still be true to itself. The "acts of stoppage and withdrawal" to which Walzer refers as nonrevolutionary are precisely the sparks which have ignited all revolutions.

The Idea of Resistance can be resurrected from the Middle Ages only by reproducing a medieval state of mind. It is an ideology of the individual in a political vacuum, operating within small groups in a stateless society. Walzer recognizes this, though not the cause for it, when he states that "Resistance has survived in the West as civil disobedience, but it has come, largely under the impact of protestantism, to be an *individual activity and a matter less of objective law and right than of private conscience.*" (My emphasis.) He continues: "Every conscientious objector is practicing a form of resistance; his disobedience is not revolutionary precisely because it is *civil,* that is, it is orderly and public, it involves no conspiracy, it does not require the total renunciation of the established social order."

Now what distinguishes revolutionary activity from resistance is not that resistance is orderly and public, while presumably the revolutionary is bloody and conspiratorial. Walzer is absorbed in the externals of revolution and not in its essence. The correct distinction, which indeed renders the C. O. a nonrevolutionary, is that he undertakes an individual act of protest which does not endanger "the established social order." In other words, he does not come to terms with the question of social power, the question of the state. His renunciation of the established order is merely symbolic—an example of individual behavior which, if it impelled masses, would be revolutionary. But masses have not been so impelled, unfortunately, and conscientious objection has not become a political force in the United States.

I DO NOT CLAIM that the Negro students of the South are now waging a revolution in the precise sense of the word. But there are two crucial senses in which their struggle can correctly be called revolutionary.

First, the students are literally doing battle with the state. Implicit in the students' action is a challenge to the very existence of the Southern state as presently constituted—not only its laws but its very structure. The state stands

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as an immediate and ever-present enemy precisely because, uniquely, *it cannot exist except through enforced segregation and political disfranchisement.* The students have won considerable success in integrating lunch counters, but they have barely scratched the surface. At some point, Southern state governments are going to have to be dismantled. Negro political representation, now virtually nonexistent, must be instituted. Now democratic representation in Dixie means displacing a huge section of a political and economic class; it means ending the direct rule of the cotton and soybean plantations, the textile mills, the tobacco factories, the fruit farms, etc. This is a revolutionary process and must be coterminous with the extension of the mass movement beyond the lunch counters, libraries and churches—which, after all, are peripheral—if the students are not to be stalemated. The student sit-in movement can last only if it helps to mobilize the adult Negro community. The students are revolutionary in that they have confronted the all-important state power directly and have adumbrated the most potent weapon for its immobilization: mass direct action executed nonviolently.

The second revolutionary aspect of the sit-ins, an extension of the first, has to do with their implications for the American ruling party, the Eastland-Goldwater coalition. Dr. King and other Negro leaders have talked about applying direct action to secure the ballot for the Negro. Consider the devastating effect of 100 Negroes "sitting in" at a polling place, refusing to move until permitted to register or vote! This is nonviolent revolution.

In short, the students are revolutionary in that the logic of their techniques and aims points necessarily to a reorganization of the state and national governments. This is not, as Walzer has "learned, the task of professionals," but of a conscious mass movement which rejects his dictum that "we need . . . to be less conscientious in our political activity." Negro resistance did not spring unfathered out of Greensboro. The Negro has always offered resistance: through the early slave revolts and the Underground Railway right up to the Montgomery Bus Protest. But such efforts are limited and tentative so long as they leave the state untouched.

The discussion around Revolution vs. Resistance is fruitful not because it contemplates seizure of power but because it illuminates a spectrum of approaches to practical problems. I believe Walzer's rejection of Revolution and indifference to political transformation of the state are at the bottom of his essentially anarchistic defense of states' rights:

> It is a piece of the good-willed naivete of liberal reformers to refuse to recognize the right of local obstruction. . . . If the obstruction is itself oppressive, as it is in the South today, then men must organize and resist it in their cities, colleges, unions, in the name of human rights or of higher law.

We are back in the Middle Ages. The state has abdicated its responsibilities for human conduct in behalf of smaller communal units: colleges, unions, cities, etc. I suppose that if the local obstruction of civil rights is legitimate and the resistance of the obstruction is imperative, then the further obstruction of the resistance is also legitimate, and so on. Would that opposition to local obstruction were the real sin of naive liberals!

I think the goals and values of the radical ought to transcend the question

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of the rights of local obstruction. I see nothing inherently more democratic in the self-rule of small units than in the rule of central authority truly responsive to the needs of the people. Obviously, local obstruction may or may not be progressive, depending on what is being obstructed. The civil rights movement illustrates the absurdity of subordinating social problems to issues of constitutionalism.

Walzer's Idea of Resistance is unequal to the needs of the Negroes. Hope rests only with a mass mobilization of which the sit-in movement is today but a suggestive symbol, a groping beginning. Such a mass movement will not seek "a defense of standards," but the creation of new standards. It will not seek the "protection of rights and liberties," but the creation of rights and liberties. For those of which Walzer speaks exist only as abstractions, if at all. To take root in the real world, such standards, rights and liberties require a refurrowed social soil. This is not the task of a defensive movement but of an aggressive one, not of the Idea of Resistance but the Idea of Revolution.

Michael Walzer replies:

Mr. Kahn and I disagree first in our interpretations of the Negro civil rights movement. He is interested in what might be called the unintended—or immanent—consequences of the movement; these, he suggests, include the revolutionary transformation of the American state. Presumably any means to that end will do, i. e., the movement of any mass, and certainly the Negroes as well as the workers. Someone must bear the burden of revolution; Mr. Kahn means to suggest that this is the black man's burden, and that he must carry it whether he will or not. Revolution is "implicit" in the student sit-downs; the "logic" of the movement points to the seizure of state power, etc. This sort of rhetoric, though it pretends to be objective analysis, seems to me something very different. It indicates that Mr. Kahn has intentions which are not those of the Negro students. Not sinister intentions, to be sure, for as it turns out he uses revolution chiefly as a metaphor for rather moderate political change; but *different* intentions, so that one can foresee his eventual battle with the Negro students' purely spontaneous defense of their interests and dignity.

The intentions of the students, of course, are quite limited. This does not mean that their success will be unimportant; it touches the most fundamental point of equality and freedom. But as they repeatedly invoke the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court decision of 1954, it is a little silly to talk of them transforming the state power. They seek rather to share in that power and to enjoy its benefits; their triumph will have the effect of liberalizing our political life —and is this so different from the "revolution" Mr. Kahn describes? But I fail to see how the FBI, which he invokes with such awe, or the limited welfare state, or the arms race, or the real power of centralized government will be in any way affected.

Mr. Kahn and I disagree secondly on the "terms" we would make with the modern state—I mean the intellectual terms, for in practice the question

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does not arise in any very immediate fashion. To me, Mr. Kahn's terms amount to a surrender; the idea of the state dominates his political thought; he cannot imagine politics as anything else than a struggle for control. He describes the modern "totalitarian" state with a perceptible shudder, yet he would "seize" that state—and seize it, I presume, to use it. The shudder would become a shudder of delight, and state power would be strengthened, as it has been strengthened by every previous "seizure."

IT DOES NOT SEEM to me that the forms of the contemporary state—whoever is in control—are compatible with the idea of freedom. Watching the enormous energy and obvious enjoyment of our new president, it occurs to me that Hegel's dictum about freedom might well be paraphrased: in the modern state only one man is free. Surely we need to imagine a society in which political activity is a real possibility for all citizens—and that means a society in which the units of political life are drawn to human scale. Mr. Kahn is wrong to believe that there *can be* a central authority "truly responsive to the needs of the people"—even more, however, he is wrong to think that such responsiveness by our representatives in Washington would be sufficient.

> People say [wrote Martin Buber in *Paths to Utopia*] that the chief changes in a socialist society will be this: that the workers will feel themselves represented by the holders of power. But what is representation? Does not the worst defect of modern society lie precisely in everybody letting himself be represented *ad libitum*? And in a "socialistic" society will there not, on top of this passive political representation, be added a passive economic representation, so that, with everybody letting himself be represented by everybody else, we reach a state of practically unlimited representation and hence, ultimately, the reign of practically unlimited centralist accumulation of power? But the more a human group lets itself be represented in the management of its common affairs . . . the less communal life there is in it and the more impoverished it becomes. . . . For community . . . declares itself primarily in the common and active management of what it has in common, and without this it cannot exist.

It was on behalf of such a "common and active management" that I defended the idea of resistance. For resistance would be the activity of communities of men, struggling to win their freedom from the state, to resist its encroachments, above all, to defend collective interests and ideals. But the achievement of such communities requires that we surrender the millenarian fantasy of transforming the modern state and commit ourselves to the more modest work of subverting it.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE WELFARE STATE

Ignazio Silone

The New Utopia

The technicians claim that a general use of nuclear energy in industry could bring about a reduction of the work day to two or three hours. It is not easy to predict how men will use the resulting surplus of energy. Strangely, no politician has so far given his opinion as to the social consequences of this possibility. Even those politicians who are traditionally tied to nineteenth-century utopias prefer not to think about it. Their perplexity is easily understood, for one is able to imagine how it would be possible to keep alive the Order and the Hierarchies (even the New Order and the New Class) in a society where the whole population is free from the burden of physical labor and is idle twenty-two hours out of twenty-four. Nuclear energy for public welfare may be as frightening a perspective as the atomic war.

The Negation of the Negation

One can never be wary enough of the illusion of logical and consequential reasoning. Although for a century the terminology of the dialectic has been abused, few men understand the nature of contradiction. Consider the fate of democracy. Since it represents, first of all, the rights of society against the expansionism of the state, democracy should logically imply an order in which the concentration of power is minimized. But in order to supply the neediest classes of society with ever-increasing public assistance, the forces of democracy work to the advantage of the state, and thus to their own ruin. Social democracy stifles political democracy. Note that we are here talking of principles, and not of the struggles of parties which call themselves democratic. A society able to assist itself, to promote the welfare of its members, through a plurality of mutual and free associations, could also give life to the democratic principles of self-government. But this its mediocre representatives, suffering from chronic worship of the state, cannot do.

The Dog and the Electric Rabbit

Since I was born and brought up in southern Italy, my first reflections on the situation of man in a rich, more or less equalitarian society go back only to my early adult years. I am referring to the time when I began writing *Fontamara,* in the thirties, at the beginning of my

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long exile in the German-speaking cantons of Switzerland. It would be difficult to imagine a contrast greater than that between the subject of my first novel (poverty and oppression in a village of southern Italy) and the social conditions of the country in which I took refuge. In Switzerland there exist forms of direct democracy that are, perhaps, unique in Europe, and poverty has for a long time been limited to exceptional cases. My awareness of this contrast was sharpened by acquaintance with a few Swiss. There were men of different classes (artists, doctors, architects, Protestant ministers, craftsmen) and different beliefs, but they had in common some typically Helvetian qualities—hidden, to be sure, by an instinctive and sometimes even rough sobriety and a dislike of any form of ostentation. Together with some of them I mourned "the God that failed"; with others I had in common an unceremonious way of applying Christian morality to the history of our time.

Stirred by homesickness and a political passion that I could not express in any other way, I wrote that story of poor southern peasants, and tried to describe the tragic, sometimes even grotesque collision between their still semi-feudal mentality and the new forms of exploitation and tyranny. At the same time, my Swiss friends were providing a no less harsh criticism of their own country's spiritual decadence. They denounced the vulgar hedonism—especially of the Swiss of the richer cantons—the mercenary neutralism, the infatuation with technology and the subsequent boredom. In support of their complaints they cited the most recent statistics on divorce and suicide, the growing fashion of psychoanalysis among all classes, and the mediocrity of artistic and literary production—in spite of substantial public and private patronage. In my frequent discussions with these friends, it was impossible not to consider the possibility that the spiritual stagnation of which they were complaining was really a consequence of the collective prosperity, and that the same stagnation would result in any other country on the road to well-being.

Although they did not divert me from what I was doing, these were not unimportant problems for me. I believed that they were problems to be dealt with when they became relevant—and it would be some time before the "cafoni" of Fontamara would have to cope with the inconveniences of opulence. But the tricky question of the link between collective well-being and moral life remained a flea in my ear, all the more because it was an aspect of the more general relationship between social structure and cultural superstructure which was already at the center of my reconsideration of Marxism.

Welfare and Morality

It has become impossible to count the voices criticizing a social order based on the idea of welfare. These are warnings from the economically more developed countries against the illusion that cultural and moral advances derive from material well-being. It seems instead that the unpleasant characteristics that often make the *nouveau riche* appear grotesque, are reproduced on a larger scale in nations which have

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attained economic wealth and security. Prosperity apparently serves mainly to satisfy the long suppressed hunger for cheap and coarse pleasures; vulgarity increases together with income. The protected individuals of well-fed nations appear to us as massive, extroverted, boring and bored beings, the permanent objects of external solicitation. Memory becomes weaker; men no longer think or stand alone; they do not have friends but only acquaintances. Just at the moment when philosophers have rediscovered the Hegelian concept of alienation, a complacent reality demonstrates it.

Mechanical progress has created machines which resemble men and corresponding social evolution fashions men who resemble machines. Even the leaders are called "big wheels." It would be useless to object that in every stage of historical development, there have been uniformities of behavior, fashion, collective infatuation. The reply is simply that these are now, as never before, mass produced, like all other objects of common usage. The size of the capital investment in consumer goods industries, from automobiles to phonograph records, from food preserves to clothing, makes it imperative that sales volume not be left to chance: consumer desires must be excited, directed, controlled.

Whatever the nature of the political regime, the manifold functions of a wealthy society tend to be directed by a class of anonymous, well-paid, disciplined, efficient and docile bureaucrats. The result reminds us of the caricature that, until a few decades ago, liberal writers drew of the future socialist order: in medical records, death by tuberculosis would be replaced by death by boredom. One might conclude that the affluent society created by industrialism has all the faults of socialism without its advantages.

It is not possible to accept such conclusions, however, without a word of caution. First of all, they seem to involve a serious confusion of three distinct notions: the affluent society, the welfare state, and mass culture. These ideas correspond to three different social conditions—which need not always coexist. To attribute entirely to affluence the faults of the welfare state and of mass culture is at least a false generalization.

Soup, Subsidy and the Welfare State

The welfare state is one of the aspects of that broader phenomenon of our times, the growth of centralized power, which is due to causes operative not only in the richer countries. A welfare state, more exactly, is one which assumes the task of helping that part of the population not able to take care of its basic needs by itself—old and sick people, invalids, unemployed workers, victims of natural catastrophes, etc. One may explain this recent evolution of the state according to one's own preferences: as a result of Christian principles of charity, or of socialist principles of social responsibility, or as a prudential defense of public order. It is certain, however, that the phenomenon, because of its very extension, is acquiring the character of necessity. The state inter-

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venes to remedy the dangerously unequal distribution of income and to restrain the disinherited classes from despair and riot.

It is obvious that richer countries can appropriate more money to social welfare; but where wealth is fairly widespread and life is still sufficiently sane and dynamic, appeal to the state is not always necessary. State intervention is, on the other hand, imperative in the poorer countries as soon as they become involved in the problems of modern life, whatever party is in power. It would be a mistake to assume this tendency to be typical of democratic states, since it now prevails also in dictatorial regimes, if for no other reason than as a demagogic reward for the deprivation of freedom. The major difference between modern and old-fashioned, conservative dictatorships is that the modern regimes must ape the socialists. Even this paradox is not new. In Sparta public assistance was more developed than in Athens. And the familiar three F's of the political art of Bourbons (*Feste, Farina, Forche*—Feasts, Flour, Gallows) may also help us in understanding the welfare state.

The state is no longer a "night watchman state," solely concerned with public order. No party can avoid coming to grips with poverty, whatever its ideas about economic policy. It is only necessary to remember that the most progressive welfare system—the English one—was conceived by Beveridge, a liberal. Within the existing social system, we cannot do without the welfare state; it is necessary to protect pensioners from inflation, to indemnify peasants whose crops are damaged by hail, to send sickly children to summer camps, to encourage the building of low-priced housing, to subsidize any number of other activities.

From all this, there result important changes in the relation between the citizen and public authority. Many of the problems said to arise from affluence are in fact the typical products of the welfare state, even in poor countries. This is particularly true wherever assistance assumes the character of bureaucratic paternalism. The over-protected man easily becomes a petulant and lazy man. The corruption of character brought about by bureaucratic paternalism is not the least of the evils which have arisen in recent years. Everyone who lives in close touch with the poor knows something about this.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards

Some of the memories of my adolescence revolve around a mutual aid society formed in my native town. It was a modest but flourishing association with many members, mostly small land owners and craftsmen, whose families participated together in its lively recreational activities. It met serious obstacles, however, in distributing its subsidies —even in case of evident need on the part of the members. The main difficulty was pride, the native modesty which restrained many members, crushed by long illnesses and other misfortunes, from requesting the assistance to which they were entitled. I also remember an argument among some of the executives of the society, guests of my family, on the most discreet way of overcoming the bashfulness of the poor.

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This same sentiment manifests itself when in 1915, a few days after the devastating earthquake in the *Marsica,* help poured in from all over Italy. This sudden public response was a new, unforeseen and unforeseeable fact which both moved and surprised all of us; for in such a time, the tradition was that the survivors buried their dead and tried to manage by themselves. That was a hard tradition, unworthy of being mourned. But today, because of the earthquake, other misfortunes, and the work of the Civil Engineering Corps, that part of the country has become one of the strongholds of the welfare state. And now, if, due to a heavy shower, somebody finds a puddle in front of his door, he does not even think of taking a shovel and filling the puddle—as his father would have done—but he writes to his representative.

Bureaucracy and Beggary

Nobody has studied deeply enough the role of governmental subsidies in shaping the ideology of the welfare state. Their value, generally very low so far as poor people are concerned, cannot by itself justify the obstinacy with which the principle of governmental subsidy is defended. It is certainly not easy to explain some aberrations, like the one I shall describe below, solely by economic motivations.

In the spring of 1944, Moroccan troops of the French army entered the country. People have not yet forgotten what then happened in some towns of the *Frosinate* region. All the women who did not have time to take shelter in the mountains were, as they say, "Moroccanated"—there was no consideration for the age of the women; every woman, from ten to seventy, was raped. (A brief parenthesis on the colonial problem is worthwhile. About that same time General Juin, commander of the French armed forces in Italy, was received by the Pope. The Pope complained to him about the immunity granted to the soldiers responsible for the brutalities. The General informed him that North African soldiers could not be punished since the war code of the French army granted to these troops, in enemy territory, the right to rape and plunder.)

In its turn, the Italian government could do nothing but grant to the "Moroccanated" women a modest subsidy. Since it had been a sad experience and one not to be proud of, it was reasonable to expect that many of them would prefer to hide their misfortune. It is possible that this happened; however, local authorities were very surprised when they began to receive requests for the subsidy from women who had been elsewhere at the time of the incidents.

This unusual attempt to swindle the government was mentioned in the newspapers, but soon, for the sake of the good name of the nation, or, more exactly, the region involved, the scandal was suppressed. The episode deserves, nevertheless, to be recorded in the annals of the welfare state, as an extreme case. It is difficult to explain why, in a region where "crimes of honor" are still frequent, mothers of families should falsely claim to have been raped—bringing as evidence the false testi-

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mony of their own relatives. Poverty could not have provided the motive; the reparation was so modest that it was very likely to be absorbed in the expense of the necessary documents and the inevitable lawyer. In other circumstances moreover, these same people would be willing to spend far more money for the sake of their reputation. The only convincing explanation, in my opinion, is to be found in the new relationship between bureaucratic paternalism and the citizenry—a relationship which makes many people lose their normal psychical balance as soon as there is a chance of governmental assistance, whatever the amount, whatever the reason for its distribution.—[*Reprinted from* Tempo Presente, *December 1960; translated by* SALVATORE SCHIAVO-CAMBO.]

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THE WHITE JEW

Jane Hayman

I

This is the age of the White Jew. I have come to resent, if only because of their number, the hordes of outsiders who clamor for admission to the clan. It is sad but true that this year everyone chooses the chosen people. The American Leopold Bloom pops up again and again these days, queer, compassionate, forgiving, and alone. He is a guest at cocktail parties everywhere but can be seen most clearly through the windows of countless city bedrooms, his (often) young body bent in rigid attitudes of love. He is now called Seymour Glass but, as his admirers imply, his real name is Hamlet and he is a prince.

The term "white Jew" (pronounced hwatt jeeoo) is not unknown in this country; it has been used in certain circles to mean a Jew who lacks the offensive traits of his tribe, a Jew, in other words, who looks and behaves like a "hwatt mayun." The hero of this piece, the White Jew (pronounced white Jew), is cut from a different bolt of cloth altogether. With apologies to Norman Mailer, I use the phrase because it seems to express conveniently a number of attributes of the would-be lover I shall presently describe.

White Jew, even in the sense meant here, is not an entirely new expression. In recent years I have heard it used, in and around New York City, of the Gentile who, for one reason or another, has become infatuated with the Jews. This usually happens among arty people and intellectuals but lately the fad has spread. It is fashionable now, with Jews and non-Jews alike, to cherish a Semitic stereotype that enables them to live without guilt while turning their backs on social and political realities. Love is all and the Jew is accounted the supreme lover. The "Jew" admired, however, is neither the actual religious Jew nor the specifically Jewish intellectual but the man, Gentile or Jew, who believes in himself as an inspired outsider: a sufferer who is at the same time a lover. The White Jew may be a Christian with a Jewish heart or even a Jewish Christian, but the important thing about him is that he is a victim.

ACCORDING TO ONE TRADITION, the Jew, an outcast and a wanderer, is sometimes unattractive and ignoble but always shrewdly human. This "true" Jew is often bitter, invariably sophisticated; he understands; he has found the meaning of life even if that meaning is merely that to

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live is to suffer. Having been forced to recognize his own mortality, he can afford the compassion for other mortals that the jealous Gentile perceives and resents.

Pain, we know, is not a virtue. When its only end is the mutual self-pity which today is called "compassion," it is worse than useless, it is decadent and destructive. Yet out of pain and united in pain there has arisen a new generation, the bleeding-heart generation of the fifties. Its more articulate members seem bound to engulf the sixties as well; they express themselves frequently and with increasing monotony in books and plays, on television and in the movies, in national magazines and in the intellectually advanced reviews. No longer silent, no longer waiting, this generation has begun to organize. Its idols are Salinger, Erich Fromm, and (acknowledged or not) the Beats. Its typical member, the White Jew, is young or youngish, college-educated, sensitive, literary, and a self-proclaimed neurotic who may or may not be, but usually is, undergoing analysis. If unmarried he (or she) probably has an active and rather casual sex life. If married he is domestic, though open to divorce. He is apolitical—that is, while he votes for the Democrats and considers himself a liberal, he has no political ideas—and whether or not he is attached to a university his thinking is neither scholarly nor original.

The White Jew may be an artist—he may write or paint—or he may not, but he is by definition an outsider, alone in a billboard world that can give him neither accepted tradition nor acceptable values. Corporations snatch away his college friends, television seduces his children, and even art sells out publicly, producing a book club "for people who like books better than automobiles." Our friend likes books better than automobiles but he's damned if they'll get him that way. However, he is bewildered, he is depressed. Society offends him but he is awed by its well-oiled sophistry and subtle scientism. He blusters by day but at night he has bad dreams; he is lost in a labyrinth with no exit.

The life of the White Jew, like that of many real Jews, is suffused with fear. Among the dark shapes that have threatened him since babyhood, biggest and blackest is the shape of the Enemy—the organized world in which he lives. If his education and his reading and his analyst and his wife have helped him to overcome the influence of the parents who, he feels, robbed him of his manhood, it is the parent figure of the Enemy that paralyzes him now with fright and disgust...while at the same time it beckons, slyly, temptingly.

With great perception, Joyce made his twentieth-century Jew, Leopold Bloom, a masochist. A stranger on the earth, Bloom suffers and understands, is persecuted and forgives, loves and cannot act. He is better than the Irishmen who torture him, yet he enjoys his own degradation. But Freud aside, if Bloom is Everyman, then, strictly speaking, every man is a cuckold and less than a man. If Bloom is not the Everyman of all time, he is at least an Everyman of today, our self-appointed Jew, not a pilgrim but a bum, walking down Nothing Street, heading for Nowhere.

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II

If the outsider can identify himself with all of suffering humanity, he is no longer an outsider, he is in. The essence of the White Jew reveals itself in his love. This love, often called compassion, is a loose amalgam of emotions invented by members of the in-group as an answer to the world situation. Basic to it is a romantic belief in the fundamental holiness of the diseased and the deranged. When Zooey Glass tells his sister Franny that a fat lady from the Middle West is Jesus Christ, he speaks as a White Jew. When Kerouac and Ginsberg canonize themselves and their associates, they expound new qualifications for sainthood, important among them fatuousness and ignorance. When such writers as Bernard Malamud, who peoples his eerie world with sad dwarfs from a long-lost ghetto, and Truman Capote, whose fancy is often taken by physical malformation, celebrate the grotesque, they only affirm a popular belief that the subhuman and the anti-human are the truly human. When the organization world presses too hard on the outsider, he declares his contempt for conformity by clutching deformity to his breast.

But love among the White Jews is not confined to love of freakishness. Sexual love, love of the little guy, and mother love are equally important. Love, in fact, has become one of the fastest-moving commodities on the market. In every case, love of weakness in general—compassion—is the thing that counts. (Occasionally love of animals or even love of plants is brought into play, as in the well-authenticated case of the Salinger fan who was late to a party one rainy night because she stopped to kiss a tree.) Such a plethora of feeling might almost be Franciscan except for the fact that the modern correlative of the saint's inner light is a rich, morbid self-hatred.

Erich Fromm quotes Nietzche in *Man for Himself*: "Your neighbor love is your bad love of yourselves. Ye flee unto your neighbor from yourselves and would fain make a virtue thereof! But I fathom your 'unselfishness'. . . You cannot stand yourselves and you do not love yourselves sufficiently." The White Jew assumes the face of love to mask his own cowardice and defeat. Afraid to act, he turns his back on action, but warmed with the soothing knowledge of his loving superiority he is able, like all martyrs, to patronize his tormentors. True life, he says, is in pain and in pain is God. Pain is what enables us to recognize and so to love one another.

TENDERNESS AND SENTIMENTALITY gush freely from the bosom of the White Jew and keep him from thoughts of suicide. Again and again his faith is awakened and affirmed by cuteness. Cute midgets, cute dwarfs, cute cripples, cute homosexuals, cute whores, cute drug addicts, cute Negroes, and cute children, especially cute miserable children, remind him constantly of the hand of God in all our doings. If he is J.D. Salinger, his particular passion is little boys and girls, if he is Bernard Malamud, little Jews. If he is John Cheever or Philip Roth, the pictures he paints are distortions of the commonplace; if he is

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Nathanael West, a precursor of the movement, genuine monstrosities excite him. If he is Saul Bellow, he draws his swaggering heroes with a touch of the picaresque to establish psychic distance between them and the real world of pain which they know so well is waiting hotly outside. (Henderson, the Rain King, big and fat, is, as a matter of fact, a kind of male Earth Mother, a gentleman farmer with a heart of gold who is never out of touch with suffering.) Love in these cases is sometimes tempered with bitterness and the intelligent man's awareness that sickness and despair are the actual stuff of his art. Too often, though, a thin film of compassion tints everything pink. These are gifted writers, but their books pall. To honor meanness for its own sake is to feed the self on its own disgust. It breeds, moreover, a subtler corruption of the soul in which the White Jew sneers at others even as he aligns himself with them. Even you, he says, who are so gross, so awful, even you I love.

The cult of love is not confined to novelists. It is the key to success for playwrights and prophets of the stage and the television screen. In the plays of Tennessee Williams, William Inge, and their imitators, a new image of the American man was created. Handsome, primitive, smelly with sexuality, but at heart a lost little boy, he is the lover dreamed about by adolescent girls and homosexuals. His gifts include physical energy plus true love, and whenever he can find a decent motherly girl to rape, he and she settle down happy as clams. Conversely, in *Tea and Sympathy* an American dream comes true when the beautiful, wise and maternal but still sexy schoolmaster's wife gives her favors and her love to the schoolboy, Tom Lee, who has been accused of pederasty. After such a triumph it must be supposed that everything goes right for him.

Love sweeps the field consistently on today's stage but nowhere with such boring regularity and with such an accompaniment of chatter as in the little plays of Paddy Chayefsky. Traces of the Leftist realism of the thirties and a dash of the Yiddish theater mingle with a faintly Saroyanesque attitude toward the human race in general; over these have been poured the real-type people and genuine home atmosphere of the Method school. Love holds the mixture together and without it the author's work would lose all of the slickness, smoothness and blandness that makes it popular. Examples of Chayefsky's misuse of love would make a long, dull list but I was particularly annoyed by a movie called *The Bachelor Party*. In it the worries of a group of male bookkeepers come to light during a night on the town. All hate the job, two of them are lonely, one is resigned, the other two need money. To all of them Mr. Chayefsky shouts: Go home to your women and shut up. If you don't have a woman, get one. Love each other, huddle together, keep warm. Love will find a way.

I am troubled by the vision of millions of bookkeepers all over the world, ten and fifteen and thirty years from now, warming themselves at the fires of love while overhead the lights of civilization flicker and

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go out. Mr. Chayefsky has converted into a positive glut on the market an idea that has come down to him from above. His use of the concept of love is irresponsible—but is he more irresponsible than those who could see disaster if they would and yet refuse to look?

The cult of compassion is in fact a cult of failure; love as the White Jew knows it is a last resort. He may, in his own life, pursue it zestfully, yea, from bed to bed, but it will elude him forever. Having surrendered before the battle, he cannot be a hero in the tradition of the Western world and if he has a go at the Eastern religions, his vaguely guilty conscience rarely permits him the necessary quietness of soul. Meanwhile he creeps around in the darkness waiting for Santa Claus to come.

AN UNATTRACTIVE and telling parable of our times may be found in a bad verse play written by one of our major poets and presented on the New York stage two seasons ago. Far too little of the right sort of attention has been given to the hideous social and political implications of this work, *J. B.*, Archibald MacLeish's story of the modern Job. Let us ignore its mythic and poetic entanglements and glance only at J. B. himself as a representative modern man. As the play starts he is a smug, stupid businessman, well-endowed with this world's goods and a far cry from the would-be lover I have chosen to call the White Jew. As the play progresses, however, catastrophe follows misfortune as in the Biblical story and when we last view J. B., he is a mutilated victim of the hydrogen bomb. Aha, we say to ourselves, he will curse man and die. But we watch with mounting horror as modern Job blesses God and calls for more love. Like Paddy Chayefsky's bookkeeper, J. B. goes back to his wife and, fortified by love, the two of them, I suppose, will try to make a life in the ruins.

This, then, is the ultimate triumph of weakness and myopia. When man blames a God, in whom he does not believe, for the sordid mess made by other men, he has begun at last to replace Jehovah with Big Brother. J. B. knows who made the bomb and if it was not he, it was his brothers in the Defense Department. The truth is that he is as afraid of them as the real Job was magnificently unafraid of the Lord. When Mr. MacLeish, in such a context, preaches love of God he is, in effect, turning the bomb into The Bomb and worshipping the defense dollar.

When confidence men are plentiful it seems unwise to fancy oneself as a victim. The White Jew has not yet come to the pretty pass of MacLeish's hero. He knows who the enemy is. In the role of conscious victim, however, he is hardly more rebellious than J. B. The White Jew accepts suffering as the norm, revels in it and calls his maudlin picnic love. By logic, if love increases as suffering does, our friend should be ever closer to God as things get worse. This is something to look forward to.

VOLUMES HAVE BEEN WRITTEN and will be written on the loneliness of American life. We respond to this in different ways; one man's togetherness is another man's compassion. But the fact is that

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individual man is always alone and that all of Western culture has been built on this hypothesis. It is in the strength and the ideas of the individual that we have sometimes found greatness. The twentieth century has underscored our solitude and made us cynics. Hitler's storm troopers grew out of a Weltschmerz akin to our own; we who witnessed the rise of Hitler, we who have generations of a liberal tradition behind us, are not likely to fall immediate prey to that kind of glittering cynicism. What we, the heirs of American lost causes, must fear instead is the frustration that will lead us first into a mire of hopelessness where, eyes averted, we clutch at one another, congratulating our own weakness in whining words of love. No one is asked to be optimistic today and few can be bravely radical. There is much to be said, however, for a grave and reasonable cynicism that leaves room for an honest attempt to shape the materials at hand. It is not by crying for love like children for a bottle but by coming to terms with events that we will justify ourselves.

DISSENT FUND DRIVE

The final figure on contributions made to the DISSENT Fund Drive indicates a total amount of $6015.51 has been raised. Although this is somewhat short of the goal we had set, we are grateful to the many readers and friends of DISSENT who made their contributions. The Fund Drive is over, but we will be more than pleased to receive contributions at any time to make possible the magazine's continuation.

—THE EDITORS.

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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:
A Note on American Political Mythology

John P. Roche

After every close presidential election, the stage is set for an inquest: one can count on debates, congressional investigations, learned letters in *The New York Times,* elaborate outbursts of anal scholarship, all concerned with the poor old Electoral College. From the viewpoint of a practical liberal, this is so much time wasted: the only revision which could possibly be adopted by three-quarters of the states would be worse than what we now have. Conversely, the only sensible alteration in terms of democratic theory – direct election – would be butchered in the states in the unlikely event that it survived two-thirds passage in the House and Senate.

However, since these rites are scheduled for this year, there is one aspect of the Electoral College that should be clarified. Clarification will hardly have any impact on either rhetoric or decision, but from a certain antiquarian passion I insist on laying some facts on the table. I am both tired of and annoyed at the generally accepted myth that the Framers of the Constitution fearing the "mob," established a Council of Wise Men to choose the President. Paradoxically this myth has been advanced both by lachrymose conservatives, bewailing our departures from the "prudential wisdom" of the fathers, and by opponents of the College who deplore the founders' undemocratic convictions.

FIRST the institutional setting: under the prevailing states'-rights ideology of the period, members of the Continental Congress and the Congress under the Articles of Confederation were (except in Rhode Island and New Hampshire) selected by the state legislatures. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were chosen in this fashion. But the manner of selection was not based on any fear of the masses—indeed, the most "radical" states were the most vigorous exponents of states'-rights—but on the conviction that these representatives were merely agents, ambassadors of the sovereign state governments. Thus to a states'-rights spokesman, a program incorporating direct popular election of federal officials was immediately suspect as a derogation of state sovereignty. It was seen as a technique for

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end-running the state legislatures and loosing a new Leviathan.

The Madisonian model for the new general government, submitted to the Constitutional Convention as the Randolph Plan, utterly circumvented the state legislatures. The House of Representatives was to be popularly elected in the states with membership proportional to population, the House would choose the Senate, and the Senate and House together would pick the President. Only with reluctance did Madison later concede the state legislatures the right to nominate candidates for the upper house with the lower chamber still exercising the right of selection. (It is odd that those who acclaim Madison the father of the "separation of powers" and "federalism" have overlooked his last-ditch fight for this universal system.)

Without tracing in detail the elaborate infighting that took place in the Convention, I think it is safe to say that the selection and term of the President was the most fought-over issue. (There was a note of irony in this since everyone present knew who the first occupant of the office would be!) Madison and his friends favored election for a fixed term by the national legislature, the states'-rights caucus argued for election by state legislatures or executives, while James Wilson was almost alone in favoring direct public election, and in despair over the possibility of compromise even suggested an electoral college of 15 chosen by lot from the national legislature.

The sticky issue was turned over to a committee chaired by Judge Brearley of New Jersey which finally on September 4, 1787, a bare two weeks before adjournment, came forward with roughly the present arrangement. To a body of working politicians, the merits of the plan were obvious: Everybody got a piece of the cake. First, the state legislatures had the right to determine the mode of selection of electors; second, the small states received a bonus in the form of a guaranteed minimum (3 votes) while the big states got acceptance of the principle of proportional power; third, if the state legislatures agreed (as six did in the first presidential election), the people could be directly involved in the choice of electors; and, finally, if no candidate received a majority, the right of decision passed to the national legislature with each state exercising equal strength. (In the Brearley proposal, the election went into the Senate, but a motion from the floor substituted the House; this was accepted on the ground that the Senate already—in its treaty and appointment powers—had enough authority over the executive.)

THE FRAMERS were extremely practical politicians—and by this time fatigued and eager to get home—so the Electoral College entered the Constitution with little debate. No one seemed to think well of it and what evidence there is indicates that the fathers assumed that once George Washington had finished his tenure as President, the Electoral College would cease to produce majorities and the chief executive would be chosen by the House. James Madison observed that the selection would be made in the House nineteen times in twenty and no one seriously disputed his point. The common knowledge that Washington was to be the first President seems to have muffled debate on this section in the state ratifying conventions—in traditional American fashion, the delegates settled for immediate certainty and were prepared to let the future take care of itself.

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In short, the Framers in their wisdom did not endow the United States with a College of Cardinals. The Electoral College was neither an exercise in applied Platonism nor an experiment in indirect government based on elitist distrust of the people—it was a jerry-rigged improvisation which has subsequently been endowed with a high theoretical content. As David Hume emphasized in his *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,* "there is no subject in which we must proceed with more caution than in [History], lest we assign causes which never existed and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and universal principles."

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competence in organizational problems.

The labor boss complaint, which is a fraud, was never taken seriously so long as it was the cry of the National Association of Manufacturers alone. What enabled the criticism to go was the impulse that pushed intellectuals with liberal reputations to take up the labor boss and bureaucrat cry. Complaints that were ignored when they came from employers and the commercial press were credited even by union leaders when they began to appear in *Commentary,* the *Harvard Business Review,* the occasional papers of the Fund for the Republic and DISSENT. Constitutions were amended, codes of ethical practice drafted, boards of review established, Ombudsmen invoked. The Teamsters, indeed, against the better judgment of union personnel, were expelled from the AFL-CIO. No profound changes took place in the union, in fact, the situation complained about was exacerbated, which, of course, brings up another fashionable but false platitude that is applied to unions, namely that unions are less democratic than they once were, or that they can be democratic if they choose to be.

EVERYONE, OF COURSE, has his own definition of democracy, but if it is formal democracy the critics are talking about, i. e., the devices by which the people who belong to an organization can actually exercise control over it, then the criticism is irrelevant, for this control in unions, as in corporations, government, and any multi-membered organization today, is impossible and will continue to be until a Thomas Edison of the social sciences comes along and invents mechanisms that do not yet exist. By a different criterion, that of measurable economic consequences in the society, there is no more effective instrument of democracy than unions, and the criticism of the union democracy becomes an empty falsehood.

Most often union sniping is counterpointed by exhortations to union leaders to democratize their organizations and to union members to take a positive responsibility for what goes on at their union headquarters. Both adjurations have as much point —less actually—as a plea to come to Jesus. The five to thirty thousand members of big industrial union locals, the lesser numbers in business agent locals, the tens and hundreds of thousands of members in national and international unions, with what is known now, cannot possibly conceive of a method of government that

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would enable the members to have a meaningful say in the operation of their union, and still have a union and a livelihood, any more than the Republican and Democratic parties have yet been able to construct any organizational form to permit individual Democrats or Republicans to exercise a one-man, one-vote control of their operations. Power is delegated irreversibly to control groups, which can never be removed from the driver's seats. About the only restraint on the ruling directorates, ultimately, is that the rank and file will slowly wander off and stop pushing, if the machine doesn't move in the right direction. In unions even this check tends not to work, if there are no rival services. Teamsters stick with Jimmy Hoffa because there is no other truck going up the same highway. Someone might suggest two trucks and a dual highway, which is encouraged in a sense by the NLRB, but in this situation most workers have discovered that a union with a very bad reputation is better than two unions using up their energies trying to strangle one another.

There are many more arguments for the irrelevance of democracy to unions, but they are unnecessary, for it is a sociological truism that workers are not only members of unions; they also belong to PTAs, insurance companies, citizens' associations, political parties, lodges, veterans' organizations, patrotic societies, bowling leagues, the NAACP, and unfortunately, even to White Citizens Councils. If a man or woman assumed what is advertised to be his organizational responsibilities he or she would have to live in a day of infinite duration and do nothing but check financial reports and attend caucuses and committee meetings.

One mnemonic affect which warms the democracy delusion is the impression that democracy did characterize the CIO in its heroic period. But there was nothing democratic about the CIO organizing committees. God knows, responsibility and sensitivity to the rank and file are a massive and tangible reality under Meany, Reuther, Carey, or even the current president of the Hodcarriers (partly on account of changes in the law) compared to what existed under John L. Lewis and Lee Pressman. Factional warfare in the thirties did give off a sound like a democratic vibrato, but in the event what took place was a struggle involving two or sometimes three, or even more cliques while the rank and file by and large stayed home and read the score in the newspapers, if they bothered at all, as is the case in steel today.

The old-time democracy that preceded the bureaucratization of the labor movement is an aging radical's optical illusion diffracted through an imperfect memory of what happened twenty-five years ago.

SIMILARLY, THE UNHAPPY comparison between the thirties that never were and the dolorous present we know, usually assigns to wilfully reactionary and anti-intellectual union leaders the responsibility for the loss of perceptiveness and virility among wage-earners.

Militance is difficult to measure. Strike statistics, however, which are a fair gauge of one aspect of militance tend to dissolve the preterite haze that surrounds the Roosevelt era. The thirties, any year of the thirties, had fewer strikes, both in terms of people involved, and strike incidents, than in recent years.

Moreover, strikes today, in rubber,

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steel, in the chain stores, on the highways, or among garbage collectors characteristically engage every person on the job, and are quietly unanimous. Wage-earners in the thirties, the majority of them, were much this side of a natural, uncorrupted, effervescent class consciousness. The sit-downs were minority coups, undertaken for the very good reason that there was not sufficient support of the union to shut a plant down by a secret strike ballot.

Strikes like those in steel and auto and rubber today, in which the decision is announced and the work stops and stays stopped without even the need to put a picket at the gate, were inconceivable.

What lends a meretricious conviction to the militant recall of the thirties was the desperation forced on a union cadre by employers who had not accepted unions. Gallantry there was on the part of a few, but militance by the masses there never was. Today the need for a cornered courage in defense of the right to bargain collectively has largely passed. In its stead there is the quiet but determined acceptance of the union, and of the necessity to strike when the occasion arises, by almost every member in a union movement embracing sixteen million Americans.

The mental trick by which intellectuals who were unemployed and alienated in the thirties, remember a happy youth when they shacked up politically with workers, arises from another kind of subjective deception.

It is, of course, true that thousands of unemployed college graduates or drop outs did picket, write leaflets, and demonstrate between 1929 and the Second World War, alongside hundreds of thousands of unemployed workers. But this association was a product of the prevailing joblessness. If lawyers, doctors, accountants, mathematicians, artists, writers, actors, playwrights, and dancers wished to picket and demonstrate today on the same terms, they could. Most of these people, however, as their incomes and places in the community have risen, have lost the need or the desire to picket. There are still picket lines and demonstrations, and the chances are if they drove up in their Buicks or Jaguars, Volkswagens or station wagons their presence would still be welcomed. When they did show, it was not because there was a different attitude on the part of workers, or union leaders, toward intellectuals from that of today; the book-readers themselves were in a different situation.

What agitates the people in the stands who urge workers to democratize their unions, or who lament the lost militance, is the presumption that unions are a central levering organization in the society.

THE CRITICS OF UNIONS are very much like the pop bottle throwers at ball games. In effect they say if the unions only behaved as they should, if the union leaders were not fumbling, the DISSENT home team would win the revolutionary ball game, the transformation of society pennant, and the international socialist party world championship.

But unions unfortunately do not play in the big leagues.

What is wrongly taken for granted by most of the people who impute some kind of misleadership to union officials is a central switching authority which could turn the society over that union leaders do not have, and which is not located in the unions in any event.

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No revolution, and no major social transformation has ever come out of a trade union.

The expectant focus on unions is clinically an example of the ideological blurring of the distinction between the trade unions and the labor movement.

Everywhere in the world and not least in the United States, the trade unions are a large, and essential, but not the directing and decisive component in the labor movement, which, in England and the Scandinavian countries, is made up of the Labor Party (or the Social Democrats), the cooperatives, the radicals, the peace movement, the nut-and-date eaters, sometimes the anti-vivisectionists, people who make their opposition to capital punishment their life goal, inarticulate sympathizers, and the entire miscellany of human beings who, out of one generous human impulse or another, want to reconstruct the society in order to institutionalize a larger measure of justice or kindness. Historically, the trade unions, with some exceptions of course, have not produced the leaders of the labor movement, its programs, or its strategies. Often the trade unions, for very good reasons, have braked the movement toward a labor party or toward fundamental reform. It is closer to the truth to say that the trade unions have been dragged reluctantly into a political labor movement than to credit them with a vanguard role.

Trade unions are, and always have been, the organizations least committed to reform in the alliance which constitutes the labor movement. The attribution of radicalism, when it has not been wishful self-deception, has come from the fact that the economic demands of the uinons, because they have been advanced in opposition to the establishment, have been misread as anti-establishmentarian.

In every generation of American life, trade unions as such have disavowed the radical demands of leaders from the non-union side of the labor movement. Unions have come late, if at all, into the campaign for civil rights and civil liberties. Even the most intelligent union leaders fail to speak out on the degradation of TV, radio, films, and the printed media, except to lament their hostility to unions. Union recommendations on education are as banal and reactionary as the ADA proposal for hundreds of thousands of merit scholarships. The commitments of most well-to-do Republicans in the arts are revolutionary compared to what union leaders cherish. The headquarters labor unions build are less imaginative and project fewer human aspirations than the monuments to the profitability of whisky or any modern bank. Tolerance of variance in people, except for larceny, drunkenness and card-playing is about on the level of an Indiana Baptist church or a Brooklyn Catholic parish. Racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice, except in the contract and the resolutions (which should not be underestimated) is considerably higher than among unaffiliated professional and middle-class people. If anything, union leaders react with greater hostility to collective bargaining by their subordinates than Tom Girdler in his green apple period.

Given the unbroken, historic backwardness of the trade unions on practically every significant social issue except jobs, wages, and working conditions, any expectation that the unions are going to be in the vanguard of a break-out toward a new society

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must end in a sterile, apathetic immobility. If change comes in the future, as it has in the past, it will come from outside the trade unions, as the New Deal emerged from bankrupt or near-bankrupt farmers, the impoverished litle business people, the unemployed, and particularly from the vital leaven among the unemployed, the unhappy intellectuals and radicals. It is arguable, indeed, that the impetus for the organization of the unions themselves came from outside the union movement.

Labor shortages caused by two wars and the Negro people have made civil rights the battleground of reform. After all, many large companies employ more Negroes than have found jobs on the staff of the AFL-CIO. Censorship, birth control, the events in Guatemala and Cuba, the gradual evolution of Demo-Christian unions and politics evoke no expression of outrage from union leaders.

No one can deny that our trade unions serve a critical need for workers on the job, at the bargaining table, on payday, when people are hired and when they are laid off, when they get sick, and when they retire. Enabling workers to live a little bit better year by year, to have somewhat more security from negotiation to negotiation, shielding them from arbitrariness and bullying by the foreman and the company, are vital functions that only the union can perform, and which absorb almost all the resources of the union in manpower, comprehension, and money. Even the Communist unions, despite their resolutions, usually attempt no more. On the job, UE is not different from IUE, contract negotiations and union activities have not changed among the fur workers because these wage-earners now belong to the AFL-CIO rather than to an unaffiliated Communist union.

The mistake made by those observers who judge the officers of a trade union by the standards properly applied to the standard bearers of an articulated labor movement is to condemn journeyman technicians because they are not national leaders, shoemakers because they are not hide and leather chemists.

If, under the smart of the criticism, union leaders actually began to conduct themselves like the leaders of a labor movement, the unions, which are the source of what power and importance they have, would dissolve underneath them.

It is not only that leadership on crucial national issues comes from outside the unions, but if unions are to survive it is essential that union leaders keep their places in the second and third rank. There, once the majority sense of wage-earners, which means the nation substantially, is fixed on a particular goal, union leaders can play an important subaltern role in organizing support for the objective. This, of course, is exactly what has happened in civil rights and what is developing in the emergence of a national attitude on education. Yet, at this moment, union contributions to the NAACP or support for a federal effort to achieve genuine, equal education are still sufficiently in question that in some internationals, in some local unions, and in some areas union staff people try to keep these matters off the agenda.

Political parties are the alembics in which the separate interests of the specialized groups in a society are combined into a transcending generalization which reconciles the conflicting and opposed demands. On the con-

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trary, one reason democracy is irrelevant to unions is that there is a practical unanimity of view among members so long as they confront employers. Once the union leaves the place of employment and moves out into the community, it is faced with a diversity of demands from many groups which it neither has the competence nor the power to resolve. Protestant and Catholic union members, for example, have no cause for disagreement in the plant when they are discussing wage demands on the employer. In the community, they conceivably could differ violently on a law regulating the dissemination of birth control information. Political parties have their justification in their ability to find practicable compromises of this sort of disagreement. No union, however, could survive very long in any of the major industrial centers of the country if it let this kind of debate get into its deliberations.

WHILE UNION MEMBERS do not write articles in order to demonstrate this thesis, they understand it in their guts. The insistent pressure on the leadership from the rank and file, is that the union get on with the problems in the shop. What success unions have had in getting support for political programs has been achieved by showing that some shop problems can only be resolved at the legislature. Unions not only argue this point of view in court when they are challenged under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley law, they acknowledge it in union political meetings where characteristically they endorse or oppose candidates on the basis of their positions on what are essentially shop issues: not how they stand on the recognition of China, but how they stand on the extension of the minimum wage, or how they voted on the area redevelopment proposal, or their stance on the Landrum-Griffin law. What you take out of the icebox, the orators have been repeating for at least a generation, depends on what you put into the ballot box.

For the wage-earner, the union is as specialized as his insurance company, his church, his PTA, his doctor, his dentist. He does not accept union decisions on political questions as authoritative. The rank and file and the leadership of the UAW, for example, were at odds on the treatment of Communists within the plant. The miners and John L. Lewis parted company on Roosevelt. Teamster members largely ignore Jimmy Hoffa's voting instructions just as they did Dave Beck's.

G. Mennen Williams as governor of Michigan could and did act independently of the UAW and of the CIO, despite the fact that his majorities came out of these organizations, because wage-earners almost invariably supported him when he differed with the unions. He, they seemed to say, and not Walter Reuther, had been chosen to act for them politically. In the lower echelons, this penchant to separate union assignments from political assignments produces a continuing and persistent irritation for COPE. Union members who are elected as Democratic precinct captains or Democratic committeemen insist on behaving as Democrats and not as Steelworkers or Auto Workers or Plumbers, or Carpenters or Teamsters. Once they get elected to political office this independence becomes even more conspicuous. What is significant is that the support of wage-earner voters enables the men and women who cross over from union to party

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to shrug off pressure from the union leadership and to operate under their own strategies, provided, of course, they stay inside the wider limits of the wage-earner oriented party program, that is, within the confines of the labor movement as distinct from the union movement.

AT THE SAME TIME partial recognition of the self-limiting role of unions has led, unfortunately to a generalization that is almost cruelly false, namely that the American unions, operating in an affluent society now at a terminal point in collective bargaining have won every possible legitimate demand and today are confronted by the need to exercise their imaginations to find new bargaining goals over on the other side of town, or out in the suburbs where every Jack is doing all right. With almost five million workers unemployed, while the number and proportion of the unemployed rise steadily, this statement is the equivalent of the Republican claim that the Democratic charge of poverty in the country is a left-wing lie. Despite the wage increase won in their last strike, steelworkers, the highest paid industrial employees in the country, still on the average in 1960 receive in annual wages slightly less than the Heller Committee of the University of California says is necessary to maintain a family of four in health and decency. Practically all other workers in industry—auto workers, rubber workers, electrical workers, the distributive trades, agricultural laborers, miners, and the railroad workers—receive less than steelworkers. Working conditions, vacations, hours, job continuity, the retirement age, medical care for workers and their families, despite what unions have accomplished, still fall far short of adequacy by any contemporary humane standard. Within unions, the criticism of rank and file leaders is not that the top officers are not showing enough imagination dreaming up new programs, but that they are exercising their imagination on affluent society projects when they might better concentrate on the grievance commonplaces, speedup, pay, layoffs, hours, and what appears to be the frustrating ineffectiveness of the appeals procedure.

THE RIDICULOUS and brutal smugness about the economically replete wage-earner in the affluent society, furthermore, has led to a lot of slush about the worker and his discontents. What is suggested is that unions, having completed their economic tasks, should now examine the work place to reorganize jobs in order to provide psychological satisfaction for the proletariat. The unhappiness of workers here is a gratuitous deduction from the work of Elton Mayo, the Mohammed of the industrial sociologists. But what data exists seems to indicate that workers do like their jobs and that when they do not, it is not because the work lacks content but because their employers do not pay enough, or they are worked too hard, or too fast, or because they are pushed around, or because they think their rights are not recognized, or, according to Mayo, because they are not being paid attention to. But as for the work itself, the reports of the companies, of management society studies, of the General Motors Company, of the opinion researchers, all indicate employed workers like their jobs because of the pay, because they find the companionship of the work place congenial, because they take pride in what the job demands of them, be-

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cause they identify with the company or the product. Most often when they are unhappy as workers, it is because they have lost their jobs. Even retired workers wistfully turn up at the plant gates for weeks and sometimes months after they depart the payroll to savor the pleasure of being back near the job with their fellows. If stewards and committeemen know what they are talking about, and there is reason to believe they do, because their reports check with the observations of the psychiatrists who must deal professionally with unhappiness, the deep discontents of workers arise not from their relations with their machines, but from their associations with their wives, their children, their parents, their siblings or themselves.

There may somewhere be a record of a strike because of the discontents and the psychological emptiness of the work place, rather than on account of the traditional grievances. but characteristically few company actions produce as much militant protest as the effort to improve the factory milieu by relocating machines, or by injecting meaning (and additional responsibilities) into the operations.

NOVELS AND STORIES dealing essentially with moods in factories themselves tend to rebut the myth of the unhappy worker, even when they claim the factory discontent as their theme, in that work, as the plot develops, has nothing to do with the personal frustrations. Instead the unhappy workers, in reality, are shown as anguished people who very likely would have suffered in the same way (and do in other novels) if they were rentiers or owners of the plant, or advertising coypwriters, or novelists.

What is certainly true, however, is that whether or not there is a grain of validity in the talk about work discontents, their importance is far down the scale toward insignificance when compared with the genuine grievances workers do have because of inadequacies of wages, hours, and conditions of employment, or when compared with the social injustice of the workers' situation in a society that is tilted to serve the appetites of a limited class of owners, rather than the needs of the community.

In summary, the literature about unions in the United States, depending on the point of view of particular authors has said:

- unions are less democratic today than they once were,
- unions have an obligation to be democratic that they are not discharging,
- unions are less militant than they once were,
- union leaders should lead the way to the new society,
- unions have a central role in social change,
- unions are less ideological today than they were in time past,
- unions have exhausted their list of possible economic demands,
- intellectuals no longer have the impact they once had on a labor movement which has grown anti-intellectual,
- unions have a special responsibility to the unhappy workers who perform meaningless tasks in the nation's work places.

False, all false.

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CAN UNIONS BE DEMOCRATIC? SOME ARE!

H. W. Benson

David Carper derides the "fashionable fallacies" of those who "dissent against unions" but he has compiled a bulging anthology of his own. Consider his comments on union democracy.

It is false, all false, he argues, that "unions are less democratic today than they once were." Does he mean to say that unions *are* democratic today? Not particularly. He merely insists that it is naive to think they ever were. What is he driving at? The "dissenter" whom he might convince would simply abandon the notion that unions are *no longer* democratic for the far more drastic one that they *never have been.* All of which would be depressing, if true. But it is false, all false.

Democracy in unions as in society at large, is a matter for constant effort, its forms decay and need to be reestablished. The United Mine Workers which once could boast of a vigorous democracy is now bureaucratized; the International Ladies Garment Workers Union lost the lively democracy that prevailed at least into the post-World War I period. The AFL was once accustomed to spirited debates; now custom prescribes a public unanimity among Federation officials.

In Teamsters Local 107 in Philadelphia, men who opposed a forcible seizure of their union by thugs were beaten with lead pipes. One elected officer, in fear of his life, was physically chased out of his office. In the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, it was a crime (before Landrum-Griffin), subject to expulsion, for a candidate for convention delegate to pass out cards asking for votes. In the International Association of Machinists, A. J. Hayes keeps a Special Trial Board on tap to punish intolerable offenses like passing out handbills.

But union democrats need not seek consolation only in the past. Rival parties exist today in the International Typographical Union. In the Masters, Mates, and Pilots Union where men were expelled nine years ago for passing out leaflets and meeting in caucus, handbills now flutter like confetti. In the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, a newly formed *Better Union Committee* campaigns to invigorate the union's democracy. In the United Auto Workers Union, caucuses have the right to function freely. In the United Federation of Teachers in New York City, a new spirit of democratic and decent unionism has arisen as an example to the labor movement. Union democracy is not the dream of an aloof critic; it is a reality. If he were not so determined to shock his readers, Carper would agree.

RIGHT NOW, however, he brushes all this aside. Democracy, he insists is "irrelevant." What on earth does that mean? Surely he would agree that the differences between the lead-pipe unionism of Teamsters Local 107 and

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the Public Review Board unionism of the UAW are hardly "irrelevant."

Two tool and die makers recently risked expulsion from the IAM to sponsor a resolution for Public Review Boards. There are, literally, hundreds of union reformers who fight in their own unions for the same rights that intelligent UAW members take for granted. Is it all irrelevant, a pointless waste of time? Surely Carper doesn't think so. At any rate, the union reformers certainly don't think so, and in their active "dissent" within their unions they demolish "fallacies" about unionism and defend its good name in their own effective manner.

Apparently Carper cannot see why there should be such a fanfare about democracy in unions when he finds that democracy in general is so rare and elusive. As he puts it:

". . . if it is formal democracy the critics talk about, the devices by which the people who belong to an organization can actually exercise control over it, then the criticism is irrelevant, for this control in unions as in corporations, government, and any multi-membered organization today is impossible and will continue to be until a Thomas Edison of the social sciences comes along and invents mechanisms that do not exist."

This is a sorry business. Critics point out that some dissenting union members have been murdered, others have been beaten; others have been blacklisted; others have been expelled with or without convenient constitutional formalities; others are intimidated into silence. And they add, it doesn't have to be that way; unions should and can be democratic. Carper replies that formal democracy is impossible. The reply, at best, is . . . irrelevant.

"Formal" democracy is "impossible" in, say, Russia. And "impossible" in England, too. Carper would see right through the apologist for tyranny who would whip this notion up into a justification for the suppression of democratic rights. There is a difference between these forms of the "impossible." Vive la difference!

If "formal" democracy is "impossible" in the UAW and in the Teamsters alike, it is enough to demand the "impossible" democracy of the UAW and to fight against the impossible "democracy" of the Teamsters.

Perhaps someone someday will devise a jet-age form of democracy, rich enough in subtleties to satisfy everyone. Fortunately, we need not wait for that ingenious Thomas Edison. We can seek in unions as in government certain tangible rights without which democracy is meaningless: the right to free speech and press; the right to assemble in groups, parties and caucuses; to elect or remove representatives through peaceable, constitutional procedures; rights not simply on paper but in reality. In democratic unions these rights do exist; in undemocratic unions they do not.

CARPER WRITES about nameless dissenters. Who are they? As he describes these anonymous critics, they seem to be persons who imagine that unionism can be decent, democratic, and socially enlightened; measuring unions by this standard, they call for a change. Presumably, they are the radical, socialist intellectuals who still regard unions as an important force for social change, even for socialism. Carper's refutation of their "fallacies" is curious. It is all an illusion, he declaims almost with cynicism; unionism can have none of these virtues; it is childish to make demands upon it. And, to shuck off the nagging dis-

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senter, he portrays unionism in its most crabbed, meager, limited, unattractive form as if this were its natural mode of existence. With such a defender, who needs a hostile critic!

But he is talking to the wind. Most of those he has in mind have vanished or lapsed into silence; they have moved in either of two directions. Some, disenchanted with labor, have abandoned hope in its basic potential. Others, uncomfortably adapted to unions as they are, have become apologists who discover good reasons for bad practices. Without seeming to notice, Carper has assembled a handy compendium of arguments for the justification of both types. That explains the strange mood of his piece; at one and the same time, it seems more critical than the most critical, yet more apologetic than the most apologetic.

What makes this whole discussion of significance are the first signs of a reawakening of union democracy. The task of winning democracy in unions where it is repressed is not the responsibility of the rank and file union reformer alone, nor of the decent union leader alone. It needs the assistance of the democratic-minded community. It requires a bond of moral solidarity between the critical intellectual and the union democrat, a bond that can be re-established in the course of a national discussion on union democracy. But Carper snips away at that link from two sides; he orders the intellectual to mind his own business and he dismisses as irrelevant the goals of the union reformer who strives for democracy.

The dissenter exists to encourage democracy. Where there is anti-democracy in unions, he is a thousand times right to point to it with revulsion. But he has a larger responsibility. Where there is democracy in the union movement he must point to that and sustain and encourage it. One trouble with the dissenter today is not that he criticizes unions but that he has failed to acknowledge democracy where it does arise and to support the fight for its extension by courageous union reformers.

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BOOKS

Albert Camus: The Life of Dialogue

RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, by Albert Camus. Knopf. 272 pp. $4.00.

By comparison with the work of men like Koestler, Silone and Orwell, Albert Camus' writing has always seemed to me somewhat grandiose and porous. He lacked Koestler's capacity for sustained argument, Silone's mixture of humor and humaneness, Orwell's gritty concern for facts. To be sure, Camus never succumbed to the casuistry of the later Koestler or the occasional anti-intellectualism of Orwell; but except for *The Stranger,* his one first-rate novel and his deepest exploration of the problem of nihilism, Camus' work had a disturbing quality: all too often he seemed to be making a speech.

To note these reservations is to do that, and no more; it is surely not to deny that Camus deserved much of the praise that has been rendered him. As a man reflecting upon the life of our time, Camus could be, in his very bewilderment, an enormously sympathetic figure. His mind was not really fecund, like Sartre's, but then he never became infatuated, again like Sartre, with his own dilemmas and agilities. Camus really preferred the truth to everything else, even to his own security as an intellectual. In defense of the values by which he tried to live, he could be properly intransigeant; but he was also ready to bend before the waywardness of impulse, the needs of personal feeling, the claims of the body. Real virtues, and in our time among the greatest a writer could have. But they were virtues that also brought with them two significant weaknesses: a temptation to reduce humanism to a mere literary device and an incapacity to embody his moral sentiments as political ideas.

To some extent, these weaknesses reflect the dilemma of the post-Resistance intellectuals in France who refused to surrender themselves to any total ideology yet felt a need for some principle by which to guide their public life. The hopes nurtured by the Resistance having been so sadly dissipated, they began to fall back upon large and unprovisioned sentiments of fraternity, sentiments without which little else can be worth while but which in themselves seldom lead to concrete realizations in life or art. Perhaps that is one reason Camus' reflections tend to go soft and his fiction seems thin-blooded.

THESE VIEWS were reinforced when I started to read *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death,* a collection of Camus' journalism beginning with war-time statements in behalf of the Resistance, reaching a point of climax in the mag-

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nificent essay denouncing capital punishment, and ending with some recent declarations on the place of the artist in modern society. There is a disconcerting sameness of tone in these articles, a fondness for the glittering epigram and oratorical lilt which seem to belie Camus' claim to be writing from the very edge of despair. In part my objection is simply to the tradition of French journalism, which seems permanently infatuated with operatic grandeur; but in part it raises the more serious problem of the extent to which the moral pronouncement can satisfy a political need.

And here, trying to imagine once again the situations in which Camus had written these overwrought pieces, I had to acknowledge that the force of my objections was not very great. For his journalism makes clear that Camus was not really a "political man," even to the limited extent that Silone is; Camus drove himself to return to journalism whenever he could no longer bear his detachment as an artist, whenever, that is, he suffered too much from the "bad faith" of silence. And recalling these occasions—the Resistance, the post-war struggle in France, the Algerian war, the Hungarian revolution—one is struck (as if it were some sort of discovery!) with the fact that it was the moral response which was the essential one, the moral response which now *became* a kind of politics.

The traditional competition between socialists and liberals, as even at times between socialists and conservatives, had rested on a tacit assumption of *some* shared values as to the needs and nature of man. But in the age of the total state, when this consensus was broken by terror, the first task of radical intellectuals who still believed in human freedom was to articulate the assumptions — assumptions often violated, yet operative as both checks upon evil and inducements to good—which had in the past been at the foundation of the human order. And this Camus did superbly:

> The world I live in is loathsome to me, but I feel at one with the men who suffer in it . . . it seems to me that there is [an] ambition that ought to belong to all writers: to bear witness and shout aloud, every time it is possible, insofar as our talent allows, for those who are enslaved as we are.

And again:

> Yes, the great event of the twentieth century was the forsaking of the values of freedom by the revolutionary movement, the progressive retreat of socialism based on freedom before the attacks of Caesarian and military socialism. Since that moment a certain hope has disappeared from the world and a solitude has begun for each and every man.

The scores of similar passages in Camus' writing testify to the fact that, as far as he could, he helped preserve the idea of freedom in a dark age, and equally important, preserve the idea of human possibility. *As far as he could* —that phrase bulks large at the moment, since these past few decades the dilemma of the democratic left, which Camus shared, has been its inability to move from abstract position to a concrete program and then from a concrete program to an active politics. But this was *our* dilemma: the one we felt to be an essential part of our experience. What Camus, clearly sensing the depth and range of that dilemma, tried meanwhile to do was to keep alive the possibility of a renewed radicalism, with or without the socialist label and vocabulary, for the decades to come.

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In doing this Camus was closer to us, more a true friend and comrade, than the vast bulk of party politicians in Europe who, from sheer inertia or petty advantage, clung to the name of socialism. So far as I know, Camus did not call himself a socialist, though he expressed a strong kinship with the traditions of socialism; but to whom does one feel closer: Camus or Guy Mollet, the chauvinist leader of the French Socialist party? Camus or Ollenhauer, the *klein bürgerlich* leader of the German Social Democracy? For that matter, which leader of the socialist movement in the recent years would have had the humane imagination to compose a pamphlet as profoundly stirring and politically significant as Camus' attack on capital punishment? Norman Thomas, Asoka Mehta, perhaps two or three others . . .

THE INADEQUACY of Camus' journalism in regard to concrete politics demonstrates the power of its moral judgment—for without the latter one would not even think to notice the former. When it came to specific proposals, he shared the troubles of everyone else, and shared them with a modesty that bears recommending both to some of his contemporaries in the intellectual world of Paris and to many of the "politicals" who clung to the socialist word even as they were incompetent to perform a socialist deed. Camus, for example, took a position on Algeria that some of us might at first glance reject: he did not favor unconditional Algerian independence, though he did speak out for Algerian self-determination. He called for an end to the terrorization of civilians by both sides, he proposed an autonomous Algerian community linked to France, he spoke for a restoration of civil freedom and order. Perhaps he was wrong in failing to see that by now it was too late for such proposals: there was no longer any choice but to allow independence to countries like Algeria even if one knew that the leadership of the FLN contained authoritarians and worse, and even if one suspected that an FLN-controlled Algeria would mean the substitution of a new-style dictatorship for old-style colonialism. Perhaps so. But if one goes beyond ready-made "positions" and tries to think about the realities of the Algerian tragedy, then one may be a little more respectful of Camus' opinion, even if still supposing him to be mistaken. He spoke on this subject, as on all others, with that good faith, that commitment to human freedom, which is the essential requirement for modern politics. That the essential is sometimes not the sufficient, is something else again.

To the political life of our time Camus contributed two simple ideas. He kept urging that the traditional ideologies had become bulwarks of misconception and pretexts for a refusal to communicate; he urged people to *talk* to each other, those who really cared about socialism and freedom; he was impatient with dialectics, ideologies and positions. That he was not entirely right in saying all this I have tried to indicate, but anyone familiar with the congealing of traditional leftist opinion in France knows he was primarily right.

And then Camus understood the primacy of the idea of liberty in this age. He was not the kind of intellectual who would sacrifice, in behalf of fidelista rhetoric, his fidelity to the idea of liberty; he was not the kind of intellectual who could be swerved by production statistics, the rapture of mass meetings, and the lure of rising power. Time and again, one comes

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across passages that are entirely unoriginal—they could have appeared in DISSENT often enough—passages so simple and unambiguous and good that one is tempted to cut them out and mail them to Professor C. Wright Mills:

> The first thing to define totalitarian society, whether of the Right or of the Left, is the single party, and the single party has no reason to destroy itself. This is why the only society capable of evolution and liberalization, the only one that deserves both our critical and our active support is the society that involves a plurality of parties as part of its structure. It alone allows one to denounce, hence to correct, injustice and crime. It alone allows one to denounce torture, disgraceful torture, as contemptible in Algiers as in Budapest.

Utterly familiar; but it goes to the heart of things. Finishing *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death* I felt that whatever its limitations it was the work of a man with whom one could live: that is, live the life worth having, the life of dialogue.

IRVING HOWE

Aliens in Their Own Land

THE ALIENATED VOTER, by Murray B. Levin. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. (Paper) $1.25.

Political poll-takers have asked the American people many questions in their years of investigation, but seldom have they tried to find out what the American people think about politics in its everyday form. Do they believe that today's politics is good or bad? Do they believe that it works and that it is useful? Do they believe that politicians are honest or dishonest? These questions are significant just because they are simple, because they reflect the way people think or react to politics and because it is from such fundamental reactions that their specific attitudes emerge. What does it signify to discover the opinion of a citizen on issue X or politician Y if the citizen's general view of politics is that neither issues nor politicians matter since they are crooked, useless, and . . . and a lot of other unprintable things.

The truth may be unpalatable, but one political scientist has now taken his IBM cards in hand and shuffled them to ask such questions. Professor Murray Levin's *The Alienated Voter* studies the reactions of Boston voters to the mayoralty campaign of 1959 and the results are shocking and even lurid. It turns out that the citizens of Boston—admittedly a discouraged and tired lot—are not only convinced that politicians are crooked but that politics is totally hopeless. The result is alienation on a colossal scale.

Levin's *The Alienated Voter* is an important book which transcends the narrow confines of its subject. It demonstrates concretely and soberly that politics for those who live in cities is what is done to them. The "citizen" may not be an immigrant but he is an alien, literally alien, because he is, or thinks he is, divorced from the political life of the city. But it is not

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just that he has no sense of participation. More important, he is, so to speak, actively alienated because he *knows* he is alien and is sore about it. Therefore he actively fears and scorns politicians and politics.

These strangers react to politics simply. Their main aim, given their assumption that politics is dirty, is to avoid being gypped. In the 1959 mayoralty campaign Senator John Powers was assumed to be the victor before the election and yet was roundly defeated by a relative unknown, John F. Collins. Why? Simply put, the voters were voting their disgust with politicians. Powers was an important politician; he looked like a politician, he had all the powers that be on his side and he spent a great deal of money. He was, even down to his name, a perfect target. Collins, not as naive as he looked, zeroed in. (His slogan was, "End Power Politics.") But the analysis of the attitudes of the voters to the election showed that they were *not* voting for Collins, but against Powers and all that he represented. The vote was a simple expression of the desire of the electorate to get even with the "pols."

THE MATERIAL in this book demonstrating the thesis of alienation is fascinating as illustrative of the verbal *graffiti* of city life. Thus to the question of what did you like least about Powers? the answers ranged from a belief that he was tied-up with unsavory elements, a disapproval of his association with too many important people, a dislike of his campaign because it was too big, to a general but undefined antagonism towards his personality. More important were the instinctive responses to Powers; the voters reacted to him simply and directly by saying they didn't like his voice, that there was something about his eyes, that they didn't like his tough ugly looks, or the fact that he was fat, that he looked crooked, that he looked "icky," etc. But, and this is the most astounding and important fact of all, even fewer of those who voted for Collins thought he would be a better mayor than those who voted for Powers!

In short, issues, as Levin shows, were of small importance; the electorate's view of the candidate's personality was the main determinant, and the most significant factor in deciding how people would judge personality was their vision of Boston as run by the pols., for the pols., and their desire to strike back at an outstanding representative of the pols.

SUCH IS BOSTON politics. Is what is true of Boston true of other cities? Professor Levin indicates that it is. But like any good book, *The Alienated Voter* raises more questions than it settles. Is alienation typical of state and national elections? Is alienation the result of the facts of American politics today or a condition of man in a mass society, regardless of the state of politics?

Professor Levin also poses a devastating question for the liberal concept of government and democracy, the idea, it should be recalled, that men act rationally in making political decisions. Do they in Boston? No.

They do not because, as this book shows, dwellers of Boston are people who are out-of-touch with those who rule them. As aliens in their own land —is it their own land?—they simply have no basis for rational judgment except for one rational judgment—that the pols. are what everyone knows they are. But the trouble with that rational judgment is that it is a dead-

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end judgment. It leads nowhere except back to alienation. Therefore, the liberal vision of a citizenry *thinking* about political problems is replaced by the ugly reality—and it is ugly, just as ugly as the city it comes from—of aliens reacting blindly and furiously and instinctively against those who have had them.

WILLIAM J. NEWMAN

In the Name of Truth

WEEKEND IN DINLOCK, by Clancy Sigal. Houghton Mifflin Co. 197 pages, 1960. $3.00.

THE WAR IN ALGERIA, by Jules Roy. Grove Press. An Evergreen Target Book. 128 pages, 1961. Paperback, 75 cents.

Here are two books—neither very large—both fitting quite easily into the pocket of one's jacket. Both deal with worlds far removed one from the other, and equally apart from our own world: in one case, *Weekend in Dinlock*, a miners' village in Yorkshire, England; in the other, the most murderous and long-drawn-out nationalist war of our time. Yet, despite this difference, I feel drawn to reviewing them together, to urging the reader to read them if not simultaneously then at least close to one another. Why? Because both clearly come out of an intense search for the truth, out of a desire to see things clearly, with precision and honesty. If the tone of both books is the tone of compassion, the trap of the sentimental fallacy is skirted because of each author's competence and knowledgeability. Clancy Sigal knows what he is talking about; Jules Roy grasps every side of the Algerian tragedy. Thus, both writers have produced works of superior political journalism often bordering on imaginative writing at its best.

Clancy Sigal, a young American writer has written, among other things, a first-class account of the American air force in Britain and some provocative studies of young London delinquents. Here he has written an account of two visits, separated by six months, to Dinlock, an imaginary coal-mining village in Yorkshire. In Dinlock he stays with a young miner friend who is also a talented, "natural" artist. *Weekend in Dinlock* presents the village, its people, their way of life with compassion and understanding. For this alone it is an exceptional example of documentary writing. But Sigal goes beyond this. The reader is drawn deeply by the spiritual drama of Davie, the young miner-artist who cannot tear himself away from the mine and whose very awkwardness in expressing his feelings about his life, his wife and family, his friends and Sigal himself, reveals the complex emotional web of Dinlock life. The power of the book — I am tempted to call it a novel—is measured by the tension set up between its author and young Davie. No doubt it is intended that way, and the final scene—confrontation, rather—is set in Dinlock's mine. Let me cite a passage written after Sigal has watched the colliers at work for an entire day.

> But the more I watch the more I see that to be a competent collier requires a substantial degree of both intelligence and skill. For one

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thing, the collier, unlike most industrial workers, actually plans his own work; it is he and he alone who is the ultimate judge of how a particular wall or shelf shall be attacked. At the face he is designer, organizer and executor in a task which must involve all the imperatives of production, schedule, personal idiosyncrasies and mood, the ever-changing grain of the face itself and the nuances of safety for himself and his comrades. The need to know how to handle his pick in such a way as to reduce a wall of coal four feet six inches deep by four feet six inches high by eight yards, the structure and consistency of whose mass can change from hour to hour, to a pile of coal rubble, of the required chunk sizes, weighing 17 tons in such a way as not to endanger the safety of himself and his mates nor impede the production total of his or the following shift, having in many cases to allow for the failures of the previous shift to properly prepare the coal face, and doing this on shifts of seven hours or more each day in team combinations which can change from week to week so that he may never be able to plan a sane personal existence, and knowing that this is the way it will be for the duration of his natural working life, this requires a fine and well-paced paying out of sheer brain power unmatched by almost any industrial operation I know. For, in the last resort, the collier at the face knows that he, and he alone, is responsible for his quota. No excuses, in his own or his mates' eyes, justifies less than his quota. He is uniquely responsible.

•

So many tears I shed, but you did not cry.
I know why now. I am a stranger here.

—Berber song of Kabylia

Algerian independence can no longer be held off, no matter what doubts one may have as to the regime that will come. Small though it may be alongside the accumulated suffering the war has piled up over the years, there has come out of this war a store of writing and literature that will not be forgotten. I am thinking of Germaine Tillion's writings, of the Algerian playwright and novelist, Kateb Yacine, whose Faulknerian novel, *Nedjma,* has just been published in English. To this list there now ought to be added Jules Roy's beautiful account of his return to his native land in the summer of 1960.

Jules Roy, a third-generation French-Algerian, novelist, playwright and former pilot in the French Air Force, does not discuss the big battles or the political maneuverings on top. He writes of his family and his friends, of Algerian villages caught in the war, of a night patrol along the Algerian-Tunisian border, of conversations with French officers, Algerian refugees in Tunisia, of people involved on both sides of a pitiless struggle. His book emerges unquestionably as the most moving condemnation of the French in Algeria and the finest explanation of what the struggle is about. His objectivity and preciseness are fired by a righteous anger. This is a personal document; the writing is superb and the translation does it justice. I believe Jules Roy's book had a great importance in bringing the French to realize that their struggle to keep Algeria was hopeless and that independence must come. Here is why:

> Toward noon we reached a third village which, I was told, was a privileged one. I was assured it had not suffered excessively from repressions and exactions, nor known the great emigrations of terror, the flux and reflux of families. The men and children waved at us, but the women's glances were heavy

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with suspicion, and some openly turned their backs. Several—motionless terra-cotta statues—seemed not to see us, their eyes fixed and empty.

What anguish lay concealed there? There was no need to ask. For me, a village that had not suffered too much or that no longer suffered was one where men came out of their houses to wave at the soldiers. The men have their reasons, I suppose—often too many and too good. They are the ones who are watched, on whom the suspicion falls; they are the ones who are jailed or tortured, and who must choose their attitude. They are, of course, cowardly and forgetful, like all men; anxious for their own safety, their politics are sometimes deceitful. On the women's faces, tears have worn channels like gutters in eroded earth. What griefs have they silently endured? They incarnate the memory of insults inflicted in their person upon life. Everything that touches their home consoles or wounds them. They do not betray, nor do they forgive. More easily than one supposes, the men sell their brothers, giving ten times more information than is expected of them. A mere argument with someone of higher rank, a whim, an impulse of jealousy sometimes persuades them to change sides and even to change back later on, when remorse or new fears torment them.

But not the women who are incapable of subterfuge, except in love.

S. P.

CORRECTION:

In Norman Birnbaum's article on the British Labor Party in the last issue of DISSENT, reference is made to an essay of Mr. Birnbaum's as appearing in the December 1960 issue of *Commentary*, under the title of "Ideology and Actuality in Britain." The essay referred to, however, appeared in the February 1961 issue, and was titled "Empiricism and British Politics."— ED.

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